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ABSTRACT
Classical logic and a given nonclassical logic are, by definition, incompatible
in some sense. In some cases, this incompatibility is innocuous. In other cases,
the nonclassical logic is incompatible with classical logic on a fundamental level,
such that the two logics can be seen as rival theories of logical entailment and
only one of them can succeed. I will explore the structure of these cases of
logical rivalry by considering three examples: Dummett’s antirealism, Putnam’s
response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vagueness.
I will show that, despite the differences between these cases’ motivations and
methods, they nevertheless all conform to a particular framework in challeng-
ing classical logic. Moreover, these diverse cases all characterize classical logic
as the result of an unwarranted generalization from a limited and apparently
privileged realm of entailment.
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINING RIVALRY
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
Given two logics, there is an excellent chance that they will disagree on the va-
lidity of at least one inference. Some cases of “disagreement” will be entirely
uninteresting; e.g.,
ϕ
ϕ will be valid in S5 and not in classical logic, but this
inference is invalid in classical logic because  is not a logical constant in that
system. In these uninteresting cases, we can explain away the disagreement
somehow, perhaps by noting that that the logics differ in scope, as in this ex-
ample, or by noting that the two logics are the result of two different projects,
as would be the case if we compared S5 to a deontic logic. Each way of differen-
tiating scopes and projects describes a new standard against which to judge a
logic. So if we define a logic in general as a theory of entailment, then we might
describe S5 more specifically as a theory of entailment involving necessity, and
we would judge it according to how well it captures this limited case of en-
tailment. We would not fault it for failing to capture entailment involving, say,
obligation. These uninteresting cases are not considered cases of conflict just
because we hold the logics to two different standards, where these standards
are partially determined by the logics’ projects and scopes. In this way, we ex-
plain away any substantive disagreement between the logics in such cases. The
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core concept of my project will be that of logical rivalry, which arises when
disagreement between two logics cannot be explained away, and so one of the
logics must fail as a theory of logical entailment.
Cases of rivalry involve philosophical positions that claim to show that clas-
sical logic is flawed and endorse a rival logic in place of classical logic. I suggest
that, given such a position, the force of its challenge to classical logic is indi-
cated by the severity of the incompatibility between classical logic the position’s
endorsed rival logic. This method may not be a rigorous way of quantifying the
strength of a challenge to classical logic, but I do think that it allows us to de-
termine which challenges present the greatest threat to classical logic’s being
a successful theory of logical entailment. In the course of this project, I will
consider three such challenges to classical logic: Dummett’s antirealism, Put-
nam’s response to results of quantum mechanics, and Tye’s response to vague-
ness. Each advocates our abandoning classical logic in favor of a rival logic—
intuitionistic logic in the first case, three-valued logic in the second, and quan-
tum logic in the third. Yet each challenge attacks classical logic’s status as a
theory of logical entailment on a different basis: Dummett claims that it fails
to respect truth, Tye claims that it fails to respect the existence of vague sets,
and quantum logic claims that it fails to respect physical reality. I will conclude
that, despite these differences, all employ the same core objection to classical
logic: that it is the result of an unwarranted generalization from some core set
of inferences to the set of all inferences. Because I am analyzing the structure
of these challenges, rather than their success or failure, I will be using relatively
old sources for each of these. As we will see, the structure of these challenges
and their characterization of classical logic remains the same throughout their
2
history, despite changes to supporting elements of the argument in responses
to objections and other developments. Dummett’s later work in particular has
become especially complex as he has responded to criticism, but his basic chal-
lenge remains the same as when it was stated more simply in earlier work.
In this chapter, I will present a formal definition of rivalry between classical
first-order logic and an arbitrary nonclassical first-order logic. In the process of
doing so, I will specify a formal language in which to express the logics and a
translation function between the formal language and a natural language. I will
define rivalry as an incompatibility between the classical and nonclassical log-
ics’ entailment relations. I will also examine three other arguments in the litera-
ture that describe similar types of incompatibility—logical pluralism, alternate
translation functions, and the problem of logical constants—and suggest that
rivalry is a more fundamental kind of incompatibility than any of them.
That said, rivalry faces a sweeping objection. In ordinary language, when
two apparently identical tokens of a word are used in significantly different
ways, we conclude that the two “tokens” are actually instances of two differ-
ent meanings of a given word. When we determine this, we write off any aris-
ing conflict as mere verbal disagreement. One may object that the same thing
happens with rivalry. If an inference is valid in classical logic but not in the rival
logic under investigation, then the logical constants appearing in that inference
are used differently in the two logics. Since any logic is a formal system, albeit
an interpreted one, any such difference in usage is significant, and so rivalry
also reduces to a verbal disagreement.
In my second chapter, I will investigate and respond to this objection, in-
cluding three specific instances of this objection due to Carnap, Quine, and
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Davidson. Each of these instances claim that the meaning of a logical constant
is exhausted by its use. To show that this claim fails, I will use Gödel’s negative
translation of the intuitionistic connectives to define connectives that would
each be used in the same way as a corresponding classical constant, yet have a
meaning different from that classical constant. I will apply this result to each of
the three specific objections, and thus clear the way for my project to proceed.
As mentioned above, my project will examine the challenges to classical
logic by Dummett, Putnam, and Tye. Dummett’s challenge is most deserving
of special attention and will be the centerpiece of my dissertation. His position
is notoriously dense and occasionally obscure; but, out of all three challenges,
his position arguably offers the most robust philosophical underpinning for the
resulting rival logic. His philosophy of language, which forms the foundation
for his rival logic, involves our generalizing from a core set of inferences to a
larger set of inferences. However, his explanation of this mechanism is unclear,
which is problematic for me, because I want to make clear his claim that clas-
sical logic arises from a misguided application of this mechanism.
My third and fourth chapters will be devoted to Dummett’s position. In my
third chapter, I will attempt to elucidate his position, while highlighting its rele-
vance to my project and offering several criticisms and small corrections. In my
fourth chapter, I will offer an amended version of his position, which will ad-
dress the problem of unclear generalization described above. This revision will
be my attempt to maintain as much of his original challenge as possible while
making changes that Dummett would accept. In a sense, this will not be a new
version of his position, but rather an adaptation of his position to my project.
In my fifth and final chapter, I will describe how the amended version of
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Dummett’s challenge characterizes classical logic as the result of unwarranted
generalization from a core set of inferences. I will then turn my attention to
vagueness and quantum logic. In each case, I will describe the challenge, spec-
ify the way in which it employs generalization of inferences, and give an ac-
count of how one could argue that classical logic may arise from misapplica-
tion of that generalization. I will then investigate the implications of these chal-
lenges’ sharing a core characterization of classical logic, and suggest future di-
rections for research.
1.2 DEFINING RIVALRY
Rivalry will be a formal incompatibility between two logics’ entailment rela-
tions. A description of this relationship, which will require a rigorous definition
of a logic, will include an explicit mentioning of its entailment relation that will
represent an attempt to capture entailment as it appears in natural language. I
will first define a single formal language to be employed by all the logics we dis-
cuss. After using this formal language as the basis for an uninterpreted system,
I will discuss a translation function between the natural and formal languages
that will allow us to interpret the system as a full-fledged logic. Finally, I define
the relationship of rivalry between two such logics.
1.2.1 The Formal Language
Let F be a set of formulas built from a set of symbols F. We will identify the
formal language described above with the set F. Call F the vocabulary of the
language F. F will contain all and only the strings of symbols of F that are well-
formed—the wffs—as defined by rules for the use of the members of F. Shortly,
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we will divide the symbols of F into categories according to the rules for their
use. One reason we do this is because natural language operates in this way:
In simple cases, nouns are words that name objects; verbs are words that oper-
ate on nouns to form sentences; adjectives operate on nouns to produce noun
phrases, which verbs can operate on; adverbs operate on verbs to produce verb
phrases, which can themselves operate on nouns or noun phrases to produce
sentences. Since the whole point of formal logic is to see how the structure of
a sentence contributes to its logical properties, we want the sentences of F to
have expressive power similar to sentences of English. It would be wholly unin-
formative, for example, if F contained only sentence letters for every sentence
of English.
We can categorize all the symbols in F by describing the kind of symbol(s)
they operate on and what kind of symbol each one produces. To do this, we
first define a set Syn that will serve as a set of indices for subsets of F. We will
define Syn inductively:
(i) N ∈ Syn
(ii) 〈τ,〈σ1, . . . ,σn〉〉 ∈ Syn iff τ ∈ Syn and σi ∈ Syn for all σi
Syn will have no other members. For the sake of convenience, we often ab-
breviate 〈σ1, . . . ,σn〉 as σ¯. We call the members of Syn syntactic indices. The
indices defined in (i) are the basic syntactic indices; all other members of Syn
are derived syntactic indices.
Every member of F is assigned exactly one syntactic index. Basic syntactic
indices will be assigned to sentence letters and constant symbols, at minimum.
We may assign basic syntactic indices to other symbols if it suits our purposes.
Derived syntactic indices will be assigned to symbols based on the rules for
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those symbols’ use. Suppose f is a member of F and is assigned a derived syn-
tactic index, say, 〈τ,〈σ0,σ1〉〉. The number τ is the syntactic index of the string
of symbols produced by f . The pair 〈σ0,σ1〉 indicates the syntactic indices of
the symbols upon which f operates in the following way: f can operate on any
two symbols that each produce symbols of syntactic index σ0 and σ1, respec-
tively. For example, if sentences and constants are assigned the indices 0 and
1, respectively, then two-place predicates will be assigned the index 〈0,〈1,1〉〉,
indicating that they can produce a sentence by operating on two constant sym-
bols.1
I will adopt the existing convention of writing the syntactic index 〈τ, σ¯〉 as
τ/σ¯. Also, when discussing some arbitrary syntactic index τ/σ¯, this should be
understood to range over the basic syntactic indices also, in which case σ¯ would
be empty. These two notational conventions reflect Ajdukiewicz’s original way
of “cancelling out” syntactic indices, as one does with fractions, to determine
whether a given expression was well-formed (see Ajdukiewicz 1961, §5). Let
Fτ/σ¯ be the set of all the symbols of F with syntactic index τ/σ¯. We call the set
Fτ/σ¯ a syntactic category of F. Since each member of F has exactly one syntactic
index, the syntactic categories form a partition of F.
We are constructing F in such a way that its wffs will have this categorical
structure, just as grammatical sentences of English do. Some may object that
the structure of English words’ operations is more complicated than allowed
for in the definition of Syn. For example, Lambek suggests that the location
of operands matters for certain words in English (see Lambek 1958). So while
1Note that we do not require that two-place predicates produce a sentence only by operating
on two constant symbols. Two-place predicates’ syntactic index of 〈0,〈1,1〉〉 indicates that they
can operate on any symbol with a basic syntactic index of 1 or a derived syntactic index of
the form 〈1,〈σ1, . . . ,σn〉〉; i.e., any symbol that is a constant or names an object through some
operation.
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poor operates on a noun to produce another noun, poor John is well-formed
while John poor is not. If we must describe the location of an English expres-
sion’s operands as well as their syntactic indices, then we must add that infor-
mation to our definition of syntactic indices for F. Another argument for En-
glish’s grammar outrunning this structure is due to Lewis, who has argued that
we need to draw a distinction between names and common nouns in English,
so we cannot speak of one basic syntactic category of “terms” in F (see Lewis
1972).
There is no need to address these concerns here. If one were convinced by
Lambek, we could have the odd-numbered positions of the sequence σ¯ corre-
spond to left-hand operands and the even-numbered positions of the sequence
σ¯ correspond to right-hand operands. If one were convinced by Lewis, we could
easily make use of another basic index of Syn. I am not asserting that the way
I have outlined is the correct way to partition F—this would require far more
knowledge of linguistics than I possess—but rather to illustrate a plausible way
of doing so.
1.2.2 Logical Frameworks
We can now turn our attention to constructing the formal systems around F
that we will later interpret to form a logic.
Let  be a two-place relation between subsets of the formal language F, and
D be a nonempty subset of the vocabulary F. We will call a structure of the form〈
F,,D
〉
a logical framework, given that  conforms to certain restrictions that
will be described below.
Given a logical framework, the set D will be the set of logical constant sym-
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bols for that structure and will be called its dialect. For example, classical first-
order logic’s dialect is {∨ ,∧ ,→ ,¬ ,∀, ∃ }; modal logic’s dialect is {∨ ,∧ ,→ ,¬ ,,
♦,∀, ∃ }.2
Eventually, the relation  will be interpreted as a given logic’s attempt to
capture our ordinary notion of logical entailment. Knowing this, will be called
an entailment relation. Note that  is a relation that holds between subsets of
F, rather than holding between a subset and a formula. The entailment relation
is characterized this way so we will have the option to more easily compare
logical entailment with proof-theoretic and model-theoretic entailment. In the
former case, logical entailment can hold between two sets of sentences as de-
fined by the terms of a sequent calculus. In the latter case, we can require that
the conclusion of any inference be a singleton.
Not just any relation qualifies as an entailment relation. We require that
whenever any valid inference’s nonlogical symbols are uniformly replaced by
other appropriate nonlogical symbols, the resulting inference is also valid. Be-
cause this is something we require of all logics, we establish this requirement
at the level of logical frameworks: Suppose ϕ ∈ F and let D be a set of logical
constants. If λ : F→ F, λ will be a D-morphism just in case λ(ϕ) is the result
of substituting all occurrences of a given symbol in ϕ with another symbol of
the same syntactic category, while any occurrence of a member of D in ϕ is left
2One last note on terminology: the word language is used in various ways in the literature.
In creating a theory of arithmetic with the Robinson’s axioms, for example, the tuple 〈s,+,<,0〉
may be referred to as the “language of arithmetic.” Its purpose is to specify which nonlogical
symbols will be used with the usual symbols of first-order logic to generate the wffs of arith-
metic. One can see from this that this use of language assumes which symbols are considered
logical. We can also speak of a “first-order language,” where we are just specifying which sym-
bols are the logical constants. In either case, language is being used to specify the logical terms
or to specify the nonlogical terms. My use of formal language is an attempt to avoid this dis-
tinction and allow each logic to determine which symbols of the formal language will be treated
logically. These symbols are that logic’s unique way of interpreting the formal language, and are
thus that logic’s dialect.
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unchanged.3 Let Λ be the set of all D-morphisms. For any set A = {α1, . . . ,αn },
let λ(A)= {λ(α1), . . . ,λ(αn) }. The relation  will be an entailment relation, and
thus L = 〈F,,D〉 will be a logical framework, just in case the following two
restrictions hold:
 Φ =⇒ ∀λ∈Λ
(
 λ(Φ)
)
Γ Φ =⇒ ∀λ∈Λ
(
λ(Γ) λ(Φ)
)
1.2.3 The Translation Function
Since logical entailment is a relation that holds between sets of statements of
English, and a logic will be ordering statements of a formal language, we must
define a translation function between the two languages. Let E be a set of gram-
matical statements of disambiguated English.4 Since a theory of logical entail-
ment will simultaneously be a theory of how truth behaves with respect to the
3Here is a more precise definition of D -morphisms: Let ϕ be a formula of F. The formula ϕ
is a string of symbols of the vocabulary F, built up according to the syntactic categories of those
symbols. Let ϕ¯ be the sequence of these symbols in the order in which they appear in ϕ. Let
len(ϕ) be the length of ϕ¯ and pii be the projection function that will map ϕ¯ to the i th member
of ϕ¯. Then λ is a D -morphism just in case all the following hold:
(i) λ : F→ F
(ii) len(ϕ¯)= len(λ(ϕ¯))
(iii) ∀i 1≤i≤len(ϕ¯)
(
pii (λ(ϕ¯))=
{
pii (ϕ¯) if pii (ϕ¯) ∈D
α ∈ Fτ/σ¯ otherwise, where pii (ϕ¯) ∈ Fτ/σ¯
)
(iv) ∀j i< j≤len(ϕ¯)
(
pii (ϕ¯)=pi j (ϕ¯) → pii (λ(ϕ¯))=pi j (λ(ϕ¯))
)
The third condition describes how λ will substitute only the nonlogical constants of a formula,
where the set of nonlogical constants is relative to the logic L . The fourth condition ensures
that λ will do this uniformly.
4The function described below will translate from disambiguated English to the formal lan-
guage. From this description alone, it should be clear that ordinary English will require quite a
bit of cleaning up before passing muster as “disambiguated English.”
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logical constants, the sentences of E must be those expressions of English that
can possess a truth value.5 Interjections and non-rhetorical questions, for ex-
ample, will not appear in E.6
For my purposes, I do not want to use translation functions from English
sentences to their schemata. Rather, we will require that a translation function
be one-to-one. I also want a translation function to have a certain respect, so
to speak, for the links between the sentences of E: which predicates are rep-
resented by which symbols of F, whether or not a particular name has already
been assigned a constant symbol, etc. For example, the stipulation that a trans-
lation function be one-to-one is enough to ensure that the sentences
• If Alice loves Alice then Bill loves Alice
• If Alice loves Alice then Carl loves Alice
will have distinct images. But we also want the translations to reflect the fact
that the antecedents of the sentences are the same. So we require that the trans-
lation function use the same string of symbols to represent the antecedents in
these sentences’ images. A translation function that does this will be called a
linkage-preserving translation function.
Ideally, our translation function would be transparent: if e ∈ E, ϕ ∈ F, and
ρ is a transparent linkage-preserving translation function where ρ : e 7→ϕ, then
ϕ should have as many symbols as e has words, and the syntactic categories of
the symbols of ϕ should be the same as the syntactic categories of the words
5To avoid a charge of question-begging against certain challenges to classical logic, the can
used here should not be interpreted as implying that all sentences of E actually have a truth
value.
6These are just examples of expressions that will not be in E, not an exhaustive list. As we will
see, the decision of what sentence “can possess a truth value” dictates which sentences belong
in E, and thus what theory of logical entailment we ought to adopt.
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of e to the greatest extent possible. The translation function we choose will
not fulfill these conditions in all cases, however. For example, E will contain
sentences involving second-order quantification; since we are studying rivals
to classical logic—a first-order theory—F will contain only first-order quanti-
fiers. So there are no symbols of F with a syntactic index correlating to the way
second-order quantifiers are used in English. In such cases, ρ will map second-
order-quantified English sentences to zero-place predicates of F.
It will also be convenient to require that linkage-preserving translation func-
tions be onto. Doing so requires our paying attention to what formulas we want
to have in F, since a linkage-preserving translation function’s being onto means
that its inverse is defined for all formulas in F. But this will be unintuitive be-
cause there are formulas in F that cannot be expressed as sentences of English
as we ordinarily speak it. We have defined Syn and F in such a way that there is
an infinite number of syntactic indices; a slight modification in the above def-
inition would allow for an infinite number of syntactic categories.7 Moreover,
we have not placed any limit on the length of the wffs of F, although it seems
reasonable to dictate that they be of finite length. So there may be an infinite
number of wffs of F and F may contain arbitrarily long wffs of finite length. We
call F maximal if it has such a structure. We call E maximal just in case there is
a one-to-one correspondence between it and F, where F is maximal.
If F is maximal, and if ρ is one-to-one and onto, then ρ would commit us to
the existence of some very strange expressions of English. E would contain sen-
tences that we never could express because they would be interminably long,
7Above, syntactic categories were defined with respect to the syntactic indices of the symbols
of F. So there were only as many syntactic categories as there were syntactic indices actually
assigned to symbols of F. Instead, we could dictate that there is a syntactic category for every
syntactic index.
12
practically speaking. Certain sentences of E would contain practically unus-
able words whose rules for their grammatical usage would reflect the incredible
complexity of the syntactic indices of their correlates in F.
This situation seems to cry out for our rejecting F’s being maximal. But sup-
pose we were to reject F’s being maximal. In order to justify the restriction,
we would need to describe E as some well-defined set of useful sentences of
English and then stipulate that F be just strong enough to capture those sen-
tences. For example, we could define E as containing only those expressions
of English that are actually truth-bearing. Such a definition would be ambigu-
ous, of course. We would need to specify that we were referring to all sentences
that had been spoken prior to a particular time by a particular population in
a particular language defined by experts to be English. Suppose that, once we
made this specification, we would have a well-defined set of sentences. Any
satisfactory theory of logical entailment would need to describe how logical en-
tailment behaved in these sentences. We will call E minimal if it contains only
our actual truth-bearing expressions of English, given a fixed definition of what
constitutes our “actual” truth-bearing expressions of English. Call F minimal
just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between it and E, where E is
minimal.
It now seems that we have two conflicting instincts. On the one hand, we do
not want F to be maximal because doing so would place many more sentences
in E than we need to analyze our ordinary concept of logical entailment. On
the other hand, we do not want E to be minimal. If it were, our theory of log-
ical entailment would apply only to those sentences; it could not speak to the
validity of any inferences spoken after the fixed point (unless, of course, some-
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one was just repeating previously-spoken sentences in an inference). We do not
want to discuss the validity of inferences including only actual sentences, but
the validity of inferences involving possible sentences also.
This conflict suggests that we make some decision on the membership of E
such that E will be neither minimal nor maximal. I want to resist this sugges-
tion. Any expansion of E that is meant to include the “possible” truth-bearing
expressions of English, short of making E maximal, would involve labelling cer-
tain grammatical expressions of English as “impossible.”8 Any such distinction
seems arbitrary. Although our notion of possibility here is ambiguous, the real
problem is that it is not obvious how we ought to justify our claim that some ex-
pression is possible but not actual. There is a fact of the matter as to whether or
not a given expression is actual: whether or not it had been expressed in accor-
dance with the parameters given by our specification of “actuality.” There does
not seem to be a similar fact to justify any given possible/impossible distinction
over another.
In the absence of a way to adjudicate between the extensions of the minimal
version of E, I believe we ought to use a maximal version of E. Doing so allows
us to avoid arbitrary decisions of what concept of possibility is relevant to our
purposes. By making E maximal, we are considering every possible extension of
the minimal version of E. Also, making E maximal allows us to make F maximal,
which simplifies the project because we need not worry about restricting the
length of the wffs of F, or the complexity of the syntactic indices corresponding
8Note that the phrase possible truth-bearing expressions of English does not mean the same
as possibly truth-bearing expressions of English. The “possible truth-bearing expressions of En-
glish” are the truth-bearing expressions of English that are contingently expressible. If we iden-
tified E with this set, we would exclude those sentences that are truth-bearing but were im-
possible to express. The “possibly truth-bearing expressions of English” are the truth-bearing
expressions of English that are contingently truth-bearing. If we identified E with this set, we
would exclude those sentences to which it is impossible to assign a truth value.
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to syntactic categories, etc. In what follows, little will actually depend on the
decision to have E be maximal; when things do, it will be noted.9
Now, finally, we can define a logic. Given some logical framework L=
〈
F,,D
〉
and some linkage-preserving translation function ρ, a logicL will be identified
with the structure
〈
ρ,L
〉
.
Note that  is still not identified with either model-theoretic consequence
or proof-theoretic consequence, even in the presence of a translation function
interpreting the logical framework. Both of these are formal notions explaining
why it would be the case that Γ ϕ. That the logical entailment relation is dis-
tinct from the proof-theoretic consequence relation should be obvious. Distin-
guishing logical entailment from model-theoretic consequence requires justifi-
cation because the entailment relation has been shown to be equivalent to the
relation of model-theoretic validity under certain circumstances. Specifically, it
has been shown that
Γ ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ ϕ,
given that the language of Γ and ϕ is rich enough to express elementary num-
ber theory (Quine 1986, 53–55).10 Despite this, I will not identify logical en-
tailment with model-theoretic validity because we have not established that E
is rich enough to express elementary number theory. E’s being maximal was a
simplifying assumption, not an established fact.
9It will be interesting, later on, to discuss whether Dummett would claim that our problem
was that E should not have been made maximal; i.e., that we should not be investigating logical
entailment between sentences that cannot realistically be expressed (in the context of canonical
application). Or whether Dummett’s claim is that E erroneously counts certain expressions as
truth-bearing. Or both.
10Quine’s notion of substitutional validity discussed in this reference is not exactly the same as
my definition of the entailment relation. However, I think we can define a translation between
the two by positing a further language whose wffs are ordered according to Quine’s substitu-
tional validity, and a many-to-one translation function mapping wffs of F onto their schemes in
the new language.
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1.2.4 Rivalry and Restricted Entailment
My project involves rivalry between classical and nonclassical logics, not be-
tween arbitrary logics. Going forward, I will refer to rivalry and rival logics with-
out including this qualification.
Let classical logic be represented byLc and its framework by Lc, whereLc =〈
ρ,Lc
〉
and Lc =
〈
F,c,Dc
〉
. To define rivalry, we will use Dc-morphisms—a
specific instance of the general idea of D-morphisms defined above—to define
a restriction on the entailment relation of some nonclassical logic Ln. Let Λc
be the set of all Dc-morphisms. We will say that Γnc Φ iff both the following
obtain:
(i) Γn Φ
(ii) ∀λ∈Λc
(
λ(Γ)n λ(Φ)
)
Suppose Lx is a logic, where Lx =
〈
ρ,Lx
〉
and Lx =
〈
F,x,Dx
〉
. Note that Lc
andLx share the same formal language and translation function, and that they
both have exactly one entailment relation. If any of these structural elements
differed between the logics, it would indicate that the two logics employ differ-
ent methods for formalizing pretheoretic logical entailment. If the two logics
disagree on the validity of a given inference, the possibility exists that this dis-
agreement is the result of these differing methods of formalization. In such a
case, we would say that the logics stand in methodological disagreement with
one another.
Let a deviant logic be a nonclassical logic that disagrees methodologically
with classical logic. We will call a nonclassical logic an alternative logic just in
case it is not a deviant logic. A logic Ln will be an ally of classical logic just in
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case it is an alternative logic and nc =c. A logicLn will be a rival of classical
logic just in case it is an alternative logic and nc 6=c.
1.3 OTHER CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL LOGIC
The definition of rivalry uses classical logic as a reference point, like the origin
of a coordinate system. My reason for doing this is both historical and practi-
cal: Classical logic has enjoyed a privileged status, even if only by convention,
such that logics are compared to it. Because classical logic plays this role in
the definition of rival logics, any rival logic is a rival to classical logic. So far,
rivalry has been described as a purely formal relation between classical logic
and a rival logic according to which the two logics’ entailment relations are in-
compatible with one another. But any logic is meant to be a theory of logical
entailment, and any theory can capture its intended phenomena well or poorly.
A rival logic thus represents a challenge to classical logic’s value as a theory of
logical entailment by offering examples of how it captures logical entailment
better than classical logic. In this section, I will discuss several other challenges
to classical logic’s value as a theory of logical entailment: alternate translation
functions, logical pluralism, and the problem of logical constants. I will show
that all are unlike rivalry, in that the first two are cases of methodological dis-
agreement and that the third is not a formal challenge to classical logic. Doing
so will more clearly locate rivalry among other debates in the literature and lay
the groundwork for my next section, in which I will contrast rivalry with those
debates and argue that rivalry represents a more fundamental challenge to clas-
sical logic.
The first of these challenges is Susan Haack’s disagreement with classical
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logic’s formalization of English sentences. Haack claims that the process of
translating from the natural language to the formal language involves our choos-
ing to ignore certain subtleties of our ordinary language. Because of this, we
may end up with several different pieces of informal discourse represented by
a single piece of the formal language. For example, “material implication, strict
implication, relevant implication, and other formal conditions might all have
some claim to represent some aspect of ‘if’, or . . . 2-valued and 3-valued and
non-extensional disjunctions might all be possible projections of (some) uses of
‘or’ ” (Haack 1978, 230). It seems that a proper logic, according to Haack, would
formalize these different uses of if and or with different logical constants, rather
than translating all of them as “→” and “∨ .” Let Lh be a theory of entailment
that is nonclassical for the reasons Haack proposes. To make this example more
concrete, suppose Lh differs from classical logic only because each interprets
our English word if differently, and does so in the way Haack describes. The
question before us is how Lh differs from Lc, and what kind of challenge this
may present to classical logic as a theory of logical entailment.
The following are all statements of E:
If the Earth is less massive than the Moon, then the Moon
is more massive than the Earth.
(1.1a)
If sugar does not dissolve in water, then the sea is not sweet. (1.1b)
If 2= 5, then Bigfoot exists. (1.1c)
The classical logician would use ρ to translate each of these, perhaps as:
L(e,m) → M(m,e) (1.2a)
18
W (a) → A(l ) (1.2b)
= (2,5) → R(u). (1.2c)
We add the information that the antecedents of all of these conditionals are
false, and thus all of these would be valid under classical logic:
c ¬L(e,m) ∧ (L(e,m) → M(m,e)) (1.3a)
c ¬W (a) ∧ (W (a) → A(l )) (1.3b)
c ¬ = (2,5) ∧ (= (2,5) → R(u)). (1.3c)
I assume that Haack would agree with the classical logician that (1.1a) is a gen-
uine instance of a material conditional, and so (1.3a) is logically true. But Haack
claims that apparently similar statements are not logically true; e.g., (1.3b) and
(1.3c). The classical logician’s mistake, Haack may claim, is that he assumes the
included conditionals—(1.1b) and (1.1c)—are material conditionals when they
are actually a strict conditional and a relevant conditional, respectively. What
marks (1.1b) as a strict conditional, she would claim, is that it appeals to a pu-
tative natural law in its antecedent, and so the entire conditional can be under-
stood as a natural law. What marks (1.1c) as a relevant conditional, she would
claim, is the unknown truth value of the consequent, and so we demand that a
conditional with such a consequent have an antecedent relevant to it.
Haack would claim that (1.1b) and (1.1c) ought to be translated using new
connectives to represent strict and relevant implication. Let  and * be in-
terpreted as the strict conditional and relevant conditional, respectively;Lh will
have these two conditionals in its dialect in addition to → . The above condi-
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tionals then would be rendered in Lh as:
h ¬M(e,m) ∧ (M(e,m) → L(m,e)) (1.4a)
1h ¬W (a) ∧ (W (a)  A(l )) (1.4b)
1h ¬ = (2,5) ∧ (= (2,5) * R(u)). (1.4c)
We know that Lc and Lh disagree on whether or not (1.1b) and (1.1c) are
logically true. But, as shown here, Lc and Lh also disagree on how (1.1b) and
(1.1c) ought to be represented in the formal language. This latter disagreement
makes the former lose its teeth.
Lh’s formalization of (1.1b) and (1.1c) is the result of Lh’s employing a dis-
ambiguation of English where material, strict, and relevant uses of if are disam-
biguated into three different connectives. Call this disambiguation E′. But then
Lh is a theory of entailment for sentences of E
′, not E. Lh must be using a
translation function other than ρ because the translation functions for Lh and
Lc are defined on different domains, and because E* E′ and E′ * E. Because
the difference in Lh’s and Lc’s disambiguations manifests itself in a difference
of translation functions, we can record the methodological disagreement be-
tween Lh and Lc using the above definition for a logic; i.e., Lh =
〈
ρ,Lh
〉
and
Lc =
〈
ρ′,Lc
〉
.
Another challenge is Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism. It claims that our
pretheoretic notion of validity is inherently ambiguous, but can be captured by
what they call the Generalized Tarski Thesis: “An argument is validx if and only
if, in every casex in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion” (Beall and
Restall 2006, 29). Each possible way of disambiguating our pretheoretic notion
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of validity corresponds to a possible way of interpreting the “cases” described
in the Generalized Tarski Thesis. For example, a given inference may be valid if
and only if, in every model in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion.
Let Lp be a logic that is pluralistic in the sense given above. According to
Beall and Restall, logical entailment comprises several entailment relations, one
for each interpretation of the cases described in the Generalized Tarski Thesis.
Moreover, none of these interpretations would be more fundamental or prim-
itive than the others, so we cannot define one in terms of another. Here, as
with Lh, we can record Lp and Lc’s methodological disagreement by speci-
fying that Lp’s framework include multiple entailment relations and dialects:
Lp =
〈
F,1, . . . ,n ,D1, . . . ,Dm
〉
.11
So far, we have considered two challenges that classical logic faces, shown
how they are cases of methodological disagreement, and how that method-
ological disagreement is manifested in a difference between the formalizations
these challenges offer compared to Lc and Lc. A given rival logic, call it Lr,
will not differ from Lc in either of the ways outlined above; and so we know
that rivalry should not be confused with either of these challenges. I will now
consider a more subtle challenge to classical logic stemming from the problem
of defining logical constants. A logic exemplifying this challenge, call it Lm,
will differ from Lc in its dialect only. Therefore, Lm will not have a structure
that marks it as being different in kind from a rival logic—unlike Lh and Lp—
because D-morphisms allow rival logics to have dialects that differ from Dc.
11Lp’s being accepted as a genuine logical framework requires a small and innocuous stretch-
ing of the definition of a logical framework to allow multiples entailment relations and dialects.
Note also that the number of dialects will vary based on the specific pluralistic logic. It may
be that one dialect serves as the set of logical constants for all the entailment relations, or that
each entailment relation has its own dialect. All that we know for certain is that a framework
must have more than one entailment relation in order to be interpreted by a pluralistic logic.
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What differentiates Lm from Lr is its advocate’s attitude toward the constants
that appear in Dm but not in Dc. To illustrate this, I will contrast classical logic’s
relation to a deontic logic with classical logic’s relation to a logic that differs
from it only in the addition of a new quantifier, “there are infinitely many.”
Let Ld be a deontic logic. The deontic logician is trying to generate a the-
ory of our correct inferences about obligations. To do this, she forms a dialect
with greater expressive power than Dc by adding two operators to Dc: O, in-
terpreted as “it is obligatory that,” and P, interpreted as “it is permitted that.”
The difference between Dc and Dd can be explained by a difference in the goals
of classical logic and deontic logic. Classical logic is topic-neutral. It concerns
reasoning in general, rather than reasoning about a particular subject. Deontic
logic fails to present a challenge to classical logic because its variance from clas-
sical logic is explained by the deontic logician’s interest in capturing a certain
subset of our inferences more specifically (with a more expressive language)
than classical logic. Informally speaking, deontic logic represents an entirely
different project from classical logic, while simultaneously assuming that clas-
sical logic holds more generally. This relationship explains why Lc and Ld are
allies according to the above definition.
Now, let the quantifier Q0 be interpreted as “there exist infinitely many.” Let
Lm be a logic using this quantifier, where the dialect Dm is just Dc with Q0
added to it. Lm and Lc will disagree on the validity of some inferences. For
example, the axioms of Robinson arithmetic (Q) form a theory of the natural
numbers with classical logic. The standard model of Q is countably infinite. So,
according to the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, there exist uncountable non-
standard models of Q also. Note that we can define a relation <, interpreted as
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“less than,” in Q:
x < y ⇐⇒ ∃z (x+ z = y ∧ z 6= 0).
Only in Lm, however, can we eliminate these nonstandard models because we
can express the idea that a given number has only finitely many predecessors:
∀y ¬Q0x(x < y). So the inference Q∀y ¬Q0x(x < y)
is valid in Lm but not in
Lc.
Unlike Ld, Lm is meant to be topic-neutral in the same way that Lc is
topic-neutral. When we fix a specific level of neutrality, we can develop a the-
ory as to what it is that makes a member of F a logical constant for that level
of neutrality. That theory will then guide us in choosing the members of F that
should be included in a dialect of a logic for that level of neutrality. Any ade-
quate theory of logical constanthood must count the members of Dc as logical
constants, so we can interpret any theory of logical constanthood as answer-
ing the question of whether or not the dialect of a topic-neutral logic ought
to be equivalent to Dc or just include Dc as a proper subset. This answer of-
ten revolves around features that we want to preserve in a logic. For example,
Lindström proved that any extension of classical logic will either fail to be com-
pact, fail to be complete, or the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem will fail to apply
to it. If we consider these to be necessary attributes of a logic, then we cannot
but have the members of Dc be the logical constants of a topic-neutral logic.
On the other hand, we may decide that there are concepts that are so funda-
mental to our reasoning that they must be considered logical constants, even if
this means accepting the consequences enumerated by Lindström. For exam-
ple, because Lm rejects the nonstandard models of Q, the Löwenheim-Skolem
Theorem fails to apply to it; moreover, Lm is not compact. So we lose these
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supposedly-desirable traits of a logic. Despite this, one may still think that hav-
ing Q without nonstandard models is worth the loss of these traits.
The problem of logical constants is one of determining the correct set of
logical constants for a topic-neutral logic. Once we settle on such a set, any
logic whose dialect differs from it cannot be a proper theory of topic-neutral
logical entailment. Unfortunately, my definition above does not account for
a logic’s topic-neutrality, as this is not a formal notion. As a result, both Ld
and Lm count as allies of classical logic, despite the fact that Lm represents a
challenge to classical logic, albeit a challenge other than rivalry.
1.4 RIVALRY AS A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE
Above, I describe three challenges to logic other than rivalry: Haack’s view on
the translation of the natural language into the formal language, logical plural-
ism, and addition of extra constants to Dc with the stipulation that these are
the only constants of a topic-neutral logic. I claim that rivalry is a more funda-
mental challenge to classical logic than any of these.
First, note that these challenges question our choice of the translation func-
tion ρ, the number of entailment relations a logic ought to have, and whether
or not Dc was an appropriate choice for the dialect of a topic-neutral logic, re-
spectively. All of these are open questions about how we ought to construct a
logic, but none of them are questions that we must answer in order to build
Lc and thus study rivals to classical logic. I am not claiming that ρ is the only
way we could translate from the natural language to the formal language; I only
claim that we must have some translation function from E to F, and ρ is the one
Lc uses. By identifying
〈
F,c,Dc
〉
as the framework of classical logic—a frame-
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work with only one entailment relation—I am formalizing the fact that classical
logic is equipped with only one entailment relation; I am not endorsing logical
monism in the process. By leaving Q0 out of Dc, I am not claiming that Q0 is
not a logical constant; I am only noting that Q0 is not considered a constant
of classical logic, even if it ought to be a part of the dialect of a more accurate
topic-neutral logic.
None of these points show that rivalry is more fundamental than the other
challenges, but it does show that the analysis of rivalry is not dependent on
these challenges being settled. So, at least, rivalry is on the same footing as
these challenges. What makes rivalry more fundamental than these other chal-
lenges is that rivalry focuses only on the differences between the entailment
relations of Lc and a rival logic. The entailment relation is the core of the the-
ory; the point of a logic is to have this formal relation correspond to our infor-
mal notion of logical entailment. By focusing only on the entailment relations,
we are free to discuss the question “what is the correct theory of logical entail-
ment?” without focusing on matters of the best way to formalize that informal
notion and the structure surrounding it. The concept of rivalry assumes only
that there is some correct theory of logical entailment. When we find a case
of rivalry, we have found two candidates for a correct theory of entailment, and
we cannot attribute that difference to a difference in dialect or translation func-
tion. We are thus assured that we are analyzing logical entailment itself, and not
letting the mechanisms we use for this study to get in the way.
That said, some have objected that this assumption is flawed, that there is
no sense in which a logic can be “correct.” We will turn our attention toward
this objection in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OBJECTION TO RIVALRY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss an objection to the very possibility of rivalry: that any
putative case of rivalry reduces to a verbal disagreement because the mean-
ings of the rival and classical constants differ. For example, when the intu-
itionist claims 1i ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for some ϕ ∈ F, and the classical logician claims c
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, the objector would claim that the connective ∨ has different mean-
ings in these two statements. This objection conflicts with the most straightfor-
ward account of the meaning of a logical constant: the member of E to which
the constant corresponds under the translation function. Under this straight-
forward account, the intuitionist’s ∨ and the classical logician’s ∨ both cor-
respond to “or.” Recall also that the translation function is the same for both
logics by hypothesis, so the objector cannot claim that each logic has a unique
mapping from ∨ to some member of E. To argue that the intuitionistic and
classical logicians actually disagree on the meaning of ∨ , and that rivalry fails
as a result, the objector will need a more robust theory of meaning for the logi-
cal constants.
The objection I will describe is based on a theory of meaning for the logical
constants according to which the meanings of the logical constants is deter-
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mined by—but not necessarily identified with—their use. Since the rival and
classical logician’s constants necessarily differ in their use, the objector claims,
they necessarily differ in meaning and so any apparent rivalry should be dis-
missed. In §2.2, I will describe the theory of meaning and accompanying ob-
jection in terms of introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants.
In §2.3, I will describe how Carnap, Quine, and Davidson have argued for ver-
sions of this type of theory. I will offer a response to the objection in §2.4, using
Gödel’s negative translations to undermine the idea that the meanings of the
logical constants can be identified with their use. If I am successful, I will have
shown that the rival logician’s constants do not necessarily have meanings dif-
ferent from the classical constants’, and thus the objection fails to be an a priori
objection to the possibility of rivalry. In §2.5, I will formulate and respond to
a weaker but more intuitive version of the objection found in §2.2. Finally, I
will argue in §2.6 that the rival logician must have a response to this weaker ob-
jection. He must explain why his constants can be used differently and yet his
challenge does not reduce to a verbal disagreement.
2.2 THE STRICT INFERENTIALIST OBJECTION
Inferentialism is the theory that the meanings of logical constants consist in
some aspect of their use. For example, an inferentialist may identify a con-
stant’s meaning with the inferences involving it that we count as valid and the
sentences involving it that we count as logically true. But use is not a precise
term. We do not want to discuss agents’ actual use of a constant. For one thing,
agents make mistakes. Also, we want to include hypothetical uses of the con-
stant. So inferentialist theories are often couched in terms of dispositions to
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use a constant in a particular way. A logical constant’s inferential role is the set
of inferences involving the constant that agents are disposed to make.1
Introduction and elimination rules for a given constant can represent these
dispositions, and thus its inferential role. Introduction rules for the constant
capture those dispositions to infer sentences that include the constant from
sentences that do not. Elimination rules for a given constant capture those dis-
positions to infer sentences that do not include that constant from sentences
that do.
Above, I showed that the meanings of logical constants are important to the
analysis of rivalry: a challenge of rivalry will fail if the classical and rival lo-
gicians’ constants have different meanings. But there is not yet consensus on
how we ought to capture the meanings of the logical constants. One option is
to identify their meanings with their inferential roles. This view has its origins in
Gentzen: “The introductions represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the sym-
bols concerned, and the eliminations are not more, in the final analysis, than
the consequences of these definitions”(1935, 80). But viewing this as a theory of
meaning for the logical constants would be to overread him. Popper, however,
does take this position, claiming that a logical constant’s “inferential definition”
captures its meaning, and the body of these definitions serve as a demarcation
between logical and nonlogical constants (1946–1947). Since Prior’s “tonk” re-
action to Popper’s position and others like it, inferentialism has been focused
on how to formulate the rules for logical constants such that there is a bound-
ary between the ordinary logical constants and constants like “tonk.” For exam-
1Of course, a agents may have dispositions to make incorrect inferences. The burden is on
the inferentialist to explain how the inferential role of a logical constant does not include these
and other undesirable inferences. However, I will grant the inferentialist that these inferences
are excluded, and that the inferential role of a constant contains only inferences that are the
product of appropriate dispositions.
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ple, Hacking argues that the logical constants must respect certain basic facts
about deducibility in their introduction and elimination rules (1979). Harman
argues that certain inferences are immediately obvious, and the rules for logical
constants should be based on these immediate implications and inconsisten-
cies (1986). Prawitz argues that the rules should embody assertion conditions
(1979).
For our purposes, we can set aside the questions of how or why a constant’s
inferential role determines its meaning. We are interested in knowing whether
two constants’ meanings differ. So if a constant’s meaning is connected to its
inferential role, we can ask whether a difference in two constants’ inferential
roles indicates a difference in their meanings. Let strict inferentialism be a the-
ory according to which any difference in two constants’ inferential roles implies
a difference in their meanings.2
According to strict inferentialism, any challenge of rivalry will be dismissed
on the grounds that the classical logician’s constants and the rival logician’s
constants have different meanings. For suppose Γc ϕ but Γ1rc ϕ, and let C
be the set of logical constants present in the formulas in Γ;ϕ. Then we should
be able to trace the disagreement over the validity of this inference to at least
one c ∈ C , where the rival and classical logician disagree on the introduction
and/or elimination rules for c.3 So we know that the rival logician’s inferential
role for c differs from the classical logician’s. This inference had been putative
2Not all inferentialist theories are strict. For example, Morton argues that classical and intu-
itionistic disjunction should not be counted as having different meanings because they share a
core of inferences that constitute their meaning (1973).
3This way of describing the disagreement between the rival logician and classical logician
may seem overly abstract. But we should avoid saying that every member of C is necessarily
being used differently by the rival and classical logician. For example, c > ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) but
1ic > ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ), where ϕ ∈ F and > is some tautology upon which Lc and Li agree. In this
case, C = {∧ ,∨ ,¬ }. But Lc and Li agree in all cases on the use of ∧ .
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evidence for rivalry between the logics. But under a strict inferentialist theory,
this inference is evidence for the rival logician’s discussing constants’ having
meanings different from the classical logician’s constants’ meanings.
2.3 EXAMPLES OF STRICT INFERENTIALISM
Several strict inferentialist theories have appeared in the literature. In this sec-
tion, I will consider three prominent ones, due to Carnap, Quine, and Davidson.
I will describe each of their theories, their conceptions of inferential roles, and
how rivalry is precluded under each specific version of strict inferentialism.
2.3.1 Carnap
According to Carnap, the project of constructing a logic is part of a more general
project of constructing a language. He describes two methods for doing this.
The first method of language-construction is to establish the formation rules
for sentences of the language, define a consequence relation for that language,
and only then interpret the meanings of the symbols of the language with a
semantics.4
Under this method, the rival logician is in no position to offer an argument
that his constants mean the same thing as the classical logician’s constants. For
example, suppose the rival logician rejected LEM. The meaning of his constant
∨ , say, and the meaning of the corresponding classical constant would be de-
termined by the syntactical rules for their use. Since the rival consequence rela-
4The two methods I discuss are described in Carnap 1939. Carnap’s order of presentation for
these methods the reverse of mine. In his text, the method that I present here first is referred to
as “the second method;” the second method I present, “the first method.” I have reversed their
order to make this discussion clearer.
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tion and the classical consequence relation differ with respect to ∨ , the mean-
ings of the two constants must also differ. As a result, rivalry is precluded by
this method.
Carnap’s second method of constructing a logic begins with a claim that the
logical constants have some meaning prior to the formulation of a logical calcu-
lus (Carnap 1939, 27). In this case, the “semantical rules”—for example, saying
that p ∧ q is true just in case p is true and q is true—constitute the meanings
of the logical constants. One can then claim that a given logical calculus is ei-
ther correct or incorrect based on whether or not it respects these semantical
rules. These semantical rules can determine the introduction and elimination
rules for logical constants in the following sense: Given a logical calculus, the
semantical rules for the connectives will determine which inferences are valid
and which are not. Using this information, we can read off the introduction and
elimination rules for the connectives. So while Carnap claims that this method
locates the constants’ meanings in their associated semantical rules, we can ex-
press those meanings using introduction and elimination rules, thus making it
easier to compare a constant’s inferential role with a person’s use of that con-
stant. And so Carnap’s position offers a clear example of how we could identify
the meaning of a logical constant with its inferential role.
Imagine the rival logician’s task, if he is trying to argue that his constants
have the same meaning as the classical logician’s, even when he denies LEM. He
is claiming that there is some ϕ ∈ F such that 1rc ϕ∨ ¬ϕ, and thus the classical
logician is wrong to claim that c ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for any ϕ ∈ F because classical logic
fails to respect the semantical rules for disjunction. The rival logician could
argue that the symbol ∨ has the same meaning in his logic as well as classical
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logic because the semantical rule for ∨ is the same in both cases: p ∨ q is true
just in case p is true or q is true.
But rivalry is precluded under this second method of constructing a logic,
also. Semantical rules are not specific enough to ensure that two constants’
meanings are the same: “Since the assignment of the meaning[s] is expressed in
words, and [are], in consequence, inexact, no conclusion arrived at in this way
can very well be otherwise than inexact and ambiguous” (Carnap 1937, xv). In
the above example, the semantical rule for ∨ is expressed in the metalanguage,
and so the word true is ambiguous. Specifically, it is unclear whether it is meant
to be understood as verification or not. One disambiguation would be captured
best by an intuitionistic calculus; the other, classical. Of course, these are only
two of the many different possible disambiguations of true. The rival logician
made the mistake of thinking that the semantical rule for ∨ expressed above
was precise enough that he and the classical logician agreed on it. If the rival
logician could express his semantical rule for ∨ unambiguously with introduc-
tion and elimination rules, and if the classical logician did the same, then it
would become obvious that the rival logician’s ∨ and the classical logician’s ∨
had different semantical rules. Ironically, the method of constructing a logic
allowed the debate between the intuitionist’s and classicalist’s conceptions of
truth to be briefly hidden by their common use of the word true in the formu-
lation of the semantical rules. Because a connective’s meaning consists in its
semantical rules under this picture of constructing a logic, the two connectives
would have different meanings. We would then have evidence that the rival
logician’s constants had meanings different from the classical logician’s.
Carnap would conclude that rivalry is precluded under both methods of
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constructing a logic. The first method leads to conventionalism about logic,
so the rival logician loses the ability to say that classical logic is wrong in any
sense. The second method entails that the rival logician’s constants and the
classical logician’s constants have different meanings.
2.3.2 Quine
According to Quine, we can see that a logical constant’s meaning is exhausted
by its inferential role by reflecting on what it means to understand that con-
stant, and he uses a hypothetical case of radical translation to show what this
understanding consists in. Suppose that we are trying to translate a native’s
language by radical translation, and the native’s language contained a word nat
that we suspected corresponded to the negation operator not in our language.
According to Quine, we would formulate a test for our hypothesis by first not-
ing which truth function our word not is meant to capture: For some sentence
e of our language, we say that the sentence “not e” is true (false) just in case
the sentence “e” is false (true). The test for our hypothesis must be a test to de-
termine whether the native’s word nat also captures this truth function. Since
we only have access to the native’s behavior, and not his belief that a given sen-
tence is true or false, we formulate our test in terms of assent or dissent. So we
determine if the native’s nat corresponds to not by outlining our own patterns
of assent and dissent for sentences involving not: We assent (dissent) to “not e”
just in case we would dissent (assent) to “e.” We then observe the native’s pat-
terns of assent and dissent for sentences involving nat, and determine if they
match with ours for not. We could question the native as part of our testing
procedure also, by taking some sentence to which the native assents (dissents),
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changing it to include nat, and rephrasing it as a question to see if the native
dissents (assents) to this new sentence. In all of these cases, the stimulation
would be kept constant. Given that the native assents (dissents) to a sentence
n of the his language, his dissent (assent) to “nat n” will be a piece of evidence
confirming that we can translate his nat as our not.
These patterns of assent and dissent for negation can be given in terms of
introduction and elimination rules. When we described Carnap’s semantical
rules in terms of introduction and elimination rules, those rules were said to
describe the behavior of truth with respect to the logical constants. In this case,
the introduction and elimination rules describe the behavior of assent with re-
spect to the logical constants.
We can also extend this theory to other logical connectives. For example,
suppose we were determining whether a native’s words ond and ar correspond
to conjunction and disjunction, respectively. A native’s assent to a sentence
containing ond will confirm ond’s corresponding to conjunction just in case the
native also assents to all of the immediate subsentences of that sentence, and
his dissent is confirming just in case he dissents from some immediate subsen-
tence. Describing the assent and dissent patterns that would confirm ar’s cor-
responding to disjunction is more complicated. Quine states that the native’s
dissent to a sentence containing ar will confirm its correspondence to disjunc-
tion just in case the native also dissents to each subsentence (Quine 1960, 58).
While Quine does not explicitly describe how the native’s assent to ar-sentences
confirms ar’s correspondence to disjunction, I think we can fill in the argument.
Quine does not want to say that a native’s assent to a sentence containing ar will
confirm ar’s corresponding to disjunction just in case the native also assents to
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at least one of the immediate subsentences of that sentence—this would de-
scribe intuitionistic disjunction, and Quine claims that we reason classically. If
the native assents to some sentence, and assents to an ar-sentence with it as an
immediate subsentence, that will confirm ar’s corresponding to or. And this is
exactly what we would expect, given the usual introduction rule for disjunction.
The elimination rule for classical disjunction is:
A ∨ B
[A]
C
[B ]
C
C
So Quine would adopt the position that a native’s assent to an ar-sentence would
confirm ar’s corresponding to disjunction only if all of the following obtain:
(i) there exists a sentence of the native’s language n such that, if the
native were to assent to one of the immediate subsentences of the
ar-sentence, he would assent to n also
(ii) if the native were to assent to the other immediate subsentence of
the ar-sentence, he would assent to n also
(iii) the native actually assents to n
Under this method of translating the native’s connectives, we cannot trans-
late any of the native’s sentences as conflicting with our logical truths. Suppose
we had a hypothesis that ond should be translated as and and nat by not. As
described above, we would begin the process of testing this hypothesis by spec-
ifying our own patterns of assent and dissent for these constants. Note that
these patterns would reflect the fact that we never assent to a sentence of the
form “e and not e.”5 So if the native were to assent to a sentence of the form
“n ond nat n,” this would be evidence that his assent pattern for ond did not
match with ours for and, or his assent pattern for nat did not match with ours
5Quine assumes that we reason classically. For the time being, we will grant him this.
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for not, or both. And so some part of our hypothesis is false; we cannot under-
stand the native as using one of our constants (in translation) with a different
inferential role.
According to Quine, we are obligated to identify the meanings of the log-
ical constants this way by the principle of charity, which dictates that we not
translate the native as rejecting our logical laws. Suppose that, according to a
putative translation manual, the native assented to a sentence “n ond nat n”
that we translate as “e and not e.” The stimulation surrounding his assent is
irrelevant, since our logical truths are stimulus-analytic and our logical false-
hoods stimulus-contradictory, according to Quine. Suppose further that there
is nothing to suggest that this is some non-truth-functional use of and and not,
and that the native persists in his assent despite the linguist’s offers for him to
recant. We then have good reason to reject this manual because Quine inter-
prets a commitment to the principle of charity as a commitment to maximize
the number of true beliefs, and minimize the number of false beliefs, that we
attribute to the native. If we were to adopt this manual, we would be attribut-
ing a false belief to the native: that “e and not e” is true. Attributing this one
false belief to the native is acceptable to charity, but in accepting this transla-
tion manual, we would also be accepting that the native’s use of and was not
the same as ours. Thus, we would lose justification for saying that the native
believes that all sentences of the form “a and not a,” except “e and not e,” were
false. Indeed, the same would go for any logical falsehood of ours that included
and. We would also lose justification for saying that the native believes logical
truths including and were true. What’s worse, this may only be half of the story
because the above sentence contains not also. The consequences of translating
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the native’s nat as not are similar to the above case with ond and and.
Any putative case of rivalry will be dismissed under Quine’s account, since
the patterns of assent and dissent for the rival and classical constants differ.
He claims that the hypothesized patterns of the native’s assent and dissent pro-
vided all we needed to understand the native’s words—specifically, whether they
corresponded to our logical connectives not, or, and and, or to some other truth
function that may or may not be reflected in some logical constant of our lan-
guage. And Quine believes that there is nothing else to which the rival logician
can appeal in his defense: “There is no residual essence of [disjunction] in ad-
dition to the sounds and notations and the laws in conformity with which a
man uses those sounds and notations” (Quine 1986, 81). Under this view, our
or and the rival logician’s or are different constants. The fact that they happen
to be visually and aurally identical is irrelevant. “Here, evidently, is the [rival]
logician’s predicament: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the
subject” (Quine 1986, 81).
2.3.3 Davidson
Quine argues that we have no way of translating the rival logician’s supposed
denials of our logical laws into our own language such that the rival constants
have the same meanings as the classical constants. The question of whether
we can translate the rival logician as contradicting our logic is distinct from,
but related to, the question of whether we can understand the rival logician
as contradicting our logic. Davidson argues that we cannot understand a rival
logician as doing this.
We could attempt to understand a foreign language by using a translation
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manual from that language to our own. But we would succeed only if we also
knew that the language into which the manual translates the foreign language
is actually our own and that we can interpret our own language6 (Davidson
1973, 129). It is unclear how we ought to support these two further assump-
tions. Luckily, they can be avoided by not mentioning our own language. So if
we are after a way of understanding the rival logician that avoids the need to
justify these requirements, we should find a way of interpreting the rival logi-
cian’s speech that does not require us to mention our language. According to
Davidson, we can do this with a theory of truth for the rival logician’s language
that is expressed in our language, provided that the theory satisfies several re-
strictions. First, such a theory must be recursive, so as to enable an interpreter
to interpret any of the potentially infinite number of sentences someone may
express and do so on the basis of a finite number of rules. So the theory will
have base axioms for determining the interpretations of the simple sentences,
and recursive axioms that determine the interpretation of a complex sentence
based on the interpretations of simple sentences it contains. Second, the theory
should have as consequences all of the T-sentences that describe truth condi-
tions for the sentences of the language to be interpreted.
Such a theory can serve as a theory of meaning, Davidson argues, because
the totality of the T-sentences, their relations to one another, and the inter-
dependence of the truth conditions give a sentence its meaning. How well a
theory of this type describes the meanings of the interpreted language’s sen-
tences is a function of how many of these T-sentences are true. Success is mea-
sured this way because of how Davidson interprets the principle of charity: “We
6Even under these circumstances, Davidson argues, we would not have a theory of interpre-
tation because one of the things we would demand from such a theory is that it describe how
the interpretation of a sentence depended on the interpretations of its parts.
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want a theory that . . . maximizes agreement, in the sense of making [the natives]
right, as far as we can tell, as often as possible” because “the more sentences
we conspire to accept or reject. . . , the better we understand the rest, whether
or not we agree about them” (Davidson 1973, 136–7).
So how do we maximize agreement with the natives? “We look for the best
way to fit our logic, to the extent required to get a theory satisfying Conven-
tion T, onto the new language” (Davidson 1973, 136). Most of the T-sentences
entailed by the theory will be generated by the recursive axioms, rather than
given by the base axioms. A theory whose recursive axioms did not capture our
logical constants would fail to maximize agreement between us and the native.
Davidson’s theory of meaning for the logical constants can be expressed in
a way similar to Carnap’s theory. For Davidson, the logical constants are those
that are defined in the recursive clauses of the theory of truth, and these are
T-schemata, which are similar in form to Carnap’s semantical rules. However,
we will change the account of what is described by the introduction and elim-
ination rules. For Carnap, the rules described how truth behaved with respect
to the logical constants. But Davidson’s position makes essential use of radical
interpretation, where we only have access to the native’s utterances. We can
take the native’s utterances to be a manifestation of the native’s belief that the
sentence is true, according to Davidson, so it may be more appropriate to say
that the rules describe how belief—specifically, the belief that the sentences in-
volved are true—behaves with respect to the logical constants for Davidson’s
theory.
So where does this leave the rival logician? Suppose the rival logician were
to utter “e and not e,” where e is some sentence of his language. By asserting
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this sentence, we understand him to have the belief that it is true. We would
need to make sure that he did not simply misspeak, of course. For our lan-
guage, which we are assuming is classical, we have the following two clauses in
its theory of truth:
T (ϕ and ψ) ⇐⇒ T (ϕ) and T (ψ)
T (not-ϕ) ⇐⇒ not-T (ϕ)
So if the rival logician is attempting to speak our language, which would be
required if he is trying to tell us an interesting fact about conjunction, then his
words and and not must correspond to and and not in our language. But these
words in our language are used as in the above two T-sentences. So if the rival
logician’s words are the same as ours, then we would be disagreeing with him.
According to the principle of charity, this should make us less likely to accept
the identify translation manual from the rival logician’s language into our own.
Specifically, this may make us less sure that the above T-sentences translate the
rival logician’s words and and not. We may then, in turn, be less sure that we
agree with the rival logician on the truth of other sentences that involve and
and not.
Nevertheless, Davidson’s theory does not fully preclude rivalry. Davidson
seeks to maximize agreement between the classical and rival logician. It may be
that agreement is maximized even when some sentences are disagreed upon.
The recursive clauses of the theories of truth for their languages would differ
in such a case. This difference would be a case of rivalry if the rival logician
can argue that he and the classical logician are seeking to describe the same
concept of truth. The rival logician will be successful if he can argue that his
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theory of truth captures that theory and the classical logician’s fails to capture
it.
2.4 RESPONDING TO THE OBJECTION
A disagreement between logics fails to be a case of rivalry if it reduces to a ver-
bal dispute. Carnap, Quine, and Davidson each provide a way of justifying a
strict inferentialist objection to rivalry, according to which any disagreement
between logics reduces to a verbal dispute. One way to cast doubt on this iden-
tification is by appealing to Gödel’s result that classical logic can be embedded
in intuitionistic logic.7 We can use Gödel’s negative translation to define quasi-
classical logical constants with the same inferential roles as classical constants,
but with different meanings. These quasiclassical constants do not represent a
direct counterexample to the strict inferentialist objection; it claims that same-
ness of inferential role is a necessary condition for sameness of meaning, while
Gödel’s negative translation will be used to show that sameness of inferential
role is not a sufficient condition for sameness of meaning. But if there is some
other factor besides inferential role relevant for determining the sufficient con-
ditions for the sameness of meaning, it may be that the logical constants can
differ in inferential role without differing in meaning.
7One may respond to strict inferentialism in other ways. For example, one may advocate a
moderate inferentialism, as mentioned above, according to which only a core of inferences was
relevant to forming a constant’s inferential role. One could then argue that the inferences upon
which the classical and rival logician disagreed were not relevant to determining the constant’s
inferential role, so the classical and rival constants did not have different meanings. I will not
be pursuing this line of argument here, however, because it is unclear to me how one ought to
draw a boundary between the relevant and irrelevant inferences.
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2.4.1 Adapting Gödel’s Negative Translation
First, we will review Gödel’s result. Let `c and `i denote provability in classical
and intuitionistic logic, respectively. Gödel defines a translation “′” from state-
ments of classical logic to statements of intuionistic logic:8
ϕ′ =ϕ (where ϕ is atomic) (¬ϕ)′ = ¬ (ϕ′)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)′ = ¬ (¬ϕ′ ∧ ¬ψ′) (ϕ ∧ ψ)′ =ϕ′ ∧ ψ′
(ϕ→ ψ)′ = ¬ (ϕ′ ∧ ¬ψ′) (∀xϕ)′ =∀xϕ′
(∃xϕ)′ = ¬∀x ¬ϕ′
If we let Γ= {γ, . . .} and Γ′ = {γ′, . . .}, then
Γ`c ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ′ `c ϕ′
because of DeMorgan’s rule and the logical equivalence ϕ → ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. In
the restricted case where ∆ and ψ contain only negation and conjunction as
logical constants,
∆`c ψ ⇐⇒ ∆`i ψ.
But the “′” translation maps inferences that are classically valid onto inferences
that are classically valid and contain only negation and conjunction as logical
8Gödel’s actual translation in his article used different symbols to denote classical negation
(∼) and intuitionistic negation (¬ ), and classical conjunction (.) and intuitionistic conjunction
(∧ ) (1933, 287). Since I am interested in discussing these issues on a background of a common
vocabulary, I will be using the same symbol for both negations and conjunctions. Also, note
that the translations for the quantifiers are from Troelstra’s discussion of Gödel’s article (1986,
283).
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constants. So we can now see that
Γ`c ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ′ `i ϕ′.
Gödel goes on to show that, based on this result, “the system of intuitionistic
arithmetic and number theory is only apparently narrower than the classical
one, and in truth contains it, albeit with a somewhat deviant interpretation”
(Gödel 1933, 295).
We will apply this result to our project by defining new logical constants,
which we will call quasiclassical, in terms of logical constants upon which clas-
sical and intuitionistic logic agree:
ϕ ∨q ψ def= ¬ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
ϕ→q ψ def= ¬ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
∃qxϕ def= ¬∀x ¬ϕ.
We will also define a translation function “*” that is logically the same as Gödel’s
“′” but which employs the quasiclassical constants:
ϕ∗ =ϕ (where ϕ is atomic) (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ (ϕ∗)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗ =ϕ∗ ∨q ψ∗ (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ =ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(ϕ→ ψ)∗ =ϕ∗ →q ψ∗ (∀xϕ)∗ =∀xϕ∗
(∃xϕ)∗ =∃qxϕ∗
Note that “*” replaces all classical constants with their quasiclassical counter-
parts, if defined, and leaves the other classical constants the same.
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According to classical logic, the classical constants have the same inferential
roles as their quasiclassical counterparts under the “*” translation. For it should
be obvious, based on Gödel’s result, that
Γ`c ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ∗ `c ϕ∗.
Moreover, since the truth tables for ∨c and ∨q are the same,
Γc ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ∗ c ϕ∗.
Proof-theoretic entailment is sufficient for logical entailment, as is model-theoretic
entailment. We can thus be assured that
Γc ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ∗c ϕ∗.
This result is expected, given that we know we can express classical logic using
a subset of Dc if we define some logical constants in terms of others, such as
defining ϕ → ψ as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. In such a case, agreement is assured because of
those definitions. The “*” function, along with an inverse of it, play the same
role in this case: ensuring that a classical logician using the quasiclassical con-
nectives will not disagree with a classical logician using the ordinary set of con-
nectives.
These examples highlight a crucial aspect of our discussion of rivalry: we
cannot determine the nature of two logics’ disagreement without being aware
of the functions we use to interpret the similarity (or dissimilarity) of the two
logics’ constants. We will now use the “*” translation to define an interpretation
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function describing how the intuitionistic logician could interpret the classical
logician.
We can conclude that
Γc ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ∗i ϕ∗,
based on reasoning similar to the way we concluded that Γc ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ∗c ϕ∗.
But we can also conclude this by viewing “*” as an interpretation function: If an
intuitionistic logician were to understand the classical logician in the way de-
scribed by the “*” translation, then the intuitionistic logician would agree with
any claim made by the classical logician regarding logical entailment. In other
words, Γc ϕ =⇒ Γ∗ i ϕ∗. If the classical logician understands the intuition-
istic logician’s words via the identity interpretation, the classical logician would
agree with any statement made by the intuitionistic logician. In other words,
Γ∗ i ϕ∗ =⇒ Γ c ϕ. Note that the logicians’ agreement is not a contingent
result of their happening to not come across a disagreed-upon inference. It is
literally the case that there is no possible statement one logician could make
with which the other would disagree.
The upshot of the “*” translation is that the classical and intuitionistic logi-
cians would each regard his own constants as having the same inferential roles
as the corresponding constants of the other. But, as I will show in the next sec-
tion, their meanings differ.
One may object that describing the classical and quasiclassical connectives
as having the same inferential role relies on an illicit extension of the concept
of inferential role. Specifically, equating the inferential roles of the classical and
quasiclassical connectives raises doubts about which connective(s) we are ac-
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tually using in a given formula. When we express, say, a disjunction, we cannot
tell whether we are using ∨c or ∨q simply by looking at how that disjunction
participates in our inferences. Even though Gödel’s negative translation, and
thus the definition of ∨q , was motivated by intuitionistic concerns, we can de-
fine arbitrarily many new logical constants in the same way ∨q was defined. So
our situation is worse than we originally thought: we were unsure if our dis-
junctions were instances of ∨c or ∨q , but now we see that our disjunctions
could be instances of many more connectives. Something must be wrong with
equating the inferential roles of the classical and quasiclassical connectives, the
objector will argue, if it entails that we have so little grip on what connective we
are using in a given formula. My use of the negative translation to define the
quasiclassical constants was founded on a policy of allowing logical constants
to be defined non-primitively. Declaring non-primitive constants to be logi-
cal constants requires a very different way of understanding what an inferential
role is. Classical and quasiclassical constants have the same inferential role in
an extended sense, but they do not have the same inferential role in the usual
sense.
We still have a response to this objection. The objector and I are discussing
two different concepts of inferential role. But I also think that what the objector
calls an “extension” of the concept of an inferential role is actually our ordinary
concept of an inferential role, and the objector is artificially restricting it. An
inferential role is just a description of a sentence’s behavior in our inferences. It
makes sense, then, that sentences logically equivalent to one another may have
the same inferential role. But it cannot hold generally that logically equivalent
sentences have the same inferential role. For example, given a sentence ϕ, we
46
can construct a sentence logically equivalent to it by forming a finite but very
long conjunction with ϕ as one conjunct and tautologies for the others. If this
sentence is long enough, then it may not actually participate in our inferences
in the same way that ϕ does because we lack the computational abilities neces-
sary to employ it in actual reasoning.9 This example shows us that it cannot be
the case that logically equivalent sentences have the same inferential role in all
cases. But the objector goes too far in claiming that no two sentences can have
the same inferential role in virtue of their logical equivalence. If we know that
two sentences are equivalent, then we would be justified in substituting one for
the other in any given inference. That said, a person’s substitution may be less
justified in cases where the logical equivalence is less obvious. But in defining
∨q , I have chosen a definition whose logical equivalence to classical disjunction
is just about as obvious as we can make it.
2.4.2 Applying the Response
The previous section argued that ∨c and ∨q have the same inferential role,
given a relatively neutral conception of what constitutes an inferential role. In
this section, I will show that this result also holds for Carnap’s, Quine’s, and
Davidson’s more specific conceptions of what constitutes an inferential role.
I think that my response applies straightforwardly to Carnap’s version of the
“change of meaning” objection. According to Carnap, a logical constant’s infer-
ential role is determined by its semantical rules. Since ϕ ∨c ψ and ϕ ∨q ψ are
9Here I am imagining ϕ to be very short, perhaps even atomic, while the logically equiva-
lent sentence is far longer than ϕ—too long to write down, perhaps even too long for a modern
computer to parse. Even if I grant that the sentence can be parsed by some computer more
powerful than our current technology, the point remains: these sentences’ inferential roles can-
not be identical because because the actual inferences in which they can participate will differ
for us.
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logically equivalent, they have the same inferential role.
For Quine and Davidson, applying the above argument takes more work.
We must show how a classically-reasoning linguist using classical constants and
performing radical translation, or radical interpretation, would understand an
intuitionistically-reasoning native using quasiclassical constants to be using clas-
sical constants. Specifically, we will show that ∨c and ∨q have the same infer-
ential role for Quine’s and Davidson’s own conceptions of how inferential roles
are determined, and that this is a result of Quine’s and Davidson’s each being
committed to some version of the principle of charity.
We will consider Quine first. Suppose that a classically-reasoning linguist
is performing radical translation on a intuitionistically-reasoning native. For
Quine, a constant’s inferential role was given in terms of assent and dissent; the
linguist sought to translate a native connective by matching the native’s pat-
terns of assent and dissent for that connective to one of his own. Quine’s ver-
sion of the change of meaning objection stated that the linguist cannot translate
the native’s disjunction as his own classical disjunction because their inferen-
tial roles differ. Gödel’s negative translation argument shows us that there is a
way for the intuitionistic native to agree with every statement of the classical
linguist, and so the patterns of assent and dissent for his intutionistic disjunc-
tion would match those of the linguist’s classical disjunction. Gödel’s actual
argument showed how this would happen in situations where the native under-
stood the linguist’s sentence ϕ∨ψ to correspond to the sentence ¬ (¬ϕ∧ ¬ψ)
in his own language.10 The only problem with this picture is that the linguist’s
and the native’s sentences are of different complexities. To address this, I de-
10Gödel’s translation also describes how the intuitionistic native would understand sentences
involving other connectives. But I will focus on disjunction only, to make this section consonant
with the last one.
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fined ∨q as a constant of the same complexity as ∨c . But Gödel’s argument still
applies when we use the quasiclassical constants: If, in general, the native un-
derstood the linguist’s sentences of the form ϕ ∨ ψ to correspond to sentences
of the form ϕ ∨q ψ in his own language, then the native would agree with any
of the linguist’s disjunctions. Moreover, Quine’s commitment to the principle of
charity requires him to adopt a translation manual based on Gödel’s negative
translation, since Quine interprets the principle of charity to require the linguist
to avoid translating the native as rejecting his logical laws. Since the negative
translation manual does not translate the intuitionistic native as rejecting the
linguist’s classical laws, it should be preferred to the identity manual accord-
ing to which the native violates one of the linguist’s classical laws. So ∨c and
∨q will have the same inferential role, under Quine’s interpretation of inferen-
tial roles, and the manual under which this holds is preferable to one in which
it does not hold, due to Quine’s commitment to his version of the principle of
charity.
Now we consider the Davidsonian case, and a situation in which we reason
classically and the natives reason intuitionistically. According to Davidson’s ver-
sion of the principle of charity, we must maximize agreement between us and
the natives. I argued above that the best way to do this is to carefully choose
the recursive axioms of the theory of truth for the native’s language. Clearly
there will be sentences upon which we disagree. Based on this disagreement,
Davidson would argue, we ought to translate the natives as using connectives
different from ours, lest we lose the ability to justify our agreement on other
sentences.
If Davidson seeks to maximize agreement in this situation, he ought to ad-
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vocate the use of the Gödel negative translations in our theory of truth for the
native’s language. For example, if we suspected that the native’s word or corre-
sponded to disjunction, but we found that he disagreed with certain sentences
of the form “e or not e,” then we could add the following recursive clauses to
our theory of truth for his language in order to maximize agreement between
us:
T (not-ϕ) ⇐⇒ not-T (ϕ)
T (ϕ and ψ) ⇐⇒ T (ϕ) and T (ψ)
T (ϕ or ψ) ⇐⇒ not-(not-T (ϕ) and not-T (ψ)).
Note that we can change these to clauses to involve ∨c and ∨q . Under that
version of the negative translation, we would perceive the native’s connective
∨q being used just as our connective ∨c is used. Therefore, given Davidson’s
concept of inferential role, ∨q and ∨c must have the same inferential role un-
der this manual. Moreover, Davidson’s commitment to the principle of char-
ity would commit him to using a negative translation in formulating a transla-
tion manual between our language and the native’s because it maximizes agree-
ment.
2.4.3 Differences in Meanings
The above discussion shows that ∨c and ∨q have the same inferential role in
each of these specific cases of strict inferentialism. In this section, I will show
that the procedures by which a competent speaker would substantiate his be-
lief in a disjunction are different from the procedures by which one would sub-
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stantiate his belief in a quasidisjunction with the same disjuncts. I then will
have shown that the senses of ∨c and ∨q differ, and that we therefore cannot
identify a connective’s meaning with its inferential role. This method is clearly
inspired by Frege, but I do not need his full theory. I only need to assume that
a difference in substantiating procedures indicates a difference in sense, and a
difference in sense indicates a difference in meaning. Neither of these theses is
contentious.
Suppose that Karl is a competent speaker of E, and that F is a formaliza-
tion of E in which our discussion can proceed. Let α,β ∈ F, and suppose that
Karl believes that α and β are both true. There may come a time when Karl
may be called upon to substantiate his belief that α is true, that β is true, or
both; e.g., another competent speaker may believe that one or both are false,
and may ask Karl to provide evidence for his belief. Let a be some procedure
that Karl may employ to substantiate his belief that α is true. For example, to
substantiate his belief that the sentence J. S. Bach died in 1750 is true, Karl may
look up Bach’s death date in a respectable music reference book. Note that the
purpose of these procedures is neither to describe the source of Karl’s beliefs,
nor to describe a condition for Karl’s understanding of a sentence. We will call
a an evidential procedure, say that a evinces α, and write this as a .α. It may
be that an evidential procedure involves performing a procedure that consti-
tutes an evidential procedure itself. We use subset notation to indicate this. For
example, if a speaker could substantiate β by performing two evidential proce-
dures b and c, we may say that a.β and b,c ⊆ a.
The evincing relation should bear a resemblance to the familiar notion of
proof that is often used to describe intuitionistic connectives. But here I am
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trying to capture a less formal notion. Saying that a.α ought to be ambiguous
between any of the following:
• a shows that α is true
• a justifies a speaker’s belief in α
• a makes a speaker’s utterance of α correct.
Evidential procedures themselves are not rigorous, either. We will not yet re-
quire that evidential procedures be algorithms or even be performable by a
speaker; e.g., an evidential procedure may take an infinite amount of time to
complete. Moreover, we allow that a given evidential procedure may be an evi-
dential procedure for sentences with different senses.
The evincing relation must carry some normative force, despite its lack of
rigor. We assume that Karl is a competent speaker of the language; as such,
other speakers would agree that a provides evidence for Karl’s belief—or any
other competent speaker’s belief—that α is true. We can thus make claims
like “a .α” without needing to relativize the evincing relation to a particular
speaker.
We will impose one restriction on evidential procedures, corresponding to
the usual assumption that a contradiction cannot be true: there is no evidential
procedure a such that a .⊥. That is, there are no procedures that an agent
would use to substantiate a contradiction. We will call this restriction evidential
noncontradiction.
We now have enough of an apparatus to define a notion of “recursive evin-
cibility” inspired by recursive realizability (see Kleene 1945). Conjunction is the
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only connective that allows for a straightforward definition:
e .α ∧ β def= 〈a,b〉 ⊆ e and a.α and b.β
That is, an evidential procedure evinces a conjunction just in case the evidential
procedure contains two sub-procedures evincing the two conjuncts. We place
the sub-procedures in an ordered pair to know which sub-procedure evinces
which conjunct.
The other definitions will be more complicated. Under the Kleene/BHK
interpretation, some constants are seen as operations on proofs: the conditi-
tional, for example, transforms a proof of the antecedent into a proof of the
consequent. To describe the recursive envincability clauses for the other con-
nectives, we will make a similar move by appealing to the fact that evidential
procedures are composed of evidential procedures, not pieces of evidence.
The traditional proof-theoretic definition of negation is:
e : ¬α def= e :α→ ⊥,
meaning that e is a proof of ¬α if it transforms any putative proof of α into a
proof of a contradiction. This interpretation is suitable because we recognize,
or stipulate, that there can be no proof of a contradiction. Informally, we might
say that a person equipped with a proof of ¬α is equipped to reject any puta-
tive proof of α. When presented with a putative proof of α, he can transform it
into a proof of ⊥, showing that the original “proof” was not actually a proof of
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α at all. An evidential procedure for α ought to do the same:
a. ¬α def= for any evidential procedure b, a. (b 6.α)
This definition is suitable only because envincability is not a purely formal rela-
tion.11 The definition for a.¬α is the same in its effect as the formal definition
of e : ¬α. The latter has more formal detail, but e proves ¬α by being a recipe
for rendering any putative proof of α unacceptable. The former is the same, but
is silent as to the method of rendering any b unacceptable.
Finally, we define universal quantification. This definition is not needed for
our discussion of classical and quasiclassical disjunction, but I will include it for
the sake of completeness. Under the traditional proof-theoretic interpretation,
a proof of a universal quantification ∀xϕ(x) is a function that maps the name
of a term t onto a proof of ϕ(t ). This definition tells us that there exists a proof
of every instantiation of the universal quantification. So we define:
a.∀xα(x) def= for every object t , and some evidential procedure e a. (e.α(t )).
This definition tells us that, by possessing the evidential procedure a that evinces
∀xα(x), we are equipped to substantiate any instantiation of that universal quan-
11The problem of interpreting negation is one of the main reasons why this discussion is in-
spired by recursive realizability, rather than Kripke frames. Under that interpretation, where 
here denotes the forcing relation,
k  ¬α def= ¬∃`≥k `α.
That is, ¬α is true at stage k if there is no later stage at which α is true. But this does not
explain why the agent at stage k would think that α is not true at some later stage. By couching
the discussion in terms of evidential procedures, we can describe what it is about a competent
speaker—namely, a procedure he may employ that rejects all putative substantiations of α—
that explains his belief that α is not true.
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tification. We should also require that a evinces these instances and nothing
else. This definition is inspired by the understanding of a universal quantifica-
tion as a long conjunction.
We are now equipped to show that the senses of classical and quasiclassi-
cal disjunction differ because ϕ ∨c ψ and ϕ ∨q ψ must be evinced by different
evidential procedures.
The recursive clause for classical disjunction is straightforward:
e .α ∨c β def= a ⊆ e and a.α, or b ⊆ e and b.β, or both.
The recursive clause for quasiclassical disjunction is not straightforward.
Remember that
α ∨q β def= ¬ (¬α ∧ ¬β)
so we need to determine which evidential procedure evinces ¬ (¬α∧ ¬β). Us-
ing the above clause for negation, we know
e . ¬ (¬α ∧ ¬β) def= for any evidential procedure f e . ( f 6.¬α ∧ ¬β).
In other words, possessing e requires that any putative evidential procedure f
of ¬α ∧ ¬β be rejected. To determine just what kind of evidential procedure
must be rejected, we employ the clause for conjunction:
e . ¬ (¬α ∧ ¬β) def=
for any evidential procedures g and h, e . (g 6.¬α) and e . (h 6.¬β).
We could apply the clause for negation once more so as to further analyze g and
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h. But I think at this point it would be clearer to describe e in these terms: e is
the evidential procedure according to which we reject all evidential procedures
that have us rejecting all substantiations of α and all substantiations of β.
We can finally show that the senses of ∨c and ∨q differ. For a disjunction
α ∨c β and a quasiclassical disjunction with the same disjuncts α ∨q β, the set
of their possible evidential procedures must differ. In the case of classical dis-
junction, either a or b will evince α ∨c β, assuming a.α and b.β. But neither
a nor b will evince the quasiclassical disjunction α ∨q β. Moreover, a’s and b’s
not evincing α∨q β is not the result of any simplifying assumption that eviden-
tial procedures are canonical. So there is at least one procedure a competent
speaker could use to substantiate the classical disjunction that would not sub-
stantiate a quasiclassical disjunction with the same disjuncts. Since the ways a
speaker would substantiate these sentences must differ, even as the disjuncts
are kept same, the senses of the connectives must differ. Thus, the meanings of
∨c and ∨q must differ.
2.5 EXPANDING THE RESPONSE
According to strict inferentialism, any difference in two constants’ inferential
roles implies a difference in their meanings. In the last section, I showed that
two constants’ inferential roles can be identical and yet their meanings can dif-
fer. I concluded that a constant’s inferential role does not exhaust its meaning.
By rejecting an identification of the constants’ meanings with their inferential
roles, we reject strict inferentialism. In this section, I will turn my attention to
a weaker version of inferentialism, which claims that significant difference in
inferential role indicates difference in meaning. This position seems to be one
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we actually employ when speaking English. We realize another speaker’s word
means something different than ours—contrary to what we may have assumed—
when he uses the word differently. Despite the initial intuitiveness of this ob-
jection, making this a viable objection to rivalry requires much more work on
the part of the weak inferentialist.
Without strict inferentialism’s identification of a constant’s meaning with its
inferential role, the weak inferentialist must claim that difference in meaning is
indicated by significant difference in inferential role. The problem for the weak
inferentialist is figuring out just what constitutes “significant” difference. Com-
pounding this problem is the fact that we have no reason to think that all parts
of an inferential role contribute to a constant’s meaning. Consider again the
example above: when hearing another speaker use some word whose meaning
I know, the speaker can use that word in ways different from the ways I would
use it and yet these uses would not necessarily count against my belief that our
words had the same meaning. In making this claim, I am not appealing to acci-
dents on the speaker’s part, where I consider his “use” of the word in question
to be an error. I claim that this holds even if the speaker’s use indicates a full-
fledged disposition to use the word in question in these different ways. These
differences in use can come from various sources: The word may have a certain
connotation for him that it does not have for me; the word may be associated
with a certain level of formality of speech that it lacks for me; or it may just be
that he prefers one word over some synonym for personal reasons. The upshot
of all this is that words may have some kind of core meaning for me that is pre-
served in a core subset of its inferential role, such that someone’s apparent use
of a word actually involves a change in meaning if his use of it indicates a lack
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of a disposition to make an inference contained in this subset. The weak infer-
entialist’s challenge to is specify which inferences form the core inferential role
that determines the meaning of a given logical constant. Without this speci-
fication, which seems to be a very difficult thing to do, the weak inferentialist
objection is merely skeptical.
2.6 SKETCHING A CASE OF RIVALRY
I began this chapter with the undebatable claim that rivalry is possible only if
the relevant classical and rival constants have the same meaning. Strict infer-
entialist theories argued that a logical constant’s meaning should be identified
with its inferential role; and since the rival and classical constants have differ-
ent roles by hypothesis, then rivalry is not possible. I then defended rivalry
by showing how a logical constant’s meaning is not exhausted by its inferen-
tial role, thus derailing the strict inferentialist’s objection. Weak inferentialism
claimed that a logical constant’s meaning consisted in some yet-unspecified set
of significant inferences. I pointed out that the specification of significant in-
ferences must be done, and that the task is not as straightforward as it may
appear.
Despite all this, so far I have only shown that strict and weak inferentialism
do not produce an a priori refutation of rivalry. So while both inferentialists
cannot simply show that the rival logician’s constants’ meanings are different
from the classical constants’ meanings, just by virtue of his using them differ-
ently, we cannot conclude that rivalry is possible. It is up to the rival logician to
show that the meanings of his constants do not differ from those of the classical
constants, thus refuting the change of meaning objection.
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We thus have two requirements that a challenge or rivalry must fulfill. The
first is a formal requirement, that the rival logic must be a rival to classical
logic as defined in the previous chapter. The second is a philosophical require-
ment, described above, that the rival logician can show that his logical con-
stants’ meanings do not differ from the corresponding classical logical con-
stants’ meanings. In the next chapter, we will examine Dummett’s challenge
to classical logic and show how he fulfills these requirements.
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CHAPTER 3
DUMMETT’S CHALLENGE TO
CLASSICAL LOGIC
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I will show that Dummett’s challenge to classical logic is a case
of rivalry. The previous two chapters described two requirements that Dum-
mett’s account must fulfill: a formal requirement that the logic Dummett ad-
vocates is a rival logic as defined in my first chapter, and a philosophical re-
quirement that Dummett has a response to the objection to rivalry described
in my second chapter. To show that Dummett fulfills these, I will offer a critical
overview of Dummett’s account. For clarity, I will divide his account into three
stages. The first is Dummett’s description of his theory of meaning. Dummett
will use this theory as the foundation for his rejection of bivalence, which con-
stitutes the second stage of his account. The third stage of Dummett’s account
is his diagnosis of why we might have thought that classical logic was correct
in the first place. After describing Dummett’s account, I will describe how it
constitutes a case of rivalry.
3.2 DUMMETT’S THEORY OF MEANING
A theory of meaning ought to be built around truth, according to Dummett,
because a sentence’s meaning should be identified with its truth conditions.
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To correctly analyze the connection between truth and meaning, he claims, we
must analyze what it means to know the meaning of a sentence. This shift from
talking about meaning to talking about knowledge of meaning is based on two
ideas Dummett imports from Frege: that the truth conditions of a sentence are
its sense, and that the sense of a sentence is what we know when we know the
meaning of the sentence. To build a theory of meaning around truth, Dummett
will need an explanation of what it means to say that a person knows the truth
conditions of a given sentence.
If knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing its truth conditions, what
kind of knowledge is this? One option is that our understanding of a sentence
consists in explicit knowledge: to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its
truth conditions, and knowledge of its truth conditions is “manifested by [an]
ability to state that condition” (1976, 45). This option has intuitive appeal, since
speakers of a language are usually able to express explicitly the truth conditions
for the sentences of their language; for example, by stating the T-schema for a
sentence. Also, when a person is unfamiliar with the meaning of a sentence,
we can explain its meaning by explicitly stating the sentence’s truth conditions.
Despite the appeal, it cannot hold generally that knowledge of sentences’ truth
conditions is explicit. The only way one could express the meaning of a sen-
tence would be by expressing its truth conditions, but those truth conditions
are expressed with a sentence whose meaning would need to be explained by
a further expression involving truth conditions, and so on. What this picture
lacks is some way of explaining the meaning of a sentence.
Knowledge of a sentence’s truth conditions must be implicit knowledge, ac-
cording to Dummett—the kind of knowledge that we can attribute to the speaker
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on the basis of some evidence other than an ability to state explicitly the truth
conditions for that sentence. Consider an example not involving meaning: a
touch-typist may not be able to specify which letters belong on every key when
she is presented with a typewriter with blank keys. But we would still say that
she knows the locations of all the letters on the keys, as evidenced by her abil-
ity to type on that blank keyboard. She has implicit, not explicit, knowledge of
the letters’ locations. We should bear in mind that “implicit knowledge” does
not refer to the psychological mechanisms of the speaker. In fact, Dummett
insists that if “a robot be devised to behave in just the ways that are essential
to a language-speaker, an implicit knowledge of the correct theory of meaning
for the language could be attributed to the . . . robot with as much right as to a
human speaker” (1976, 37). However, I suspect that Dummett would not claim
that any “speaker” that could pass a Turing Test would be considered to have
the relevant kind of implicit knowledge. An automaton programmed to use sen-
tences just as we do would not know the meanings of these sentences. I suspect
this is a form of the problem of other minds, for only a minded speaker can
know the meanings of the sentences it uses. To avoid superimposing the prob-
lem of other minds onto the question of whether a speaker knows the meaning
of a sentence, the “ways that are essential to a language-speaker” should in-
clude the requirement that the language-speaker has learned the language in
the same way we do. If the speaker has learned the language in the same way
that we have, we can be sure that the speaker is not simply an automaton.1
1I suspect that learning a language also requires a mind. But suppose a zombie were to
behave in just the ways that are essential to a language-learner. I want to avoid begging any
questions, so I must admit that, under my account, we may be forced to accept that the zom-
bie was a speaker despite its lack of consciousness. But we want a description of a theory of
meaning, not a theory of mindedness; and if we have been fooled into thinking that the zombie
possessed a mind, so be it.
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One consequence of claiming that knowledge of sentences’ meanings is im-
plicit, and thus requires manifestation, is that we have no justification for be-
lieving a sentence has some part of its meaning that cannot be put into use:
“if two individuals agree completely about the use to be made of [a] statement,
then they agree about its meaning” (1983, 98), so “there must be an observable
difference between the behaviour or capacities of someone who is said to have
that knowledge and someone who is said to lack it” (1983, 99). Dummett sup-
ports this by pointing to language-learning: when we learn a language, what
we learn is how to use the sentences of that language; and “our proficiency in
making the correct use of the statements and expressions of the language is all
that others have from which to judge whether or not we have acquired a grasp
of their meanings” (1983, 99). A putative speaker’s use of a sentence will be
the evidence for his knowing the meaning of that sentence, and we will need
an account of what counts as evidence for that knowledge. To accomplish this,
the theory of meaning must have two parts, according to Dummett. One is the
theory of reference. In a theory of meaning where the meaning of a sentence
consists in its truth conditions, the theory of reference will be “an inductive
specification of the truth-conditions of sentences of the language” (1976, 40).
The other is the theory of sense, which will explain what counts as evidence for
the implicit knowledge a speaker possesses when he understands a sentence.
The theory of sense will “lay down in what a speaker’s knowledge of any part of
the theory of reference is to be taken to consist, by correlating specific practical
abilities of the speaker to certain propositions of the theory” (1976, 40). We will
now clarify the structure of this “inductive specification” by contrasting it with
two other views.
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It is often assumed that a sentence’s truth conditions are determined by the
truth conditions of its components. By claiming that truth conditions deter-
mine a sentence’s meaning, it stands to reason that Dummett would also ac-
cept that a sentence’s meaning ought to be determined by the meanings of its
components. Let such a view be called componentialism. A further question is
whether a sentence’s components’ meanings alone determine the meaning of
that sentence, or if there is some other factor that contributes to the determin-
ing of the sentence’s meaning. Let radical componentialism be the view that
there is no such other factor; i.e., only the sentence’s components’ meanings
determine its meaning. This is the first type of theory of meaning with which I
will contrast Dummett’s theory.
Radical componentialism cannot be correct, Dummett would argue, because
such a theory cannot explain what it means to know the truth conditions of cer-
tain sentences. We can draw a distinction between those sentences whose truth
value is determined by the truth values of other sentences—logically complex
sentences, for example—and those whose truth conditions do not involve the
truth conditions of other sentences. Dummett sharpens this distinction. He
defines the set of reducible sentences, which includes the sentences of the for-
mer kind.2 Those sentences that are not reducible, which includes most of the
latter kind of sentences, are labelled barely true. The radical componentialist
2Dummett’s definition of reduction is:
The thesis that statements of a class M are reducible, in this sense, to statements
of another class R takes the general form of saying that, for any statement A in
M , there is some family A¯ of sets of statements of R such that, for A to be true,
it is necessary and sufficient that all the statements in some set belonging to A¯
be true; a translation is guaranteed only if A¯ itself, and all the sets it contains, are
finite. In such a case we may say that any statement of M , if true, must be true
in virtue of the truth of certain, possibly infinitely many, statements in R (1976,
56–7).
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has an account of how a speaker knows the meaning of a reducible sentence:
A person knows the truth conditions of a reducible sentence when he has im-
plicit knowledge of how its truth depends on the truth of the other sentences
to which it reduces. But it cannot be the case that all of our sentences are re-
ducible, for the same reason that it cannot be the case that knowledge of all our
sentences is explicit: the reduction must end at some point, and it is only at
this point that we will have an explanatory account of meaning. So reducible
sentences may reduce to other reducible sentences, but eventually there must
be a reducible sentence that reduces to a barely true sentence. However, the
radical componentialist has no way of describing the meaning of a barely true
sentence and thus no way of accounting for what it means to know the meaning
of a reducible sentence that reduces to that barely true sentence.
We can now turn our attention to the other view with which we will con-
trast Dummett’s position. A view that is componentialist, but admits that a
sentence’s meaning is determined by the meanings of its components and the
meanings of outside sentences is a holistic theory.3 We can define a spectrum
of theories by varying the outside sentences that play this role. One end of this
spectrum is radical componentialism, the limit case in which no outside sen-
tences contribute to determining the meaning of a sentence. The other end of
the spectrum would be radical holism. According to this view, all sentences of a
language contribute to determining the meaning of any given sentence of that
language.4
3Using the term holistic here may seem unusual, since Dummett often contrasts his view
with holism and yet Dummett’s own view will be considered holistic, as will be explained below.
But Dummett himself has admitted that his view is holistic in a moderate sense (see 1987, 271–
274). See Hansen (2001) for a longer discussion of this.
4Dummett is clearly alluding to Quine when he describes radical holism. According to Dum-
mett, Quine’s brand of radical holism is a radically holistic theory with the additional thesis that
“no truth-value assignment to any sentence is ever mandatory in the light of experience: a re-
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Dummett rejects radical holism on the grounds that it fails to account for
how we can know a sentence’s determinate individual content—that attribute
a sentence possesses, described by the theory of meaning, which serves to de-
termine a sentence’s correct use. Call this the sentence’s core content. If we
cannot know that a sentence’s core content is determinate, we lose the ability
to say that a use of a sentence is correct. If we cannot know that a sentence’s
core content is individual, we lose the ability to say that a use of a particular
sentence is correct when that use does not involve certain other sentences.
Dummett admits that radical holism can give some account of a sentence’s
meaning, but not its core content:
its meaning simply consists in the place which it occupies in the
complicated network which constitutes the totality of our linguistic
practices. The only thing to which a definite content may be at-
tributed is the totality of all that we are, at a given time, prepared to
assert; and there can be no simple model of the content which that
totality of assertions embodies; nothing short of a complete knowl-
edge of the language can reveal it (1983, 100).
So we cannot explain a particular sentence’s significance to linguistic practice
because we can only interpret linguistic practice monolithically.
What’s worse, radical holism requires knowledge of an entire language in
order to know the meaning of a certain sentence, yet it cannot explain how
fusal to accept it may always be compensated for by new assignments to sentences elsewhere
in the network.” Because of this additional thesis “any assignment to an individual sentence
is compatible with any range of experiences whatever,” and so “a knowledge of the truth-value
assigned to any one such sentence tells us nothing at all about how the world is, however well
we know the language, and so that sentence cannot be said to have a content” (1987, 273).
As we will see below, Dummett claims that any theory of meaning that fails to explain how a
sentence can have a determinate individual content must be incorrect. This reading of Quine
seems uncharitable, however. Even if we note that no sentence is immune to revision under
Quine’s theory, the varying levels of embeddedness provide some basis for arguing that certain
truth value assignments are more or less accurate, given a particular set of experiences. But
regardless of whether or not this is an accurate reading of Quine, the main value of identifying
radical holism is to serve as a contrast to Dummett’s own view.
66
we come to have the complete knowledge of the language required to possess
knowledge of a sentence’s core content. Under a radically holistic theory, it is
impossible for a speaker to learn the meaning of any sentence whose meaning
depends upon her knowing the meaning of other sentences, since she would
have needed to learn the meanings of those outside sentences first. Once again,
we see how language-learning is key to formulating a proper theory of meaning
for our language.
The radical holist could try to respond to this objection by claiming that the
process of learning a sentence’s meaning involves first learning some “initial
meaning” which is then expanded as the student learns more of the language.
The idea is that the sentence’s initial meaning is a kernel of meaning that per-
sists even as the student learns more uses for the sentence. The student then
possesses the full meaning when he has learned the entire language.
This response fails, however. Suppose the student did know the initial mean-
ing of some sentence. Since we assume that componentialism holds, the stu-
dent would also need to know the meanings of the sentence’s components. Fi-
nally, since this is a holistic view and not the limit case of radical componen-
tialism, the student will need to know the meanings of some other sentences. I
will grant the radical holist that the student knows the meaning of these further
sentences, even though it is unclear how he came to have them, or if the stu-
dent possesses these meanings fully or initially or whatever, or how the amount
of knowledge of these sentences he possesses affects the amount of the mean-
ing of the sentence in question he possesses. As the student learned more of the
language, the content of the sentence would change: it may participate in in-
ferences involving newly-learned sentences, for example, and these would need
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to be licensed by the sentence’s content. We expect this, since we are assuming
that the sentence’s initial meaning is properly “smaller,” so to speak, than its
full meaning.
A picture of meaning according to which a speaker grasps a sentence’s mean-
ing partially, but grows to grasp it fully, seems like a picture of meaning accord-
ing to each stage of the speaker’s language learning is a conservative extension
of the previous stage. But the radical holist wants to claim that we cannot deter-
mine the entirety of the sentence’s use simply by possessing its initial content.
So it seems that a radical holist must claim that some intermediate fragment
is not a conservative extension of the fragment learned immediately before it.
Otherwise the full language is a conservative extension of the initial fragment
described above and thus all uses of the sentence in the full language are deter-
mined by its initial content.
So the radical holist must hold that, while the sentence’s initial content may
license some use of that sentence in the context of the initial fragment, that
same use may be illegitimate at some later stage. In other words, we cannot
know that an sentence is correct in any intermediate fragment. For example,
given some sentence, that sentence can only be judged to be “really correct”
once the entire language is known, even if it is apparently correct at some in-
termediate state. The only explanation for why a particular use of the sentence
could be correct at an earlier stage and incorrect at a later stage is that the sen-
tence’s meaning changed. If this kind of language-learning allows a sentence’s
content to change this way, the later content does not seem to be an extension
of the first; it is simply a different content. So the radical holist was incorrect
when he said that the “initial content” somehow reflected the sentence’s mean-
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ing.
Dummett’s actual position is holistic, but neither radically componentialist
nor radically holistic. Dummett calls his moderate holism molecularism, ac-
cording to which “individual sentences carry a content which belongs to them
in accordance with the way they are compounded out of their own constituents,
independently of other sentences of the language not involving those consti-
tuents” (1983, 104). So a molecular theory of meaning built on truth would in-
clude a theory of reference to explain how the truth conditions of a sentence are
determined by the truth conditions of its components and the sentences of the
language that have those components as components. At the same time, it will
describe what implicit knowledge a speaker possesses when he understands a
sentence, based on the meaning of the sentence and its constituents.
So far, I have described the location of Dummett’s molecular theory of refer-
ence on a spectrum of componentialist theories of reference. Dummett locates
his position on another spectrum by distinguishing his theory of sense from
atomistic theories of sense, which would describe what constitutes evidence of
our knowing the meaning of a sentence by describing what constitutes evidence
of our knowing the meanings of the words in that sentence. In contrast, if our
theory of reference is molecular, the theory of sense will describe what consti-
tutes evidence of our knowing the meaning of a sentence by describing what
counts as evidence of our knowing the meanings of the constituent sentences of
that sentence.
Dummett admits that atomistic theories of sense are tenable, but faults them
for requiring that the smallest linguistically significant act is the utterance of a
word. Since we commonly view the utterances of sentences as the smallest lin-
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guistically significant act, according to Dummett, and this is just what molecu-
lar theories of sense require, we ought to prefer them over atomistic theories of
sense (1976, 38).
Dummett does not specify what constitutes linguistic significance, but we
can understand it in a way that builds a stronger case against atomism. He says
that besides “unimportant exceptions,” we think of utterances of sentences as
the smallest linguistically significant act (1976, 38). On a weak reading of this,
utterances of words are linguistically significant but utterances of sentences are
more linguistically significant somehow. The only way I can think to justify
this reading is to claim that sentences and words both possess meanings, and
that the possession of meaning is required for linguistic significance. But this
explanation should be unsatisfying. It makes our attribution of linguistic sig-
nificance look arbitrary because there is no explanation for why an utterance
of any meaning-bearing piece of language should be linguistically significant.
Moreover, meaning-bearing is not enough to ensure linguistic significance. Af-
ter all, the roots of a word are etymologically significant just because they pos-
sess meaning, but uttering a root of a word is often linguistically insignificant.
A better reason for thinking sentences to be the smallest linguistically sig-
nificant act is because words cannot be truth bearers. If words cannot be truth
bearers, then they cannot function in a theory of reference based on truth, like
the one Dummett advocates. The theory of reference must be more primitive
than the theory of sense, since we require that the theory of reference have an
inductive structure that the theory of sense coordinates with a description of
what counts as a manifestation of the implicit knowledge of sentences’ mean-
ings. We can thus be confident that a molecular theory of meaning, rather than
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an atomistic theory of meaning, is the most accurate way to structure the the-
ory of meaning for our language.
Dividing the theory of meaning into the theory of reference and the theory
of sense is necessary because of our desire to have a theory of meaning that
is both molecular and respectful of a speaker’s knowledge of a sentence’s truth
conditions being implicit. As a result, we were forced to accept that evidence
of a speaker’s implicit knowledge of a particular sentence’s truth conditions is
something specific (though not necessarily unique) to that sentence. In the next
section, we will focus on determining just what kind of abilities will count as
evidence for a speaker’s possessing knowledge of a sentence’s meaning.
3.3 CORRELATING ABILITIES AND SENTENCES
According to Dummett, a sentence is true only if we can recognize its truth con-
ditions’ obtaining. This thesis can be traced to Frege’s thesis that a sentence’s
sense determines its reference. Dummett says the following about the relation-
ship between senses and references of words, but the same holds for senses and
references in general, including those of sentences:
I understand [a] term by knowing what is needed, for any given ob-
ject, to establish that the object is the referent of the term, but, of
course, I cannot be expected to be able to determine that question
at a glance. At least from Frege’s standpoint, there cannot even be
a requirement of effective decidability: as long as I can recognize
something as settling the question, it is unnecessary that I should
be able in all cases to employ some procedure which will lead to a
settlement of it (1981, 488).
Given Frege’s identification of a sentence’s reference as its truth value, Dum-
mett is here suggesting that understanding a sentence consists in knowing how
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to determine whether its truth conditions obtain. I suggest that this “knowing
how” consists in possessing an ability to apply a procedure at the end of which
we recognize whether the sentence’s truth conditions obtain. Let such a pro-
cedure be called a verification procedure for the sentence. The theory of sense
will correlate to each sentence the ability to apply a verification procedure for
that sentence. Granted, the above quote seems to imply that understanding a
sentence does not require our being able to apply a verification procedure, but
only our being able to recognize a verification procedure when presented with
a description of it. But Dummett’s point is that we can understand a sentence
even if we cannot actually apply a verification procedure for it because the lim-
its of our understanding are determined by the actual abilities we possess to
apply verification procedures as well as certain potential abilities we possess by
virtue of some extending of our actual abilities. In this way, even a speaker’s
recognition of a verification procedure is underwritten by an ability to perform
that procedure.5
The shape of a given sentence’s verification procedure is partially determined
by that sentence’s being either barely true or reducible. In either case, knowl-
edge of the sentence’s meaning is implicit. In the case of barely true sentences,
“our model for such knowledge . . . is the capacity to use the sentence to give a
report of observation” (Dummett 1976, 57). If a person knows the meaning of
a sentence, he therefore knows its truth conditions. If the truth conditions ob-
tain at some moment, and he can recognize those truth conditions’ obtaining,
then an outward sign of his knowing the truth conditions will be a use of the
5Some may balk at this, since it seems as if we understand sentences that we could never ac-
tually verify. As I will explain below, Dummett claims that some of these sentences are ones we
do not actually understand. For other such sentences, we may possess the potential to perform
the procedure even if, at a given moment in time, we may not be able to actually perform it.
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sentence as an assertion that the truth conditions obtain, which Dummett calls
a “report of observation.” The verification procedure for a barely true sentence
will then be a procedure by which the speaker places himself in a position to
make such a report, followed by the report itself.
Dummett claims that grasping a reducible sentence’s truth conditions “will
consist in an implicit grasp of the way in which its truth depends upon the truth
of statements in [the set of sentences to which it reduces]” (1976, 57). But a
reducible sentence need not reduce to a barely true sentence—it may reduce to
another reducible sentence. For any given reducible sentence, there is a chain
of reductions which will eventually lead to a set of barely true sentences, so the
the verification procedure for a reducible sentence will be constructed from the
verification procedures of the barely true sentences to which it reduces. This
verification procedure must also make it clear that the speaker is aware that
those barely true sentences are the sentences which lie at the end of this chain
of reductions.
There appears to be an obvious flaw in Dummett’s position: a person can
apparently be using a sentence to report a direct observation but the truth con-
ditions may not actually obtain. One may be tempted to conclude that Dum-
mett is assuming that direct observations succeed. To be sure, understanding a
sentence requires that we be able to successfully make a direct observation. So
the skeptic can object that Dummett insists that a person have the ability to use
a sentence to report a direct observation, but we have no way of being sure that
any putative report is successful. I will gloss over this here; I think this is ac-
tually a problem with implementing Dummett’s theory of meaning, rather than
a problem with the theory itself. More precisely, this is a problem that affects
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our ability to ascribe to a putative speaker an ability to use a given sentence to
report a direct observation. Even if the skeptic is correct, and we cannot always
accurately ascribe this knowledge to the speaker, that does not affect the struc-
ture of the theory of meaning. The Fregean picture of sense requiring recog-
nition, so that a person cannot understand a sentence without being able to
recognize its truth conditions’ obtaining, is correct. (So says Dummett.) If we
are unable to ascribe understanding of a sentence to a speaker, that does not
impugn the theory of meaning; it only impugns our performance in ascribing
abilities to a person.
3.4 THE LIMITS OF ABILITIES
Based on the above account, truth will be bivalent just in case a competent
speaker of our language is able to perform a verification procedure for every
sentence of it. According to Dummett, this is what most speakers assume: We
have a “propensity to assume a realistic interpretation of all sentences of our
language, that is, to suppose that the notion of truth applicable to statements
made by means of them is such that every statement of this kind is determi-
nately either true or false, independently of our knowledge or means of know-
ing” (1976, 62). This propensity would be innocuous if our ability to verify sen-
tences extended so far as to allow us to verify any sentence, but this does not
seem to be the case. Above, we described Dummett’s argument that a person
knows the meaning of a barely true sentence only if he is able to use the sen-
tence to report a direct observation. Now, there are sentences that, by hypoth-
esis, we could never use in this way. These undecidable sentences can come
from “the use of quantification over an infinite or unsurveyable domain (e.g.
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over all future times); the use of the subjunctive conditional, or of expressions
explainable only by means of it; the possibility of referring to regions of space-
time in principle inaccessible to us” (1976, 46).
The advocate of bivalence—call her a bivalentist—needs some way of argu-
ing that we can perform undecidable sentences’ verification procedures.6 Ac-
cording to Dummett, since we cannot use an undecidable sentence ourselves
to report a direct observation, the bivalentist instead imagines the observations
being made by “some being with a different spatio-temporal perspective, or
whose observational and intellectual powers transcend our own, such powers
being modeled on those which we possess, but extended by analogy” (1976,
60). For example, we often consider sentences about the past to be understood
just as well as sentences about the present. We may be able to verify a sentence
in the present tense, but understanding sentences about the past requires us
to use our fallible memory. We understand past-tense sentences, Dummett’s
bivalentist would claim, because we understand the sentence’s verification pro-
cedure as being performed by a being whose memory is not as fallible as ours,
whose powers of observation are as clear in the case of past-tense sentences as
ours are in the case of present-tense sentences. Given an undecidable sentence,
the bivalentist claims that we understand it because the superhuman abilities
needed to perform its verification procedure have analogues among our actual
6Dummett’s opponent is usually characterized as being a realist. Surely a realist is an advo-
cate of bivalence, but I think this statement is true of more than just realists. As I understand it,
a realist is one who rejects the above picture of truth being relative to our ability to recognize it.
He takes issue not with Dummett’s rejection of bivalence, which occurs below, but rather with
Dummett’s recognition-immanent theory of meaning. In other words, his main disagreement
with Dummett occurs earlier in Dummett’s argument. At this point in Dummett’s argument, the
recognition-immanence of truth has already been established (supposedly). So the advocate of
bivalence who remains must be one that accepts the recognition-immanence of truth and who
also believes in bivalence. Thus, she must claim that we can perform a verification procedure
for any sentence.
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abilities. A grasp of these actual abilities, as well as an understanding of the
analogy between them and the superhuman abilities, provide us with the con-
ception of how the undecidable sentence’s verification procedure might be ap-
plied. According to the bivalentist, this conception is enough to underwrite our
understanding of that undecidable sentence.
The problem is that we can only account for our “understanding” of the un-
decidable sentences “by imputing to us an apprehension of the way in which
those sentences might be used by beings very unlike ourselves” (1976, 62). Since
we could never find ourselves in a position to use this sentence to report a di-
rect observation, this account fails to show us how we could have “come to be
able to assign to our sentences a meaning which is dependent upon a use to
which we are unable to put them” (1976, 62). In other words, this account fails
to show us that we understand those sentences. Bivalence requires that we can
use those sentences in principle and so puts us in a situation where we are un-
derstanding certain sentences based on a illusory analogical relationship with
other sentences; “that is, that we systematically misunderstand our own lan-
guage” (1976, 62).
I think that Dummett’s diagnosis can be strengthened and be made more
clear by offering a more complete account of the analogical extending by which
he claims we extend the abilities we actually possess. An example will be help-
ful. Consider the following sentences:
(s1) I can walk from my office to the water fountain in 150 steps.
(s2) I can walk from my office to New York in 1,500,000 steps.
(s3) I can walk on the surface of a sphere for an infinite number of steps.
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Under Dummett’s theory, if I understand these sentences, then for each sen-
tence I must possess some ability that allows me to verify it. I certainly under-
stand s1: I have the ability to walk 150 steps, and this is the ability that allows
me to see the water fountain at the end of my walk.7 I can show that I have
this ability by walking out my office door and taking 150 steps toward the wa-
ter fountain. To understand s2, I must have the ability to walk 1,500,000 steps.
However, I am not physically fit. Unlike my ability to walk 150 steps, I do not
actually have the ability to walk 1,500,000 steps. So how could I justify my be-
lief that I understand s2? Reasoning according to Dummett’s diagnosis goes like
this: I understand s1 for reasons indicated above; I can state what ability would
allow me to understand s2 regardless of whether or not I possess that ability;
I then recognize a similarity between these two abilities. I can walk 150 steps;
the only thing that prevents me from walking more—viz., 1,500,000—is my lack
of physical fitness. So I could have the ability to walk 1,500,000 steps if I were
to get into better shape. Similar reasoning may lead me to think that I also un-
derstand s3: I can walk 150 steps; the only thing that prevents me from walking
more—viz., an infinite number—is my finite lifespan. So I could have the ability
to walk an infinite number of steps if I were to live forever.8
Dummett describes this process as analogical extension, which I think is a
misleading way of characterizing what’s going on. Certainly there is analogical
reasoning going on here; the ability to walk 150 steps is like the ability to walk
7One may argue that I must also have the ability of recognizing the water fountain or maybe
the ability to count my steps. Assume that the ability to walk 150 steps is the only ability whose
exercising allows one to recognize s1’s truth conditions obtaining.
8Technically, what prevents me from possessing the ability that will allow me to recognize s3’s
truth conditions’ obtaining is my inability to walk an infinite number of steps in a finite amount
of time, since Dummett claims that verification procedures must be decidable. However, I think
that the force of the analogy is best felt when we compare these abilities without reference to
this restriction. The rest of my argument can proceed either way.
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1,500,000 steps and the ability to walk an infinite number of steps, insofar as
they are all an exercise of the more general ability of walking. Dummett argues
that we try to widen the number of sentences we understand by claiming that
we understand sentences which can be verified through abilities we do not pos-
sess actually but are nevertheless analogous to abilities we do possess actually.
This analogy-based stretching of our understanding can only extend so far, he
claims, and it breaks down when we try to explain how we might understand
undecidable sentences. In the case of undecidable sentences, the abilities nec-
essary to verify them are simply disanalogous to any ability we may possess
actually. In the above example, walking an infinite number of steps is disanalo-
gous to walking 150 steps. Now, I agree with Dummett that these abilities have
no analogues among the abilities we possess actually. But I think that Dummett
places too little emphasis on why these are disanalogous. Abilities’ being anal-
ogous or disanalogous should be based on more than the presence of a general
ability of which they are apparently instances. For example, the ability to walk
150 steps is not analogous to the ability to walk an infinite number of steps just
because they are both instances of walking. After all, the “ability” to walk for-
wards and backwards at the same time is written as an instance of the more
general ability of walking. But no human could possess this ability. In this case,
I have set up what appears to be an analogy. But there is no relevant analogy
between the ability to walk 150 steps and this other ability; the only similarity
we see is a similarity in the words we use to describe each of them (they both
begin with the ability to walk). But this is how we describe the abilities, not a
property of the abilities themselves, so we cannot use it as a basis of an exten-
sion.
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Analogical extension is better understood as being underwritten by the ways
in which we come to possess abilities. One comes to possess the ability to walk
150 steps by following a certain process. Since this ability is gained early in
one’s walking career, this process will be relatively rudimentary: learning to
keep one’s balance, to move one’s feet in a particular way, to manage one’s en-
ergy, etc. This process would also include physical changes in the learner, such
as an increase in stamina. The process by which an individual comes to possess
the ability to walk 151 steps is similar to the process just described. This second
process would be nearly identical to the first, but would require the learner to
gain slightly more mastery in all the areas described above. Similarly, the pro-
cess by which an individual came to possess the ability to walk 1,500,000 steps
would require even greater mastery in these areas. Nevertheless, we can con-
ceive of this advanced process as being an extension of the rudimentary pro-
cess first described. The ability to walk an infinite number of steps is not anal-
ogous to these abilities. Rather than claiming that there is no process by which
we could gain his supernatural ability—which seems true, but also question-
begging—let us assume that an individual possesses this ability. This individual
could not have come to possess this supernatural ability via a process that is
an extension of the rudimentary process described above.9 An individual can
come to possess a supernatural ability only via some supernatural process dis-
analogous to the processes by which we gain the abilities involved in legitimate
examples of analogical extension.
9If the force of this claim seems weak, recall that this ability, insofar as it is a semantic ability,
is best described as “the ability to walk a infinite number of steps in a finite amount of time,”
as described in my previous note.
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3.5 THE CHALLENGE TO CLASSICAL LOGIC
According to classical logic, for any sentence ϕ, either ϕ or ¬ϕ is true. Above,
we showed that a sentence is true only if we can recognize this, so if classical
logic is correct then for any sentence ϕ, we can recognize either ϕ’s or ¬ϕ’s
truth conditions’ obtaining. Since we are unable to recognize undecidable sen-
tences’ truth conditions’ obtaining, they cannot be true and so it appears that
classical logic is wrong.
This is Dummett’s challenge to classical logic in a nutshell. But there are
several steps we must follow before we can describe his challenge fully. The
first is to understand how a theory of meaning carries normative weight at all,
much less enough to ensure that we ought to believe its account of truth when it
conflicts with classical logic’s. We will do this by characterizing the relationship
between linguistic practice and a theory of meaning.
In order for language to be a tool for communication, the units of linguistic
practice—viz., sentences—must possess meanings. Moreover, communication
can be successful only if the speaker’s sentences mean what he believes them to
mean. How a sentence’s meaning relates to the ideas that the speaker intends
to communicate is far beyond the scope of this project. But I do think we can
say that a competent speaker will know the meanings of the sentences he uses
and will use a sentence to communicate an idea just because the sentence has
that meaning. In other words: given a sentence, we use it in a particular way
just because we believe it has a particular meaning. If that belief is incorrect,
and so a sentence has no meaning at all or a meaning other than we think it
does, then communication will not be successful.10 The upshot is that our be-
10Communication can be unsuccessful, albeit in a different sense, if the sentence’s truth value
80
lief that a sentence has a particular meaning requires some kind of justification;
otherwise we have no reason to think that we are actually communicating as we
intend or even at all. It falls to the theory of meaning to provide this justifica-
tion. A theory of meaning will describe how meaning behaves in our language;
e.g., how the meaning of a complex sentence is determined by its parts. If a
theory of meaning is to provide justification for our belief that a sentence has
a particular meaning, it must also explain how a sentence possesses the mean-
ing it does. An explanatory theory of meaning will then serve to underwrite the
assumption that our language is a tool for communication.
In the process of describing sentences’ meanings and how they have those
meanings, a theory of meaning will certify certain utterances as being correct
or incorrect. Note that the terms correct and incorrect here are different from
true and false. If a speaker is convinced that snow is black and utters “Snow
is black,” then he has uttered a false sentence. The speaker makes a mistake
about how the world is. A speaker’s utterance is incorrect, as I am using the
term, when he makes a mistake about the meaning of the sentence he utters.
For example, one way that a theory of meaning determines which utterances
are correct or incorrect is by determining which sentences of our language are
meaningful.11 Since language is a tool of communication by hypothesis, and
meaningless sentences cannot be used for communication, the use of a mean-
ingless sentence in a language would be an incorrect use of that expression,
relative to a particular theory of meaning.12
is different from what the speaker assumes. I will discuss this more below.
11I am not sure if sentences are necessarily meaningful. For example, if we accept that It is
noontime on the sun is meaningless, we could say that it is a sentence without meaning or that
it does not even count as a sentence.
12I do not see how it could be used correctly at all; maybe it is better, rather than say that it
is an incorrect use, I should say that it is not a correct use in the sense that it fails to fulfill our
intent to communicate.
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An expression can also be incorrect relative to a theory of meaning when
a speaker uses some sentence under the assumption that it has a particular
meaning when it actually has a different meaning. If an English speaker trav-
els to Germany and wants to express his belief “Snow is white” but instead ut-
ters the sentence Schnee ist rot, he has said something incorrect. Now, clearly
Schnee ist rot is false because it means “Snow is red” and snow is not red. But
his utterance is not incorrect because he asserted something false. Rather, we
trace the problem to his mistakenly believing that Schnee ist rot meant “Snow is
white.” So his utterance is incorrect relative to that theory of meaning just be-
cause, according to that theory of meaning, Schnee ist rot does not mean “Snow
is white.”13
We now know what it means to say that a given assertion is incorrect rel-
ative to a theory of meaning. But it should be clear now that we could posit
different theories of meaning for a language. And so currently we are unable to
say that a given assertion is correct, simpliciter, because that assertion may be
correct relative to one theory of meaning and incorrect according to another.
What we need is some way of adjudicating between theories of meaning, with
the hope of finding which theory of meaning is the right one for our language.
We could then speak of a given utterance as being correct without needing to
relativize this correctness to a particular theory of meaning. Indeed, I think we
must have a way of adjudicating between conflicting theories of meaning be-
cause we demand that we have a theory of meaning to underwrite our assump-
tion that our language is communicative. In fact, this underwriting role shows
us how to make this adjudication: A theory of meaning must be explanatory in
13Now we can see how correctness is distinct from, but somehow more fundamental than,
truth. Uttering a false sentence is blameworthy only if that sentence correctly reflects the
speaker’s intention.
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order to fulfill this role, so we choose the theory of meaning for our language
that best explains how our sentences have the meanings they do.
I think that any disagreement over correctness can be couched in terms of
conflict between theories of meaning, even when it may not be obvious that a
speaker is hypothesizing a theory of meaning to underwrite his assertion. For
example, the “Schnee ist rot” case above could be understood as an example of
conflicting theories of meaning. The speaker clearly possessed some informal
theory of meaning—since this is required for language to be communicative,
and clearly his intent was to communicate—according to which Schnee ist rot
means “Snow is white.” More than likely, the speaker does not have a well-
worked-out theory of meaning according to which his utterance of Schnee ist rot
is correct. But we assume that his assertion was an attempt to say something
true, and this requires that he was under the impression that, at the very least,
Schnee ist rot meant “Snow is white.”
An important objection to this picture is the skeptical challenge that we can-
not formulate the correct theory of meaning for our language. If we could not
formulate an explanatory theory of meaning, it must be because our language
is actually meaningless or because our language is meaningful but we lack the
ability to formulate an explanatory theory of meaning. I will simply dismiss the
first version of the challenge. Claiming that our language is meaningless implies
that our linguistic practices are not instances of communication, which seems
to fly in the face of empirical data. Dummett responds to the second version
by making a simplifying assumption that our language can be systematized in
a way that allows us to formulate a theory of meaning (Dummett 1976, 65). I
would go further and argue that our language’s being systematizable is required
83
for its being a tool of communication. It makes no sense to say that there is a
correct theory of meaning for our language, and it can thus be a tool of com-
munication, but it is impossible for us to have access to that theory of meaning.
If we cannot grasp the theory of meaning for our language, even in principle,
then we have no hope of knowing which linguistic practices are correct and
which are incorrect. If this happens, then our linguistic practices are commu-
nicative but not in a way that we can grasp. So our language may be a “tool for
communication” in some sense, but not in a sense that we can understand. In
other words, we cannot use our own language to communicate as we intend.
A fundamentally inaccessible theory of meaning therefore cannot fulfill our de-
mand that we have a theory of meaning to underwrite our assumption that our
language is communicative.
We now know what it means to say that a sentence is correct or incorrect ac-
cording to a theory of meaning, and how to choose the proper theory of mean-
ing for our language. We already knew what it means to say that a sentence is
wrong according to a logic: it contradicts the laws of that logic. We can now
explain how these accounts allow us to say that a given logic is correct or incor-
rect, and how Dummett’s account represents a challenge to classical logic.
Logics codify correct linguistic practice. A person’s use of a contradictory
sentence, say, the ball is red and the ball is not red is not incorrect “because it
violates classical logic,” as if classical logic somehow determines what linguis-
tic practices are correct and which are incorrect. Correct linguistic practice is
prior to any codification of it, and a logic is a regimentation of correct practice
and perhaps a heuristic for it. So any authority classical logic apparently has
is derived from whatever makes correct linguistic practices correct. I explained
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above how a theory of meaning ultimately determines which linguistic practices
are correct, and how we can determine which theory of meaning is correct for
our language. And so this is where we ultimately find the source of normativ-
ity for our linguistic practices: the correct theory of meaning will determine the
correct linguistic practices, whose regimentation will be the correct logic.
If we assume that classical logic is an accurate regimentation of a particular
set of linguistic practices, we can ask if those practices are correct. To ask this
question, we must determine whether those practices are the ones certified by
the theory of meaning for our language. But the linguistic practices regimented
by classical logic could only be approved by a theory of meaning built around
a recognition-transcendent notion of truth. No theory of meaning for our lan-
guage of this kind can be the correct theory of meaning for our language for rea-
sons given above, according to Dummett, so the linguistic practices regimented
by classical logic cannot be correct. Classical logic is an accurate regimentation
of incorrect linguistic practices. Since the whole point of a logic is to capture
correct linguistic practices, classical logic fails.
3.6 DUMMETT’S CHALLENGE AS RIVALRY
My first two chapters described two requirements for rivalry. The first was a
formal requirement: the rival logic, understood as a formal system, must stand
in a particular relationship to classical logic. The second was a philosophical
requirement: the rival logician must have a way of responding to the objection
that his particular challenge to classical logic amounted to a purely verbal dis-
agreement. By fulfilling both of these requirements, a rival logic will present a
genuine challenge to classical logic.
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Dummett’s logic fulfills the formal requirement for rivalry as described in
chapter 1. That requirement stated that a logic was a rival to classical logic just
in case it disagreed with classical logic over the validity of inferences, even while
classical logic and the rival logic agreed that the logical constants in those infer-
ences were actually logical constants according to certain minimal conditions
for logical constanthood. The motivation for this requirement was to ensure
that the rival logic’s challenge to classical logic could not be dismissed as the
result of a difference in dialect or translation function. Dummett’s project in-
volves a widening of intuitionistic semantic principles, but his logic is formally
identical to intuitionistic logic. In chapter 1, I showed that intuitionistic logic
was a rival to classical logic, so Dummett’s logic fulfills the formal requirement
for rivalry also.
Dummett has a response to the philosophical requirement for rivalry. The
motivation for this requirement was an objection prevalent in the literature,
and described at the beginning of chapter 2, which charged that rivalry was
impossible because the rival logician’s logical constants’ use differed from the
classical logician’s logical constants’ use. This difference in use implies a dif-
ference in meaning, according to the objection, and so the apparent rivalry re-
duces to a verbal disagreement. The philosophical requirement for rivalry is a
requirement to respond to this specific objection. In doing so, the rival logician
will have advanced a position according to which his challenge to classical logic
more than verbal disagreement.
A difficult way of responding to this objection would be to show that a differ-
ence in two logical constants’ uses does not imply a difference in their mean-
ings. I took a step in this direction in the second part of chapter 2, where I
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argued that we cannot identify a logical constant’s use with its meaning. But
I think that a fully-formed version of this response would require an account
of what the meanings of the logical constants actually consist in—a daunting
project, and one I will not pursue here.
Dummett’s position allows for a different response to the objection. He can
grant that a difference in two constants’ uses implies a difference in their mean-
ings, but even the classical logician must admit that we would not take the in-
correct uses of these constants into account when comparing them. One way
to draw the distinction between correct and incorrect uses is by appealing to
the theory of meaning for our language. Dummett’s theory of meaning rules as
incorrect the instances of LEM about which Dummett and the classical logician
disagree. There would be no difference in the correct uses of classical disjunc-
tion and Dummett’s disjunction. The objector thus loses the evidence he would
use to show that Dummett’s disagreement with classical logic is a case of verbal
disagreement.
It is unclear how the objector may attempt to rebut this response without
arguing that Dummett’s larger argument fails. Besides this strategy, one may
argue that Dummett’s standard of incorrectness described above is irrelevant
here. Dummett’s argument concerns the meaning of or, one may argue, but the
meanings under discussion here concern the meanings of the logical constants
∨c and ∨i (classical disjunction and intuitionistic disjunction, respectively).
This rebuttal fails, however. The logical constants in the formal language
are meant to correspond to the logical constants in the natural language—or,
in this case. Claiming that a flawed disjunction in the natural language can be
a correct disjunction in the formal language is to sever the connection between
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the two languages and to regard the formal language as a purely formal system.
One is welcome to do this as a project of pure mathematics, but it is no longer
logic as we understand it.
Although Dummett has the means of fulfilling the formal and philosophical
requirements for rivalry, this is distinct from concluding that his challenge suc-
ceeds and so has proven that classical logic is wrong. There is no question that
the logic he advocates fulfills the formal requirement for rivalry. But the many
attacks on his larger argument in the literature do not allow us to say defini-
tively that his position is correct. Since his larger argument forms the basis for
his response to the philosophical requirement for rivalry, we thus cannot con-
clude that his response to the second requirement is successful. But this does
not impact my project. I am not trying to show that there are rival logics that
successfully show that classical logic is wrong; I am trying to show that rivalry is
possible and explore the structure of these challenges. Even if we cannot say for
certain that Dummett’s larger argument succeeds, it certainly has merit, and so
his arguments do provide good reason to think that rivalry is possible, and that
his theory represents a genuine challenge to classical logic. That said, I do think
that the structure of Dummett’s account can be made clearer. In the next chap-
ter, I will offer a modest addition to Dummett’s account and a supplemental
challenge to classical logic based on this addition that will make the structure
of Dummett’s account more apparent.
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CHAPTER 4
AMENDING DUMMETT’S
CHALLENGE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter, I distinguished between three stages of Dummett’s account.
The first is his development of a theory of meaning that will serve as the back-
ground for the challenge proper. In this stage, Dummett concludes that under-
standing a sentence consists in the possession of a semantic ability or abilities
corresponding to the sentence that allow us to verify and falsify the sentence.
Dummett’s opponent in this stage is the realist, who argues for a recognition-
transcendent notion of truth.1 The second stage is Dummett’s argument that
bivalence does not hold because we do not possess enough semantic abilities
to verify and falsify every sentence of our language. Dummett’s opponent in this
stage is the bivalentist, who claims we do possess, at least in principle, the se-
mantic abilities necessary to understand our entire language. Note that we as-
sume that the bivalentist agrees with Dummett on the success of the first stage,
and her objections are different from the realist’s. The third stage is Dummett’s
diagnosis of why one may have erroneously thought that bivalence held.
I claimed that Dummett describes bivalence as arising from unwarranted
1Referring to Dummett’s opponent here as “the realist” serves to give that opponent a name,
not to assert that any variety of realism would disagree with Dummett at this point or in this
way.
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idealization: it diagnoses our faith in bivalence as coming from a misrepresen-
tation of the extent to which we can extend our abilities to apply verification
processes for a sentence. Warranted idealization can occur, according to Dum-
mett, when we draw analogies between the abilities we possess actually and
those we possess only in principle. I will refer to these as our actual abilities
and our potential abilities, respectively. Eventually, the analogies we draw be-
come strained, and we mistakenly attribute to ourselves abilities that we do not
possess actually, and which have no analogues among the abilities we possess
actually. These are our unobtainable abilities.
In this chapter, I will propose an amendment to Dummett’s theory of mean-
ing. According to Dummett, we understand a sentence just in case we pos-
sess two abilities: the ability to verify the sentence and the ability to falsify
the sentence. I will show that these abilities each can be decomposed into
two abilities: the ability to identify the objects named in that sentence, and
the ability to recognize whether the relevant predications of those objects oc-
cur. I will also show these further semantic abilities require, as a manifestation
condition, that speakers direct their attention toward an appropriate region of
spacetime. Based on this amended first stage, I will offer amended second and
third stages that follow the same methodology as Dummett’s original second
and third stages, but which take advantage of my additions.
To be clear: I am not suggesting that Dummett’s challenge to classical logic
is flawed, or that my amended version of his challenge replace his original one.
That said, my amended version offers two advantages. First, it will offer a novel
mechanism with which to characterize the idealization of our semantic abil-
ities. Analogical extension is difficult to comprehend, and I suggest that my
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mechanism is more clear. Using this other extension mechanism may result
in different lines being drawn between the actual and potential abilities, and
the potential and unobtainable abilities. But Dummett’s point—that where the
lines fall is unimportant to his challenge as long as the set of unobtainable abil-
ities is nonempty—will survive and still serve as the basis for an attack on biva-
lence. The second advantage of my amended version is that it will allow us to
compare abilities’ degrees of idealization, making it possible to take a chain of
abilities and identifying the point at which to draw the line between the po-
tential and unobtainable abilities, in theory. Dummett does say that we do
not need to know precisely where this line lies. In order to mount a challenge
against classical logic, according to Dummett, all we need to show is that the
set of unobtainable abilities is nonempty.2 I do agree with him on this point,
but I also think that we have a sense that a given semantic ability involves more
or less idealization than another. The force of Dummett’s challenge is amplified
when we have a way of capturing this intuition.
Even after describing these advantages, I must clarify my motivations for
amending Dummett’s challenge and explain its place in my larger project. As
shown in the last chapter, Dummett’s challenge is an example of rivalry. My
amended version of the challenge makes additions to his theory of meaning,
but I am not motivated by a desire to improve Dummett’s challenge. My ad-
ditions to Dummett’s theory will provide more structure upon which Dummett
can base his challenge while remaining faithful to spirit of the original chal-
lenge. In that sense, my amended version of Dummett’s challenge is not a new
challenge, but a more detailed presentation of Dummett’s original challenge.
2Strictly speaking, we also need an assurance that the members of the unobtainable abilities
correspond to sentences of our language such that not possessing those abilities implies that
we do not understand these sentences.
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This additional detail will be used in the next chapter to describe Dummett’s
characterization of classical logic, and compare it to characterizations of classi-
cal logic from other cases of rivalry.
4.2 AMENDING DUMMETT’S FIRST STAGE
In his original first stage, Dummett describes a speaker’s understanding a sen-
tence ϕ in terms of his ability to apply a verification procedure for ϕ. The
following example that will show how spatiotemporal location and a speaker’s
ability to identify the subject of a predicate are crucial to understanding his
ability to apply a verification procedure for a sentence. Because of their impor-
tance, they must be included in our discussion to allow our accurately ascribing
understanding to speakers.
Suppose Karl is standing in front of, and looking at, the Empire State Build-
ing. He would then seem to be in a good position to verify or falsify the sen-
tence The Empire State Building is grey, hereafter Grey(EB). We may tentatively
describe the ability he possesses to verify Grey(EB) as the ability to recognize
whether the Empire State Building is grey. We will denote it as
[
Grey(EB)
]
. For
the sake of argument, let’s assume that Karl possesses
[
Grey(EB)
]
actually, so
there is no question of whether we are idealizing Karl’s semantic abilities. Since
Karl can actually verify Grey(EB), Karl therefore understands Grey(EB), but only
in a partial sense, according to Dummett, until Karl also possesses the ability to
falsify Grey(EB).3
3In general, Karl’s understanding a sentence does not require his being able to actually carry
out that sentence’s verification procedure. Here we consider a simplified case, where we do not
yet need to address the complications of whether Karl’s not being able to actually execute a
sentence’s verification procedure affects his understanding of that sentence.
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Suppose now that Karl flies to Paris and stands in front of the Eiffel Tower.
He would then seem to be in a good position to verify or falsify the sentence The
Eiffel Tower is painted a bronze color, hereafter Bronze(ET). We may tentatively
describe the ability he possesses to verify Bronze(ET) as the ability to recognize
whether the Eiffel Tower is bronze colored. We will denote it as
[
Bronze(ET)
]
.
Again, assume that he possesses this ability actually. Since Karl can actually
verify Bronze(ET), Karl therefore partially understands Bronze(ET), according to
Dummett.
Based on Dummett’s position, the following questions are roughly equiva-
lent:
• On what grounds can we say that Karl can verify and falsify Grey(EB)?
• How can Karl show that he understands this sentence?
• In what way can one conclude that Karl possesses
[
Grey(EB)
]
?
In all cases, our answers will reference Karl’s exercising of
[
Grey(EB)
]
and de-
scribe his use of Grey(EB) to report a direct observation.4 Yet our actual an-
swers to these questions will differ depending on whether Karl is in New York
or Paris—even when we assume he understands Grey(EB) in both cities. In New
York, his understanding of Grey(EB) was underwritten only by
[
Grey(EB)
]
. In
Paris, he still possesses
[
Grey(EB)
]
but his distance from the Empire State Build-
ing prevents us from saying that he simply exercises
[
Grey(EB)
]
to underwrite
his understanding of Grey(EB). If his understanding of Grey(EB) requires his ex-
ercising
[
Grey(EB)
]
, then his understanding of Grey(EB) while in Paris must be
underwritten by
[
Grey(EB)
]
and an additional ability: the ability to travel from
4This “reporting” is important. It’s an action that we, as arbiters of Karl’s understanding,
understand to indicate an awareness on Karl’s part of the connection between the sentence
Grey(EB) and the verification procedure involving
[
Grey(EB)
]
.
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Paris to New York somehow. So Grey(EB) is understood more immediately, in a
sense, in New York than in Paris. We will say that it is proximately verifiable and
proximately falsifiable in New York City, but neither proximately verifiable nor
proximately falsifiable in Paris.5
The upshot of this is that we are unable to discuss the ability that under-
writes our understanding of a sentence without also mentioning the circum-
stances in which that ability is exercised. Even if a speaker possesses the seman-
tic ability
[
ϕ
]
, the speaker can perform a verification of ϕ only if the speaker ex-
ercises
[
ϕ
]
in circumstances that allow this ability to succeed. Karl may possess[
Grey(EB)
]
, but he must exercise
[
Grey(EB)
]
while looking at the Empire State
Building in order to convince us that he understands The Empire State Building
is grey.6 It follows that a speaker may exercise
[
ϕ
]
under certain circumstances
and fail to perform a verification of ϕ. If Karl exercises
[
Grey(EB)
]
while looking
at the Eiffel Tower, he will not be able to perform a verification of Grey(EB). But
we may not count this failure as evidence that Karl did not understand Grey(EB).
His failure is not due to his not possessing
[
Grey(EB)
]
or because Grey(EB) is
without truth value, but only because he exercised
[
Grey(EB)
]
under inappro-
priate circumstances.
5There is a difference between a sentence’s being proximately verifiable and its being true,
and its being proximately falsifiable and its being false—even if we understand truth and fal-
sity in justificationist terms. Saying that Grey(EB) is proximately verifiable in New York means:
assuming Grey(EB) can be verified at all, it can be verified most immediately in New York. This
definition must not be understood as meaning that proximate verifiability is conditioned on a
sentence’s actually being true. Rather, we determine where one would verify the sentence if it
were true. A false sentence like The Empire State Building is red is proximately verifiable in New
York, because the most appropriate place to attempt its verification is in New York.
6Dummett claims that using a sentence to report a direct observation is the model manifes-
tation of implicit knowledge of that sentence’s meaning, so we focus here on direct observa-
tions. One may still object that one need not observe, say, the Empire State Building to knows
is color: one need only observe some kind of authoritative photograph or other source. In or-
dinary cases, this kind of observation ought to be sufficient. However, the question of what
constitutes an acceptable manifestation is a complicated one to answer, and a separate one at
that. So we will consider only the model case.
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This example reveals a manifestation condition for a semantic ability: that a
speaker be observing an appropriate region of spacetime. For example, Karl
can exercise
[
Grey(EB)
]
in the way relevant to manifesting understanding of
Grey(EB) only if he is directing his attention toward the Empire State Building.
In addition, he must be able to identify the Empire State Building; we will turn
our attention to this further condition shortly.
In essence, the above story illustrates how truth is regulated by a principle
more specific than Dummett’s Principle C (“if a statement is true, there must be
something in virtue of which it is true”). The realist may appeal to Principle C
in order to support a correspondence theory of truth, where the “something in
virtue of which” a sentence is true is some feature of the world. The above story,
in the hands of the realist, would suggest that that feature of the world can be
located at some restricted region of spacetime. Dummett claims that the real-
ist has his conceptual priority backwards: the configuration of the world does
not tell us which sentences are true; rather, the true sentences tell us about the
configuration of the world. So the above story, in the hands of Dummett, would
suggest that each sentence’s contribution to a full description of the world is
restricted to a particular region of spacetime. The realist would claim that the
greyness present in the region of spacetime occupied by the Empire State Build-
ing underwrites the truth of Grey(EB). Dummett would claim that the truth of
Grey(EB) assures us of the presence of greyness in the region of spacetime oc-
cupied by the Empire State Building.7
Having invoked Dummett’s understanding of Principle C, I will introduce
two convenient pieces of shorthand: we will say that a verifier or falsifier of a
7Dummett and the realist would disagree as to the nature of spacetime. The realist would
claim that spacetime exists independently of us, while Dummett would claim that spacetime is
the spatiotemporal grid that makes communication possible (see Dummett 2004, 51 and 55).
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sentence occupies a particular region of spacetime, similar to the way that a
realist may say that a truthmaker for a sentence occupies a certain region of
spacetime. To say that a verifier or falsifier for a sentence is located at a spa-
tiotemporal location is to say that a speaker’s belief in that sentence’s truth or
falsity is justified—and thus his understanding of that sentence partially un-
derwritten—because he is directing his attention toward that location and ex-
ercising his ability to perform a verification (or falsification) of this sentence.8
Speaking of verifiers and falsifiers appeals to the intuition that a verification
procedure succeeds only if a speaker is focusing his attention on an appropriate
region of spacetime, and this connection obtains based on something particu-
lar to that region of spacetime. That said, verifiers are not objects in any sense,
even as we may casually refer to them as being “located” in a particular region
of spacetime.
So far, we have shown that semantic abilities have manifestation conditions
specifying what region(s) of spacetime a speaker must be observing. Before
moving on to the amended version of Dummett’s first stage, we must talk about
another type of ability a speaker must possess.
Consider Dummett’s original first stage. There, understanding a sentence
consisted in the possession of two abilities. Using the example of Grey(EB),
these abilities would be:
(i) the ability to verify Grey(EB)
(ii) the ability to falsify Grey(EB)
8This understanding is partial, not full, because Dummett requires that the speaker must
possess the ability to verify and the ability to falsify a sentence. So a speaker who understands
some sentence will also need to have access to a falsifier for that sentence, along with an ability
to apply the relevant procedure for the sentence.
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Or, to use the language from the above paragraph,
(i) the ability to recognize the presence of greyness in the region of
spacetime occupied by the Empire State Building
(ii) the ability to recognize the absence of greyness in the region of space-
time occupied by the Empire State Building
Expressed this way, we can see that these abilities no longer assure understand-
ing of Grey(EB). The ability to recognize the presence of greyness in the region
of spacetime occupied by the Empire State Building is the same practical ability
as the ability to recognize the presence of greyness in the region of spacetime
occupied by, say, Notre Dame de Paris. Both of these are names of one ability—
the ability to recognize the presence of greyness.9 There’s nothing wrong with
one ability being involved in the meaning of multiple sentences. The ability to
recognize greyness is a piece of what a speaker must possess in order to under-
stand both The Empire State Building is grey and Notre Dame de Paris is grey, the
latter hereafter Grey(ND). But a speaker may understand one of these sentences,
and not understand the other, if he were unable identify the Empire State Build-
ing or Notre Dame. This contrast is more striking if a speaker had no exposure
to French; such a speaker could not understand Grey(ND) because the subject
phrase of the sentence would be gibberish to him.10 The problem, it seems, is
a speaker’s possessing the abilities of recognizing the presence and absence of
greyness ensures that he can recognize the predication appearing in Grey(EB),
but he cannot understand Grey(EB) unless he can recognize the subject of the
9The same goes for the ability to recognize the absence of greyness, but for the sake of sim-
plicity we will set that aside.
10If the example involving Notre Dame is not sufficiently evocative, consider a sentence de-
scribing an object as grey, where the name of the object is given in an obscure, untransliterated
language.
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sentence also. So we must amend Dummett’s account to include subject iden-
tification. A speaker must be able to recognize the Empire State Building, but
not in any context whatsoever. Rather, we need a requirement that establishes a
connection between subject identification and verification procedures. We can
thus limit the requirements for subject identification by claiming that a putative
speaker must be able to identify the subject of the given sentence in the context
of a verification of that sentence, and he must be able to identify the subject of
the given sentence in the context of a falsification of that sentence. One would
expect that a speaker be able to identify the subject of a given sentence in far
more contexts than those described in these requirements. Indeed, Dummett’s
larger philosophy of language includes an account of what a speaker must know
in order to know the meaning of a name. But here we are not concerned with
giving an account of whether a speaker understands, say, the name Notre Dame
de Paris. Rather, we are concerned with ensuring that a speaker’s abilities to
apply a verification procedure for a sentence are sufficient to underwrite his
understanding of that sentence.
Note that we cannot simply assume that a speaker can identify the subject
of a predicate, even if it is described explicitly in the semantic ability in ques-
tion; e.g., “the ability to observe the presence of greyness in the region of space-
time occupied by the Empire State Building.” That is, even if a speaker were to
possess this ability, we have no guarantee that the speaker would be able to
identify the Empire State Building. To suggest otherwise is to fail to see the am-
biguity of this ability. “The region of spacetime occupied by the Empire State
Building” defines a particular region of spacetime, but this definition is a name
for that particular region of spacetime. A speaker may apparently manifest this
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ability while being unfamiliar with the Empire State Building, believing him-
self to be manifesting, say, “the ability to observe the presence of greyness in
the region of spacetime occupied by the building at the southwest corner of
the intersection of 34th Street and 5th Avenue.” This speaker’s manifesting of
this ability is indistinguishable from his manifesting “the ability to observe the
presence of greyness in the region of spacetime occupied by the Empire State
Building.” Yet this speaker would not understand Grey(EB) because he would
not know the meaning of the phrase the Empire State Building.
We are now ready to amend Dummett’s first stage. To make his account
more explicit, and to include subject identification, I propose the expanded
Dummettian thesis that understanding a sentence ϕ consists in possessing the
following abilities:
(i) the ability to identify those objects mentioned in a verification of ϕ,
written Id+
[
ϕ
]
(ii) the ability to identify those objects mentioned in a falsification of
ϕ, written Id−
[
ϕ
]
(iii) the ability to recognize the relevant predications of the above-mentioned
objects appearing in a verification of ϕ, written Rec+
[
ϕ
]
(iv) the ability to recognize the relevant predications of the above-mentioned
objects appearing in a falsification of ϕ, written Rec−
[
ϕ
]
Let us refer to the first two as examples of identificational abilities and the sec-
ond two as examples of recognitional abilities.
Earlier in this chapter, I described a manifestation condition for semantic
abilities: that a speaker be observing an appropriate region of spacetime. Call
the region of spacetime being observed by a speaker his spatiotemporal focus.
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While spatiotemporal focus is not explicitly mentioned in the above list, its in-
fluence is still felt in ways we will explore in the next section.
4.3 THE ROLE OF SPATIOTEMPORAL FOCUS
In this section, we will formalize spatiotemporal focus so as to understand how
it comports with the logical constants. We have two reasons to analyze the con-
nection between spatiotemporal focus and semantic abilities. First, we learned
from the above story that a putative speaker must have an appropriate spa-
tiotemporal focus in order for his action to count as evidence of his understand-
ing a particular sentence. Second, a formalization of spatiotemporal focus will
allow us to resolve an ambiguity we may encounter when attempting to iden-
tify which semantic ability a putative speaker is manifesting in a given situation.
This ambiguity arises because semantic abilities are just practical abilities that
we use for semantic ends. For example, Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
is just the ability to rec-
ognize a predication of greyness, which is a non-semantic, practical ability. By
describing Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
as a semantic ability, we are not describing it as an
entirely new ability. Rather, we are noting the connection between the ability
to recognize greyness and Grey(EB). We partition off certain uses of our abil-
ity to recognize greyness—those in which our exercising of that ability occurs
in the context of a verification procedure for Grey(EB)—and refer to those uses
as being uses of the semantic ability Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
. All of this follows from
Dummett’s theory of meaning. Up to this point, we have not described a way
to distinguish between manifestations of two different semantic abilities when
they share the same underlying practical ability. For example, Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
and Rec+
[
Grey(ND)
]
are different semantic abilities, but since they share an un-
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derlying practical ability, a manifestation of either will be a manifestation of
the ability to recognize greyness.11 The way we differentiate between a putative
speaker’s manifesting Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
rather than Rec+
[
Grey(ND)
]
is by noting
whether he is directing his attention toward the Empire State Building or Notre
Dame when he declares that greyness is present.
To have a rigorous account of spatiotemporal focus, we must first define
what regions of spacetime are relevant. Let a spatiotemporal coordinate be an
ordered quadruple 〈s1, s2, s3, t〉 that we interpret as a point in spacetime, with
each of the sn ’s representing that point’s location along a spatial dimension and
t representing that point’s location along a temporal dimension.12 Let P be the
set of all sets of spatiotemporal coordinates that are both connected and open,
and call the members of P spatiotemporal patches. In a sense, spatiotempo-
ral patches are a more general case of the “spacetime worms” one may use to
capture an ordinary object’s enduring through an interval of time. Indeed, any
spacetime worm of any object is a member of P. The main difference between
patches and worms is that patches may not be occupied. We are not looking to
capture an object during an interval of time, only a region of space during an
interval of time.
A proper account of spatiotemporal focus requires two mappings: one from
a patch to the set of sentences whose verifiers are located there, and another
11We cannot appeal to a speaker’s intent when we attempt to determine whether a given
manifestation is a manifestation of Rec+
[
Grey(EB)
]
or Rec+
[
Grey(ND)
]
. Dummett’s theory of
meaning is built around the idea that a putative speaker understands a language just in case
a community that speaks that language can judge that he understands the language. So under-
standing can only be manifested in actions observable to others.
12I am claiming that, for a given semantic ability, a speaker’s having an appropriate spa-
tiotemporal focus is manifestation condition for that ability. We could include more informa-
tion in the manifestation conditions, such as location in a possible world. In that case, our
coordinates would be ordered quintuples that included spatiotemporal coordinates and the in-
dex of the world in which the area was located. To keep my discussion simple, for the time
being I will use spatiotemporal coordinates only.
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from a patch to the set of sentences whose falsifiers are located there. These
mappings must be relativized to a possible distribution of verifiers and falsifiers
across the patches. Let a procedural specification s be an ordered pair
〈
s+, s−
〉
,
where s+, s− ( F, such that s+ and s− are those sentences that can be simul-
taneously verified and falsified, respectively. Given Dummett’s rejection of di-
aletheism, s+ and s− will be disjoint. We will require that these specifications
be complete: s+ ∪ s− = F, so while there could be as many as 2|F| procedural
specifications, in practice there will be fewer because of extralogical connec-
tions between sentences.13 For example, verifying Bronze(ET) implies that we
cannot verify The Eiffel Tower is painted pink. Let S be the set of all procedural
specifications. We will index the procedural specifications, and carry that index
over into the members of each ordered pair; so S= { s1, s2, . . . } and si =
〈
s+i , s
−
i
〉
.
For every si ∈S, let pii be an ordered pair of mappings
〈
pi+i ,pi
−
i
〉
. Let pi+i :P→
℘(F) such that, for p ∈ P, if ϕ ∈ pi+i (p), then a speaker can successfully manifest
Rec+
[
ϕ
]
if he is directing his attention toward p. Let pi−i : P→ ℘(F) such that,
for p ∈P, if ϕ ∈pi−i (p), then a speaker can successfully manifest Rec−
[
ϕ
]
if he is
directing his attention toward p. For example,
Grey(EB) ∉pi+i (The front of the Eiffel Tower at noon on July 12, 2010)
but
Bronze(ET) ∈pi+i (The front of the Eiffel Tower at noon on July 12, 2010).
13The set of procedural specifications does not constitute an exhaustive catalog of possible
verificationist truth specifications. If so, then the requirement that procedural specifications
be complete would amount to an endorsement of bivalence. Rather, the procedural specifica-
tions should be seen as a catalog of the extralogical connections between the sentences of our
language. Dummett would claim that any verificationist truth specification would be a proper
subset of a procedural specification
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We can also describe pi+i and pi
−
i by saying that a sentence ϕ will be proximately
verifiable at p under procedural specification si just in case ϕ ∈pi+i (p) and prox-
imately falsifiable at p under procedural specification si just in case ϕ ∈ pi−i (p).
For any spatiotemporal patch p, we call
〈
pi+i (p),pi
−
i (p)
〉
its semantic map under
specification si , and refer to pi+i (p) and pi
+
i (p) as its positive semantic map and
negative semantic map under procedural specification si , respectively.
Note that we map patches onto sentences, rather than the other way around,
because we do not assume that a given sentence has a “canonical verifier,” as if
any given sentence ϕ is proximately verifiable at only one spatiotemporal patch.
Sentences may have multiple verifiers and falsifiers; i.e., for a given sentence ϕ,
there may be patches p and p ′ such that a speaker’s verification of ϕ could in-
volve his directing his attention toward p or his verification of ϕ could involve
his directing his attention toward p ′. For example, suppose p, p ′ ∈ P, and let p ′
be the patch such that 〈s1, s2, s3, t〉 ∈ p just in case 〈s1, s2, s3, t +ε〉 ∈ p ′, where ε
is some arbitrarily small amount of time. Informally, p ′ is spatially the same as
p, but slightly shifted temporally. If Grey(EB) ∈ pi+i (p), then it ought to be the
case that Grey(EB) ∈pi−i (p ′) also. If we can confirm the color of the Empire State
Building at one instant, we ought to be able to do the same one instant later.
Verifiers are ubiquitous: for any p, p ′ ⊆ P, if p 6= p ′ then pi+i (p) ∪ pi−i (p) con-
tains at least one sentence that is not a member of pi+i (p
′) ∪ pi−i (p ′). In other
words, there is no P (P such that ∪p∈P (pi+i (p)∪pi−i (p))= F. Ubiquity formalizes
the fact that each spatiotemporal patch contains at least one unique verifier or
one unique falsifier to contribute to our project of determining how much of
F we understand. For example, for any patch p, verifiers and falsifiers for The
patch p is nonempty and The patch p is empty would both be located at p, if
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under different procedural specifications.
We will define pi+i and pi
−
i recursively. Since Dummett advocates a compo-
nentialist semantics, and because we assume that a falsification for a sentence
is also a verification for its negation, our base cases will use the atomic sen-
tences and their negations. We will then continue our definition of pi+i and
pi−i by explaining how proximate verifiability and proximate falsifiability com-
port with the logical constants. To respect Dummett’s verificationism, we will
express these definitions in terms of confirmation, represented as conditional
probability, utilizing the probabilistic semantics introduced by Popper and de-
veloped by Field (1959; 1977). In order to adapt this probabilistic semantics to
the current context, we need to modify the way in which evidence is handled.
Consider the case of a sentence’s being certain. According to Field’s semantics,
a sentence A is certain just in case ∀B P(A | B) = 1, where B ranges over the
set of all sentences.14 This definition is too general for our purposes, because
we are relativizing a sentence’s conditional probabiliy to some spatiotemporal
focus. The spirit of Field’s definition is that a sentence is certain when the con-
ditional probability of that sentence is 1 regardless of what evidence is consid-
ered. To relativize certainty to a spatiotemporal focus, we will specify evidence
by referencing semantic maps. Given a patch p, a sentence ϕ is certain under
p just in case, for every γ ∈ pi+i (p), P
(
ϕ | γ) = 1.15 That is, ϕ is certain under
p just in case ϕ’s conditional probability remains 1 regardless of the evidence
we gather from p. One should not interpret this definition as suggesting that
every γ makes ϕ certain, as if ϕ has a low absolute probability but any γ is good
14If B = ¬ A, then P(A | B) 6= 1, but I do not believe this should count against A’s being certain.
Therefore, I assume ¬ A is excluded from the set of sentences over which B ranges. I cannot
see where Field makes this exclusion, so any errors from this assumption are mine.
15Unlike Field’s definition of certainty, here we do not need to exclude ¬ϕ from the possible
values of γ because we cannot have ϕ,¬ϕ ∈pi+i (p), according to Dummett.
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enough to make ϕ certain. Rather, ϕ’s certainty consists in its conditional prob-
ability remaining 1 regardless of the other evidence we consider. So every γ is
a piece of evidence that we consider in a search for disconfirming evidence for
ϕ. Finding none, with ϕ’s probability remaining 1 throughout the process, it is
certain at p.
Certainty will play a role in the below definitions, as will a complementary
concept: Given a patch p, a sentence ϕ is groundless under p just in case, for
every γ ∈ pi+i (p), P
(
ϕ | γ) = 0. A sentence’s being groundless under p does not
amount to a claim that p cannot contribute any evidence to confirm its being
true. Rather, a sentence is groundless under p just in case any evidence from p
confirms, in the strongest possible sense, that the sentence is not true.
We can now define pi+i and pi
−
i . Let pi
+
i : P→℘(F) and pi−i : P→℘(F). Dum-
mett claims that the verifiability of atomic and negated atomic sentences is
primitive. To capture this, let Fa be the subset of F containing only the atomic
sentences of F and their negations, and let α+ : P→℘(Fa) and α− : P→℘(Fa).
For each p ∈ P, let α+(p) be the set of atomic and negated atomic sentences
that are proximately verifiable at p, and α−(p) be the set of atomic and negated
atomic sentences that are proximately falsifiable at p. We then use the following
as our base cases:
ϕ ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈α+(p) (for atomic or negated atomic ϕ) (Base+)
ϕ ∈pi−i (p) ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈α−(p) (for atomic or negated atomic ϕ) (Base−)
Now, we detail clauses for the logical connectives. The positive clause for
conjunction is adapted from a postulate appearing in Field and van Fraassen
(1977; 1981). The positive clause for disjunction is adapted from a postulate
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from van Fraassen (1981):
ϕ ∧ ψ ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every γ ∈pi+i (p), P
(
ϕ | γ) ·P(ψ | ϕ ∧ γ)= 1 (Conj+)
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every γ ∈pi+i (p), P
(
ϕ | γ)+P(ψ | γ)−P(ϕ ∧ ψ | γ)= 1
(Disj+)
For the conditional, van Fraassen suggests that ϕ → ψ ∈ pi+i (p) just in case
P
(
ψ | ϕ∧ γ)= 1 for every γ ∈pi+i (p). By defining a relation of extension between
patches, we can say something stronger. We will say that a patch p ′ extends p,
written p ≤ p ′ or p ′ ≥ p, just in case both of the following conditions obtain: for
every ϕ ∈ pi+i (p), then ϕ ∈ pi+i (p ′); and for every ψ ∈ pi−i (p), then ψ ∈ pi−i (p ′). To
say that a conditional is proximately verifiable at p is to say that data available
at p guarantee that ψ is proximately verifiable wherever ϕ is proximately verifi-
able, but this gurantee extends only as far as the data are still accessible. To say
that data accessible at one patch is accessible in another is to say that the latter
extends the former, so we can create the positive clause for the conditional as:
ϕ→ ψ ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every p ′ ≥ p and γ ∈pi+i (p ′), P
(
ψ | ϕ ∧ γ)= 1 (Cond+)
We have already accounted for negated atomic sentences, but still require a
clause for negated compound sentences. Field claims that P
(¬ϕ | ψ)= 1−P(ϕ |
ψ
)
. This equivalence implies that a compound sentence is groundless just in
case its negation is certain, suggesting ¬ϕ ∈ pi+i (p) just in case P
(
ϕ | γ) = 0 for
any compound ϕ and any γ ∈ pi+i (p). Instead, we will use the above clause for
the conditional to adapt the traditional intuitionistic identification of ¬ϕ with
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ϕ→ ⊥ to the current definition, and thus say something stronger:
¬ϕ ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every p ′ ≥ p and γ ∈pi+i (p ′), P
(
ϕ | γ)= 0 (for compound ϕ)
(Neg+)
Given a universal quantification ∀xϕ(x) with instances {ϕ1, . . .}, let Φ be
a sequence of all the instances of ∀xϕ(x) and Φi =
〈
ϕ1, · · · ,ϕi
〉
be an initial
subsequence of Φ. We then say:
∀xϕ(x) ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every γ ∈pi+i (p), limi→|Φ|P
(∀xϕ(x) | ϕ1 ∧ ·· · ∧ ϕi ∧ γ)= 1
(Univ+)
The clause for the existential quantifier is straightforward:
∃xϕ(x) ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ for every γ ∈pi+i (p), P
(
ϕ(a) | γ)= 1 for some subject a
(Exist+)
Dummett upholds noncontradiction, so we are free to identify a proof of a
negated compound sentence as showing that the compound sentence is false.
The above clause for negation is relativized to p, so we can identify ¬ϕ’s being
proximately verifiable at p with ϕ’s being proximately falsifiable at p, assuming
ϕ is compound:
ϕ ∈pi−i (p) ⇐⇒ ¬ϕ ∈pi+i (p) (for compound ϕ) (Rec−)
Finally, we stipulate that no other sentences are in pi+i (p) or pi
−
i (p), and our
definition is complete.
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The above definition suggests the following account of logical entailment:
Γ ϕ⇐⇒ for every p ∈P, if Γ⊆pi+i (p) then ϕ ∈pi+i (p)
According to this relation, entailment extends only as far as our abilities to ver-
ify sentences of F. So, while this relation may not be the same one described by
Dummett, I claim that it is one he would endorse.
We now have a robust theory of how spatiotemporal focus comports with
the logical constants. Above, I mentioned that it may be difficult to identify the
ability a speaker is manifesting when two abilities share an underlying practical
ability. To solve this problem, we appeal to the fact that the manifestation con-
ditions for a given recognitional ability Rec+
[
ϕ
]
(or Rec−
[
ϕ
]
) are determined,
at least in part, by the spatiotemporal patches containing verifiers (or falsifiers)
for ϕ. So we associate with each recognitional ability Rec+
[
ϕ
]
(or Rec−
[
ϕ
]
) an
equivalence class of patches P , where p ∈ P just in case ϕ ∈pi+i (p) (or ϕ ∈pi−i (p)).
We can then identify a semantic ability with its underlying practical ability and
equivalence class.
4.4 ANOTHER CHALLENGE AND DIAGNOSIS
Above, I offered an amended version of Dummett’s first stage and gave rea-
sons for why it represented a more detailed version of Dummett’s account while
keeping the spirit of his argument intact. In this section, I will describe a chal-
lenge and diagnosis that center on the relationship between spatiotemporal fo-
cus and semantic abilities, and that share the same goals as the challenge and
diagnosis described by Dummett in the second and third stages of his original
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account. The additional diagnosis and Dummett’s diagnosis will complement
each other to more fully describe how we may have come to believe that truth
is bivalent. Nothing in my amended first stage contradicts Dummett’s original
first stage, so this additional challenge and diagnosis sit alongside Dummett’s.
One may object that a new diagnosis is unnecessary, because Dummett’s di-
agnosis is separate from his challenge to classical logic and so his argument can
succeed regardless of the success of the diagnosis. According to this objection,
Dummett’s diagnosis is meant only to pacify the classical logician by explaining
how he could have fallen into his error.
I believe that Dummett’s diagnosis carries greater rhetorical weight than this
objection claims. Dummett’s semantics entail that the classical logician system-
atically misunderstands his own language—an audacious conclusion, one that
may imperil his challenge. If his semantics leads to an implausible account of
how we use our language, that could be seen as evidence for his theory’s be-
ing flawed. A diagnosis softens the blow of this conclusion by explaining how
it is entirely understandable that the classical logician would have mistakenly
thought that truth was bivalent. And so a diagnosis defuses the objection that
the audacity of Dummett’s conclusion counts as evidence against his challenge.
Besides its rhetorical importance, the diagnosis is also critical to my project
because it serves as the basis for Dummett’s characterization of classical logic.
In the next chapter, I will use the below diagnosis to show how Dummett char-
acterizes classical logic as an unwarranted idealization from inferences under-
written entirely by actual and potential abilities to inferences underwritten par-
tially by unobtainable abilities. I will then come to my final conclusion, that
this general formula for characterizing classical logic—that it arises from an un-
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warranted idealization from inferences of a privileged class—is shared by other
examples of rivalry.
Bivalence obtains only if we understand all sentences of F, which requires
that we possess Rec+
[
ϕ
]
and Rec+
[¬ϕ] for any ϕ ∈ F. Possessing these recog-
nitional abilities must involve some idealization, since the ubiquity of verifiers
entails that this can be possible only if we are able to direct our attention toward
any p ∈ P. Because there are certain patches toward which we could never di-
rect our attention, there must be certain sentences that we cannot understand.
This argument is similar to the one Dummett offers for why we do not possess
the semantic abilities necessary to understand sentences concerning cases of
quantification over infinite domains, counterfactuals, and inaccessible regions
of spacetime. In that argument, he did not explain exactly how we extended
our semantic abilities through idealization. Instead, he gave examples of puta-
tive semantic abilities that we could not possess. I will follow the same pattern.
I am reluctant to say that sentences whose verifiers lie in inaccessible patches
are counterexamples to bivalence. A patch’s inaccesibility is not a feature of the
patch itself, but of that patch’s relation to a speaker. It’s difficult to describe a
patch’s being inaccessible in an absolute sense. The only way I can see to do
this is by determining which patches are inaccessible for every speaker. This,
however, requires full knowledge of the limits of idealization of semantic abili-
ties for every speaker.
In contrast, the verifiers for barely true counterfactuals seem to be located
at genuinely inaccessible patches because the verifiers seem to be located in
counterfactual reality. Now, the inaccessibility of these patches could be seen as
the result of our coordinate system, rather than the patches themselves. Our co-
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ordinate system for describing patches is limited to the actual world, so we have
no way to locate the patches containing the verifiers for counterfactuals. But
suppose we were to include a modal index in our coordinate system. Dummett
would claim that the patches in other possible worlds were inaccessible be-
cause having the ability to observe them would constitute having “direct insight
into counterfactual reality,” which we clearly do not possess, even in princi-
ple. Even if we included a modal index, but set aside Dummett’s claim, I would
still hesitate to grant that we do not possess these semantic abilities. These
counterfactual patches would be inaccessible patches as described above: un-
observable but not because of some feature of the patch itself but because of
the patch’s relation to a speaker.
The verifiers for sentences involving quantification over infinite domains
must be located in unobservable patches because those patches appear to be
infinitely long temporally or infinitely large spatially. Unlike the patches con-
taining verifiers for inaccessible regions of spacetime and counterfactuals, these
patches are unobservable due to a feature they possess intrinsically. Here we
find the limits to our semantic abilities: If ϕ is a sentence involving quantifi-
cation over an infinite domain, then any patch p such that ϕ ∈ pi+i (p) is unob-
servable. A speaker could not manifest Rec+
[
ϕ
]
because he could not fulfill the
manifestation condition of observing p, and so we are unable to ascribe un-
derstanding of ϕ to him. In other words, we do not understand ϕ. As a result,
bivalence fails.
Having described an amended version of Dummett’s first stage and an addi-
tional challenge to classical logic based on that amended first stage, I will now
propose an additional diagnosis. This diagnosis will serve the same purpose in
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my amended challenge as Dummett’s diagnosis serves in his original challenge.
If there is any justification to be had for extending our semantic abilities
beyond those we possess actually, it must be on the basis of abilities we pos-
sess actually. Suppose ∀xϕ(x) is a sentence we can verify using semantic abili-
ties we possess potentially, and that this sentence has instances ϕ(c1), . . . ,ϕ(cn).
Dummett claims that “we gain our understanding of quantification over finite,
surveyable domains by learning the procedure of conducting a complete sur-
vey, establishing the truth-value of every instance of the quantified statement”
(1976, 61), so for every p ∈P,
∀xϕ(x) ∈pi+i (p) ⇐⇒ ϕ(c1) ∧ ·· · ∧ ϕ(cn) ∈pi+i (p).
Moreover, Dummett describes the process of verification as one in which we
check the instances of ∀xϕ(x) individually, so if
ϕ(c1) ∧ ·· · ∧ ϕ(c j ) ∈pi+i (p)
and
ϕ(c1) ∧ ·· · ∧ ϕ(ck ) ∈pi+i (p ′)
where j ≤ k, then p ≤ p ′. Suppose a putative speaker attempted to verify ∀xϕ(x).
According to Dummett, he must verify this sentence’s instances. As the speaker
verifies the instances, he manifests a series of semantic abilities: Rec+
[
ϕ(c1)
]
,
Rec+
[
ϕ(c2)
]
, and so on. Simultaneously, with each instance the speaker veri-
fies, he continues to manifest another series of semantic abilities: Rec+
[
ϕ(c1)
]
,
Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ ϕ(c2)
]
, . . . , Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm)
]
. At some point, we must ide-
alize our abilities. Suppose Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm)
]
is the limit of our actual
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abilities. Knowing that we possess Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm)
]
, the idealization
seems to rest on the instance ϕ(cm+1); i.e., we need only show that we possess
Rec+
[
ϕ(cm+1)
]
in order to show that we possess Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm+1)
]
.
This, I think, is the beginning of a new diagnosis, describing how it is that
we come to believe that we can limitlessly extend our recognitional abilities
relevant to verifying sentences involving quantification over infinite domains.
Dummett claims that we believe that this idealization is not bounded by medi-
cal possibility. By couching Dummett’s diagnosis in terms of recognitional abil-
ities, we gain a greater appreciation for why we would disregard medical pos-
sibility: the process we follow in verifying ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm) involves observ-
ing some spatiotemporal patch, and it seems to be a modest extension to al-
low us to verify one more instance, such that we verify ϕ(cm+1), thus verifying
ϕ(c1)∧ . . .∧ϕ(cm+1), and manifesting the corresponding recognitional abilities.
The belief in limitless extension is reminiscent of the sorites paradox: Know-
ing that we possess Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm)
]
actually, and believing that we
thus possess Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm+1)
]
in principle, then we believe there is
no limit to what recognitional abilities we possess in principle. Moreover, the
bivalentist’s case seems to grow stronger as the number of verified instances
grows larger. For if we possess Rec+
[
ϕ(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ(cm)
]
actually, for a large
value of m, then we have already shown that we have a powerful ability to ob-
serve spatiotemporal patches, and so the extension of those abilities to verify
one more instance seems less significant than for smaller values of m.
At this point, we have only diagnosed how we might come to think that we
understand bounded quantifications over arbitrarily large domains, not quan-
tifications over infinite domains. The furthest we can idealize according to the
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above method is to imagine applying a verification procedure that required a
patch that was infinitely long temporally—this is a consequence of Dummett’s
claim that we understand quantifications over finite domains by verifying each
instance of the quantification. But we may think that this sequential verifica-
tion is just one possible way we could have idealized our abilities so as to un-
derstand quantifications over arbitrarily large domains. Rather than verifying
a quantification’s instances sequentially, we may think we could have verified
all of them simultaneously. In idealizing simultaneous verification, we idealize
our powers of observation along spatial dimensions, rather than the temporal
dimension. This second process of idealization allows for the verification of
quantifications over infinite domains, but the idealization of our actual abilities
for verifying quantifications results in recognitional abilities that allow observa-
tions of patches that are infinitely large temporally, not infinitely large spatially,
according to Dummett. So we mistakenly think we understand quantifications
over infinite domains by assuming that the two processes of idealization are
interchangeable.
All this may be the symptom of a deeper misunderstanding, that verifiers
operate in a componentialist fashion—for conjunctions, at the very least. Un-
der this view, to verify a conjunction one must observe only the patches con-
taining the conjuncts’ verifiers. For example, suppose that Grey(ND) ∈ pi+i (p)
and Bronze(ET) ∈ pi+i (p ′) under some procedural specification si . One may as-
sume that Grey(ND) ∧ Bronze(ET) ∈ pi+i (p ∪p ′), but p ∪p ′ is not a spatiotempo-
ral patch because it is not a connected set. Rather, a verifier for Grey(ND) ∧
Bronze(ET) would lie in a spatiotemporal patch q such that p, p ′ ⊆ q . To un-
derstand what q would look like, we need to remember that the purpose of
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introducing spatiotemporal patches is to locate verifiers, which formalize the
fact that we demand a putative speaker direct his attention toward a region of
spacetime in order to manifest a recognitional ability and thus partially prove
he understands a given sentence. The purpose of this whole apparatus is to
make more rigorous our expectations about how verification procedures ought
to proceed. So the shape of q is determined by some verification procedure
for Grey(EB) ∧ Bronze(ET), and will likely involve a subpatch describing travel
from the New York to Paris.16 This misunderstanding is most likely the result
of thinking that verifiers make sense outside the context of verificational pro-
cedures. The picture becomes one in which verifiers are located in spacetime
and are thus available to participate in verificational procedures. Here, I be-
lieve, is the ultimate diagnosis for why the bivalentist believes what she does.
Just as the realist posits truth conditions that obtain independently of our abil-
ity to observe whether or not they obtain, the bivalentist posits verifiers that
exist independently of our ability to observe them.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I presented a more specific way of describing the semantic abil-
ities that Dummett claims one must possess in order to understand a given
sentence. One of the advantages of this more specific version of Dummett’s
account is that it gives us a more rigorous way of understanding how our se-
mantic abilities are idealized. In the original version of Dummett’s account,
16I write “some verification procedure” here because I expect that there are multiple verifica-
tion procedures for Grey(EB) ∧ Bronze(ET). Even if were happened to be interested in privileg-
ing one verification procedure for a given sentence as canonical, there would likely be multiple
spatiotemporal patches associated with it, and thus multiple semantic maps containing the
sentence.
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idealization was described in terms of analogical extension of actual semantic
abilities. This version lacked a way of comparing two potential semantic abil-
ities and thus say that one required more idealization than the other one. In
the amended version of Dummett’s account, idealization of actual recognitional
abilities will be accompanied by an increase in the set of patches to which we
have access: as we add recognitional abilities to our stock of available abilities,
those abilities’ manifestation conditions will describe patches we add to our set
of accessible patches.
So far, our discussion has centered on bivalence. In the next chapter, we will
describe the consequences that the failure of bivalence has for classical logic.
In doing so, we will describe Dummett’s characterization of classical logic and
compare it to two other cases of rivalry.
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CHAPTER 5
THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF
RIVALRY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In previous chapters, I described two requirements for rivalry. In this chapter, I
will describe a general framework for rivalry that will show how a challenge of
rivalry fulfills these requirements. In describing this framework, I will appeal to
the challenge of rivalry advanced by Dummett to illustrate various parts of the
framework. I will then consider the challenges of Dummett, Putnam’s quantum
logic, and Tye’s three-valued logic arising from his semantics for vagueness and
show that each one is a case of rivalry that conforms to the framework of rivalry.
The most important part of this process is an illustration of how each challenge
includes an account of the meanings of the logical constants, and uses this ac-
count to animate the entire challenge.
5.2 THE FRAMEWORK OF RIVALRY
A challenge of logical rivalry begins with motivating principles that determine
initial conditions on the project of forming a theory of logical entailment. For
example, Dummett argues for a theory of meaning according to which truth is
identified with warranted assertibility; since a logic should describe how truth
comports with the logical constants, identifying truth with warranted assert-
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ibility may affect which logical laws will be acceptable. For the rival logician’s
challenge to have any force, these principles must be normative. The rival lo-
gician must support these principles so that anyone, even someone inclined to
endorse classical logic, must accept them. These principles will then determine
the rival logician’s responses to the formal and philosophical requirements of
rivalry.
In order to define a logic as a rival to classical logic, we described a restric-
tion of the putative rival logic’s entailment relation. Any entailment relation
must treat entailment schematically, in the following sense: given a valid infer-
ence, the result of replacing the nonlogical symbols of the inference with other
syntactically appropriate symbols will yield a valid inference. We formalized
this by defining D-morphisms, each of which described a way to vary the non-
logical elements of a wff while keeping the members of D—the set of logical
constants—fixed. Given a putative rival logic Lr with entailment relation r,
we defined a restricted entailment relation rc using Dc-morphisms, a spe-
cial case of D-morphisms in which the members of Dc—the classical logical
constants—are held fixed while the other elements vary. The motivation for
defining this restriction is to ensure that we are making a fair comparison be-
tween classical logic and the putative rival logic. We must see which inferences
are counted as valid by the putative rival logic when only the members of Dc
are treated as logical constants. Formally, Γrc ϕ just in case both the follow-
ing obtain, where Λc is the set of all Dc-morphisms:
(i) Γr ϕ
(ii) ∀λ∈Λc
(
λ(Γ)r λ(ϕ)
)
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A logic will be a rival to classical logic just in case there is some inference Γ
ϕ
such that Γc ϕ but Γ1rc ϕ (or vice versa).
Note that this definition hinges on comparing the logics’ treatments of the
classical logical constants, since both the classical and rival entailment rela-
tions are defined in terms of Dc-morphisms. That is, this comparison will be
appropriate only if there is a common core of logical constants used in both
the definition of c and the definition of rc. The set of classical logical con-
stants seems to serve this purpose, but in chapter 2 we discussed ways in which
one may object that there can be no such common core of logical constants—
once the entailment relations of the logics diverge, the objections claims, the
rival and classical logical constants must differ in meaning. According to this
objection, the Dc-morphisms can preserve a given symbol’s status as a logical
constant across logics, but it cannot preserve such a symbol’s meaning across
logics. So any account of rivalry must include some mechanism to explain why
the meanings of the logical constants in Dc do not differ from the meanings
of their counterparts in Dr. In all the cases I consider below, this is accom-
plished by the challenge itself, which determines a particular realm or subject
as paradigmatic for logical entailment. Within this realm, classical logic holds.
For example, Dummett’s challenge is that truth is warranted assertibility, so the
paradigmatic realm is the one in which our ability to verify sentences is certain;
i.e, where the domain of discourse is finite. Indeed, whenever the domain of
discourse is finite, classical logic holds, according to Dummett. How then does
this paradigmatic realm provide evidence that the rival constants’ and classi-
cal constants’ meanings do not differ? Recall that the rival logician’s motivating
principle is normative, implying that his rival logic is the correct theory of logi-
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cal entailment for our language. This conclusion holds for any part of our lan-
guage also, including the paradigmatic realm. At the same time, the challenge
determines the borders of the paradigmatic realm. So the challenge simulta-
neously describes a particular realm as paradigmatic, and describes the rival
logic and classical logic as both holding within that realm. To respond to the
philosophical requirement of rivalry, then, the rival logician will point to the
agreement between the rival logic and the classical logic in the paradigmatic
realm. If those logics agree in that realm, then the differences in use that the
inferentialist objector offers as evidence will not come from it, but rather from
some other realm less central to our concept of logical entailment. For exam-
ple, Dummett’s logical constants and the classical logical constants disagree in
their uses only when the domain of discourse is infinite. But this realm is not
paradigmatic just because warranted assertibility begins to break down in this
context.
So the challenge’s motivating principle itself, as normative initial conditions
for the project for forming a logic, produces responses to both the formal and
philosophical requirements of rivalry. For the former, the challenge will show
that the rival logic holds generally. For the latter, the challenge will provide an
account of the meanings of the logical constants.1 This account takes the form
of a demarcation of a paradigmatic realm where both the rival logic and clas-
sical logic hold, and provides evidence that the rival logical constants and the
1Referring to this as an account of the meanings of the logical constants, rather than a theory
of meaning for the logical constants is deliberate, although this terminology is mine and admit-
tedly arbitrary. I mean to draw a contrast between a theory of meaning for the logical constants,
which I think of as a complete description of the meanings of the logical constants, and an ac-
count of the meaning of the logical constants, which I think of as a less-complete collection of
statements about the meanings of the logical constants. The rival logician would need to pro-
vide a theory of meaning for the logical constants if he had to show that the meanings of his
constants were the same as the classical constants. Since the requirement is weaker, needing
only to show that they do not differ, an account will suffice.
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classical logical constants do not differ in their meanings.
Above, we discussed the challenge’s response to the formal requirement be-
fore we discussed the challenge’s response to the philosophical requirement.
This ordering made sense for expository purposes: any satisfactory response by
the rival logician to the formal requirement of rivalry will involve a demonstra-
tion that his logic is a rival logic. This demonstration requires reference to a
set of logical constants shared by the rival and classical logicians. The philo-
sophical requirement was then introduced as a demand for the rival logician
to show that the meanings these constants possess in the context of the rival
logic do not differ from the meanings these constants possess in the context of
classical logic. But it should now be clear that the challenge’s response to the
philosophical requirement is conceptually prior to its response to the formal
requirement—the rival logician must have in hand an account of the meanings
of the logical constants before his logic can fulfill the definition of a rival logic.
I showed above how a challenge’s response to the philosophical requirement is
a demarcation of a paradigmatic realm. This demarcation is the essence of a
challenge of rivalry, and shows us how to understand a case of logical rivalry as
a challenge to classical logic: it claims that classical logic does not hold in the
general case, but only in the limited case of the paradigmatic realm.
The final element of a challenge of rivalry is its diagnosis of how one could
have come to believe that classical logic held in the general case. In my discus-
sion of Dummett, I tried to make clear the importance of his diagnosis. It was
more than an attempt to placate the classical logician, I claimed, and served as
a response to a potential objection: that Dummett’s challenge must be flawed if
it had as a consequence that we were wrong about something so fundamental
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as logic.2 I believe that the framework just described—especially the demarca-
tion of the paradigmatic realm—accounts for diagnoses made by Dummett and
other rival logicians.
A rival logician’s diagnosis is an explanation of how we could have come to
believe that classical logic held in the general case. Recall that a challenge’s mo-
tivating principles is normative—even the classical logician must accept them.
These principles are the basis for the demarcation of the appropriate paradig-
matic realm, so the classical logician must also be aware that classical logic
holds in the paradigmatic realm, and must be aware that the normative prin-
ciples grant the paradigmatic realm a special status. If the classical logician
believes that classical logic holds beyond this paradigmatic realm, it must be
because she believes that the principles under which logical entailment oper-
ates in the paradigmatic realm can be generalized to the general case some-
how. That is, the classical logician overestimates the power of the paradigmatic
status granted by the rival logician’s principles. For example, Dummett claims
that truth is warranted assertibility and so the paradigmatic realm comprises
cases where the domain of discourse is finite. This realm involves sentences
we understand based on abilities we possess actually or potentially. The claim
that classical logic holds outside of this realm, according to Dummett’s diag-
nosis, results from our assuming that we possess in some sense analogues of
these abilities that will allow us to understand sentences involving quantifica-
tions over infinite domains.
When I discussed Dummett, I broke up his account into three stages: the
discussion of his theory of meaning, which constituted his motivating princi-
2Dummett assumes, as most rival logicians do, that we believe that classical logic holds in
the general case. I am not entirely convinced of this, but I will adopt this assumption for the
sake of explaining the framework surrounding challenges of rivalry.
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ples for the project of logic; his challenge to classical logic, which included re-
sponses to the formal and philosophical requirements of rivalry; and his diag-
nosis. It should be clear from the above discussion that any challenge of rivalry
will have these elements. The advantage of the current framework is to unify all
of these elements. Although it may not have been apparent in the discussion of
Dummett occupying the previous two chapters, the stages of his argument are
not discrete units. According to the above framework, Dummett’s challenge—
as well as any other instance of rivalry—will consist in normative initial prin-
ciples for the project of logic according to which we demarcate a paradigmatic
realm. Note that the framework does not simply codify the elements of a chal-
lenge of rivalry as exemplified by Dummett, but shows how the demarcation
of the paradigmatic realm animates the challenge’s response to the formal re-
quirement of rivalry, its response to the philosophical requirement of rivalry,
and its diagnosis.
We can now describe two different categories of motivating principles the ri-
val logician may employ to demarcate the paradigmatic realm, and distinguish
between two types of logical rivalry based on these two categories of princi-
ples. Recall that one function of the paradigmatic realm is to provide an ac-
count of meaning for the logical constants. As we consider more examples of
rivalry below, it will become clear that a given instance of rivalry will involve an
account of meaning for the logical constants that emphasizes either sense or
reference. A challenge of rivalry that focuses on sense will be called internal-
ist; one that focuses on reference, externalist. Dummett, for example, presents
an internalist challenge. His project begins by asking what conception of truth
can be employed in a theory of meaning. If we understand what it means to
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know the truth conditions of a sentence, he claims, we will understand what
it means to know the meaning of a sentence. In previous chapters, I have dis-
cussed in detail Dummett’s view on what it means to know the truth conditions
of a sentence; in short, a speaker knows the truth conditions of a sentence just
in case she possesses the ability to use that sentence correctly. A full account
of the correct use of sentences is given by Dummett’s full theory of meaning—
including the theory of force, which was not discussed above—and claims that
the paradigmatic use of a sentence is as a report of a direct observation. Hence,
the familiar distillation of Dummett’s theory: a sentence’s truth conditions are
its conditions of warranted assertibility. Combined with his motivating prin-
ciple, he will conclude that knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing its
conditions of warranted assertibility. When comparing the rival and classical
constants, then, we judge them as “assertibility functions.”
Having described the general framework for challenges of rivalry, I will now
show how several examples of rivalry fit into it. I have discussed Dummett at
length in earlier chapters to elucidate the structure of his challenge but will still
offer brief comments on Dummett in order to make clear the way in which his
challenge fits the framework. I will then discuss Putnam’s challenge based on
quantum mechanics and Tye’s challenge based on vagueness. I will not examine
these cases with the same level of detail found in my treatment of Dummett,
since the overall framework of rivalry has been described above. Instead, I will
show how these challenges also conform to the framework.
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5.3 DUMMETT
Dummett’s motivating principle is that truth should be identified with warranted
assertibility, which I have described in previous chapters. The task now is to
show how this principle can motivate a response to the formal and philosophi-
cal requirements for rivalry in the context of the framework described above.
On its own, the identification of truth with warranted assertibility is not
enough to produce a rival logic because it does not involve the logical con-
stants. Dummett assumes that we are comfortable with the idea that the truth
value of a sentence is a function of the truth values of its components. But even
if we accept that a sentence is true just in case it is warrantedly assertible, we
cannot be guaranteed that the warranted assertibility of a sentence is a function
of the warranted assertibility of its components. We can make some progress in
this direction by noting that Dummett endorses componentialism. But this still
does not get us where we need to be. Under classical logic, we might accept the
following clause as a description of how truth comports with disjunction:
“ϕ ∨ ψ” is true ⇐⇒ “ϕ” is true or “ψ” is true
The same goes for the other disquotational clauses for the logical constants.
Identifying truth with warranted assertibility (abbreviated “w.a.” here) does not
allow us to say
“ϕ ∨ ψ” is w.a. ⇐⇒ “ϕ” is w.a. or “ψ” is w.a.
and make similar substitutions in the other disquotational clauses, even af-
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ter we make the claim that componentialism applies to warranted assertibility.
Mere componentialism is not enough to guarantee that warranted assertibility
comports with the logical constants in the same way truth is described to be-
have in the clauses. It may be, for example, that
“ϕ ∨ ψ” is w.a. ⇐⇒ it is not the case that “¬ϕ” is w.a. and “¬ψ” is w.a.
which Dummett must avoid. This clause is inspired by Gödel’s negative trans-
lation discussed in an earlier chapter. If warranted assertibility comports with
the logical constants according to it, classical logic will result. Dummett does
not address this issue, but we can gesture toward a way to resolving it. After
accepting that componentialism holds for warranted assertibility, we ought to
specify that the ordinary disquotational clauses with w.a. swapped for true de-
scribe its behavior. This specification is appropriate for two reasons. First, it is
the most natural and familiar way of specifying how truth—whether it be war-
ranted assertibility or not—comports with the logical constants. Familiarity is
rarely a means of support for a premise, but in this case it is appropriate be-
cause we want our theory of logical entailment to hew to our ordinary concepts
as closely as possible. Second, the intuitionist and classical logician can agree
on these clauses, albeit with different interpretations. Dummett means to show
that both logics hold in the paradigmatic realm, so utilizing clauses on which
both logicians agree seems fitting.
With this more specific brand of componentialism in place, Dummett’s chal-
lenge fits in the framework described above. Given Dummett’s argument about
the limits of our semantic abilities, and the fact that his motivating principle
dictates that a logic must describe how warranted assertibility comports with
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the logical constants, we know classical logic will not hold in the general case.
As mentioned above, the paradigmatic realm will comprise those cases where
the domain of discourse is finite, since it is in these cases that there is no ques-
tioning our ability to verify the sentences in that realm. Classical logic and
Dummett’s rival logic will both hold in this paradigmatic realm, thanks in part
to the decision to use the ordinary disquotational clauses for the logical con-
stants. The logics’ coinciding in the paradigmatic realm forms a foundation for
a claim that the meanings of the logical constants do not differ, despite the fail-
ure of classical logic in the general case. Classical logic’s holding in the paradig-
matic realm also serves as the basis for Dummett’s diagnosis: the classical logi-
cian makes an unwarranted extension from this limited case to the general case,
attributing to himself semantic abilities he cannot possess. Dummett calls this
a diagnosis, and yet it seems to be only part of full diagnosis. The paradigmatic
realm’s status is not enough to explain the extension. To extend the medical
analogy, this extension is the pathogenesis of classical logic, and we should also
describe its etiology. The origin of this extension is the classical logician’s be-
ing so taken by her power to verify in the paradigmatic realm that she assumes
her power to verify extends beyond that realm. This kind of idealization seems
common, especially considering that all semantic abilities are practical abili-
ties, according to Dummett. We are so accustomed to extending our abilities
through various processes and means—exercise and technology, for example—
that we can easily imagine a being possessing the abilities lying at the logical
extreme of this extension.
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5.4 PUTNAM’S QUANTUM LOGIC
In contrast to Dummett, Putnam presents an externalist challenge to classical
logic. His externalist views are clearer in some of his other writings—that wa-
ter on Earth and Twin-Earth are not synonymous despite the similarity of their
senses, for example. In the current context, the externalist character of his chal-
lenge can be seen in the motivating principles he proposes for the project of
logic: that a theory of logical entailment must conform to the world.3 Classical
logic is flawed, then, because it fails to respect empirical results from the study
of quantum mechanics.
The impact of quantum mechanics on logic is analogous to the impact of
relativity on geometry, according to Putnam. Before the advent of relativity, Eu-
clidean geometry had the character of necessary truth. More specifically, the
parallel postulate enjoyed this status. If we agree that lines are defined as the
shortest distance between two points—and so are geodesics—then the parallel
postulate will hold just so long as space is not curved. Space’s having curvature
at all—zero or otherwise—was unknown prior to relativity, which explains why
the parallel postulate had the character of necessary truth. Relativity showed
us not only that space can be curved, but also that space is curved by massive
objects. Where space is curved, the distance between geodesics will vary, so
the distance between two parallel lines can vary, which contradicts the paral-
lel postulate and thus shows that it is not a necessary truth after all.4 We may
3It must be noted that Putnam has since rejected the view I will describe. For the sake of
simplicity, I will still refer to the view as his. I will be discussing the features of this particular
challenge to classical logic, which is independent of its author.
4To be precise, Putnam covers just this one version of the parallel postulate. Other versions
of the parallel postulate will be unscathed by the results of relativity; e.g., that parallel lines
never meet.
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have thought otherwise, according to Putnam, because the average curvature
of space is nearly zero in the context of our ordinary empirical observations.
But this nearly-zero curvature of space is still a consequence of relativity, so
we have a convergence of the Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries in the
context of our ordinary empirical observations. This case of “rivalry” in geom-
etry has the same structure as a case of logical rivalry described by the above
framework. Non-Euclidean geometry holds in the general case and Euclidean
geometry fails in the general case. Non-Euclidean and Euclidean geometry both
hold for our ordinary empirical observations, which is deserving the label of
“paradigmatic realm” because Putnam’s principle for choosing a geometry is
that it best matches the world, and this limited case is the one in which we
have the firmest grasp on the external world.
Note that we have chosen in this example to have our ordinary concept
of straight lines correspond to geodesics; i.e., the shortest paths between two
points. When relativity proves that space has nonzero curvature, Putnam claims
that we ought to ensure that the properties we attribute to lines fits these re-
sults. This principle, that geometry ought to conform to empirical results, leads
to our rejection of the parallel postulate because geometry best fits the world
if we do so. The same principle ought to guide our construction of a logic, ac-
cording to Dummett, and empirical results from quantum mechanics require
that we reject the law of distribution in order to have our logic best fit the world.
In quantum mechanics, physical systems are represented as Hilbert spaces
where each normalized vector of this space represents a possible state of the
system. For a Hilbert space H , let S(H) be the set of all subspaces of H . We
can arrange S(H) into a lattice ordered by inclusion, with the zero-dimensional
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origin as its minimum and H as its maximum. Call this lattice L(H). According
to the above framework, a challenge of rivalry begins with motivating princi-
ples meant to guide the project of logic. Putnam’s motivating principle is that
the correct theory of logical entailment ought to best fit the world. In the cur-
rent context, that means our logic must conform to L(H), where we interpret
the subspaces of H as propositions about states of the system. At this point, we
have a lattice of subspaces interpreted as propositions and relations between
them. What we need is a lattice of propositions ordered by logical entailment.5
Putnam’s charge that logical entailment best fit L(H) is a charge that our lat-
tice of propositions be isomorphic to L(H). It is in this sense that we will “read
off” a logic from this lattice: we will interpret relations between the subspaces
of L(H) as logical constants. We will now define a mapping m from the set
of propositions to members of L(H) to accomplish these interpretations. First,
note two special propositions: let > denote a tautology and ⊥ denote a con-
tradiction. Then m(>) is the maximum of L(H) and m(⊥) its minimum, and
for any atomic ϕ, m(ϕ) will be a one-dimensional subspace in L(H). We must
also define the span of two subspaces: given a space H and any number of its
subspaces h1, . . ., spanH (h1, . . .) will be the smallest subspace h
′ of H such that
h1, . . . ⊆ h′. We complete the definition by accounting for several logical con-
5The logical entailment described here is restricted, in a sense, because it is defined only with
respect to H . Logical entailment can be defined more properly across Hilbert spaces. However,
this weaker version of entailment more closely matches the argument Putnam presents, and
the consequences of his challenge will be felt nonetheless.
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stants:
m(ϕ ∨ ψ)= spanH (m(ϕ),m(ψ)) (5.1)
m(ϕ ∧ ψ)=m(ϕ)∩m(ψ) (5.2)
m(¬ϕ)= the orthocomplement of m(ϕ) (5.3)
Call the resulting lattice of propositions m(L(H)). Putnam claims that a the-
ory of logical entailment that respects the results of quantum mechanics can
be “read off” m(L(H)), interpreting the universal and existential quantifiers in
terms of conjunction and disjunction, respectively.6 The resulting logic will be a
rival to classical logic because it will lack distributivity. For example, according
to quantum mechanics we cannot simultaneously assert that a given particle
has a specific momentum and a specific position at an instant. Let ϕ be the
proposition that a given particle has a particular momentum, and let ψ1,ψ2, . . .
be propositions attributing a position to the particle, where ψi 6=ψ j if i 6= j , and
where ψ1,ψ2, . . . together describe every possible position the particle can have.
The proposition that the particle has a certain momentum described in ϕ and
some unspecified position is
ϕ ∧ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∨ ·· · )
Because the ψi ’s account for every possible position of the particle, m(ψ1 ∨
ψ2 ∨ ·· · )= H . Note also that, for any h ∈ S(H), h∩H = h. Therefore, according
6Putnam notes that this method is not original (see 1979, 179).
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to the above definition of the mapping m,
m(ϕ ∧ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∨ ·· · ))=m(ϕ)
Contrast this with the proposition
(ϕ ∧ ψ1) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ2) ∨ ·· ·
asserting that some unspecified state obtains in which the particle has a mo-
mentum described by ϕ and a position specific to that state. We cannot know
a particle’s position and momentum at a given instant; i.e., m(ϕ ∧ ψi ) = ⊥ for
any particular ψi . Therefore,
m((ϕ ∧ ψ1) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ2) ∨ ·· · )=⊥
This shows that ϕ∧ (ψ1∨ψ2∨ ·· · ) does not logically entail (ϕ∧ψ1)∨ (ϕ∧ψ2)∨
·· · , contrary to classical logic.
Putnam’s motivating principle is that the correct theory of logical entailment
ought to best fit the world. As predicted by the framework for rivalry, and as
foreshadowed by our discussion of geometry, the paradigmatic realm will be the
one in which we have the firmest grasp on the external world; i.e., whenever the
domain of discourse contains only macroscopic objects. We define the paradig-
matic realm this way because it comprises most of our ordinary experience with
the world. Quantum mechanics predicts that the phenomena described above
that lead to the failure of distributivity only occur at the microscopic scale, so
quantum logic and classical logic will both hold in the paradigmatic realm. In
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the above description of the framework for rivalry, I showed how the demarca-
tion of a paradigmatic realm can be used to respond to the philosophical re-
quirement of rivalry, and how the demarcation motivates a challenge’s diagno-
sis. I will now describe how Putnam’s demarcation accomplishes both of these.
The philosophical requirement for rivalry, essentially, is a requirement to
show that the change in the use of the classical logical constants does not imply
a change in their meanings.7 Putnam does claim that “we simply do not pos-
sess a notion of ‘change of meaning’ refined enough” to address the question
of whether the meanings of the logical constants change from classical logic to
quantum logic, and that “even if we were to develop one, that would be of in-
terest only to philosophy of linguistics and not the philosophy of logic [empha-
sis in the original]” (1979, 190). This claim could be seen as a rejection of the
philosophical requirement itself. In the process of arriving at this conclusion,
however, Putnam does offer a more straightforward response to the philosoph-
ical requirement. Putnam notes that certain “basic properties” of disjunction
7Recall that this is distinct from the strict inferentialist objection to rivalry I addressed in
chapter 2. Putnam does offer his own defense of quantum logic against Carnap’s version of the
strict inferentialist objection, but here I am concerned with the part of Putnam’s position that
constitutes a response to the philosophical requirement.
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and conjunction hold in both classical logic and quantum logic:
p  p ∨ q
q  p ∨ q
if p  r and q  r then p ∨ q  r
p, q  p ∧ q
p ∧ q  p
p ∧ q  q
while adopting quantum logic involves “merely changing our minds” about dis-
tribution: “Only if it can be made out that [the law of distribution] is ‘part of
the meaning’ of ‘or’ and/or ‘and’ (which? and how does one decide?) can it
be maintained that quantum mechanics involves a ‘change in the meaning’ of
one or both of these connectives” (1979, 190). Even as he rejects the idea that
we have a robust enough account of the meanings of logical constants, and
therefore cannot judge if there has been a change in meaning, he also sketches
an account of meaning for the logical constants according to which the mean-
ings have not changed because only certain parts of a constant’s use contribute
to its meaning; viz., the “basic properties” upon which classical and quantum
logic agree, and which hold in the paradigmatic realm.
As with Dummett, a description of Putnam’s diagnosis is straightforward
when we have in hand his demarcation of the paradigmatic realm: the clas-
sical logician must accept Putnam’s motivating principle about logic fitting the
world, so a belief that classical logic holds in the general case must come from
an extension to the general case of the classical logic holding in the limited case
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of the paradigmatic realm. If the classical logician were to claim that this exten-
sion held—even in the face of Putnam’s motivating principle—it must be be-
cause he mistakenly thought that the paradigmatic realm was privileged, in that
it could serve as the base for this extension. The classical logician’s error, Put-
nam may say, lies in his being enthralled by the view of the world with which he
is most familiar, thinking that the logical laws holding there held in the general
case.
5.5 TYE’S SEMANTICS OF VAGUENESS
According to Tye, a theory of vagueness ought to embrace vagueness by accept-
ing that certain sentences are indefinite, and specify how our semantics ought
to account for this. The motivating principle for his challenge is that our logical
constants ought to allow for indefinite truth values. This kind of semantics and
resulting logic will be appropriate just because “it concedes that the world is, in
certain respects, intrinsically, robustly vague; and it avoids, at all levels, a com-
mitment to sharp dividing lines” (1999, 293). Because Tye views vagueness as
the result of a feature of the world, and demands that a theory of logical entail-
ment conform to it, his challenge will be externalist in the same way Putnam’s
challenge was externalist.8
The centerpiece of Tye’s account is his claim that the extensions of vague
predicates are vague sets. According to Tye, a set is vague just in case it ful-
8Tye will claim that the extensions of vague predicates are vague sets, and insists that these
sets are examples of ontic vagueness. For that reason, we categorize challenge as externalist.
However, it seems that other types of theories of vagueness could use this kind of semantic
also, with a different explanation for why the sets are vague. That said, any such alternative
theory of vagueness would need to be one that was willing to abandon classical logic in order
to take full advantage of his semantics.
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fills two criteria. First, the set must have borderline members, objects for which
“there is no determinate, objective fact of the matter about whether they are
in the set or outside of it” (1999, 283). Tye claims that this criterion is sup-
ported by our ordinary conception of the extensions of vague predicates. Sec-
ond, a set is vague only if “there is no determinate fact of the matter about
whether there are objects that are neither members, borderline members, nor
non-members” (1999, 284). Suppose otherwise, Tye argues: If we assume that
there are no such objects, then there are sharp borders between the members
and borderline cases, and between the borderline cases and the non-members,
which contradicts our ordinary notions about the extensions of vague predi-
cates. If we assume that there are such objects, we have introduced “gratuitous
metaphysical complications” because this type of object is not required to ac-
count for our pretheoretic ideas about vague predicates (1999, 283). Moreover,
it sets a precedent according to which we might continue to ask a “potentially
endless” series of questions about the existence of further categories of objects,
he claims (1999, 283).
After defining the extensions of vague predicates as vague sets, Tye is then
equipped to establish conditions for three truth values: Given a sentence P (a)
where a′ is the object named by a, P+ is the extension of P , and P− is the
antiextension of P , P (a) is true (denoted T) iff a′ ∈ P+; P (a) is false (denoted F)
iff a′ ∈ P−; and P (a) is indefinite (denoted I) iff there is no determinate fact of
the matter about whether a′ ∈ P+ or a′ ∈ P−. Tye then defines his three-valued
logical constants as follows:
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ϕ ψ ¬ϕ ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ→ ψ ϕ↔ ψ
T T F T T T T
T I F I T I I
T F F F T F F
I T I I T T I
I I I I I I I
I F I F I I I
F T T F T T F
F I T F I T I
F F T F F T T
Under Tye’s three-valued logic, classical tautologies will not be logically true.
For example, ϕ∨ ¬ϕ has the value I when ϕ has the value I. In addition, classi-
cal contradictions will not be logically false. For example, ϕ∧ ¬ϕ has the value
I when ϕ has the value I. Tye seeks to minimize this disagreement with classical
logic, noting that classical tautologies are never false under any interpretation
in his system, labeling them quasi-tautologies in his system; and classical con-
tradictions are never true under any interpretation in his system, labeling them
quasi-contradictions in his system.
Despite his efforts at minimization, I think Tye’s disagreement with classi-
cal logic is clear. However, one more example will bring the disagreement into
sharper focus. Consider the inference:
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
ψ→ ψ
which is valid under classical logic. Tye claims that one sentence is logically en-
tailed by another sentence “so long as it cannot be true that the first is anything
other than true when the latter is true” (1999, 283). Under the truth assign-
ment where ϕ has the value T or F and ψ has the value I, the premise will have
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the value T and the conclusion I. Thus, by Tye’s own definition, this inference
will not be a case of logical entailment because the premise can be true and
the conclusion something other than true. This inference will serve as evidence
that classical logic cannot hold in the general case.9
Tye’s motivating principle is that we must respect the vagueness in the world
by accounting for I in a theory of logical entailment. As surprising as it may
seem, Tye’s principle grants paradigmatic status to the realm in which all exten-
sions are precise sets. Recall that vague sets are defined with respect to precise
sets. They must have borderline members—objects for which there is no fact
of the matter about whether they are in the set or outside of it. This definition
refers to two precise sets: objects that are definitely members and objects that
are definitely non-members of the set. Also, in order for a set to be vague, there
must be no fact of the matter about whether there are objects that are neither
members, borderline members, nor non-members. Again, this condition makes
reference to the sets of definite members and definite non-members. A similar
situation arises in Tye’s definition of the truth value I. According to his defi-
nition, a sentence is valued I just in case there is no fact of the matter about
whether the sentence is true or false. We must conclude that the definite truth
values T and F are conceptually prior the indefinite truth value I.
Within this paradigmatic realm, Tye’s rival logic and classical logic will both
hold. Even more important to the formulation of a response to the philosoph-
ical requirement is the fact that Tye’s three-valued logical constants and their
9To be fair, I think Tye made an error in defining logical entailment this way without also
introducing a notion of “quasi-entailment,” that one sentence quasi-entails another just in case
the latter cannot be false if the former is true. Nevertheless, the disagreement with classical
logic is apparent. I have chosen to discuss an inference, rather than relying only on the cases
of (quasi-)tautologies and (quasi-)contradictions to make the discussion mesh with my other
examples of rivalry.
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classical counterparts disagree in a weak sense outside of the paradigmatic realm.
Where I is admitted as a truth value, the classical constants will be undefined,
rather than yielding outputs different from their three-valued counterparts. Tye
can therefore respond to the philosophical requirement by claiming that, given
two logical constants and a truth-assignment to an ordered set of component
sentences upon which they both operate to form a compound sentence, those
constants will differ in meaning just in case they output different truth values.
For example, consider the following three versions of the conditional:
ϕ ψ ϕ→c ψ ϕ→v ψ ϕ→ł ψ
T T T T T
T I I I
T F F F F
I T T T
I I I T
I F I I
F T T T T
F I T T
F F T T T
where →c is ordinary two-valued conditional, →v is the three-valued condi-
tional introduced by Tye, and →ł is the three-valued conditional introduced by
Łukasiewicz (see Łukasiewicz 1920). It is clear that →v and →ł disagree when
ϕ and ψ both take the value I: ϕ →v ψ takes the value I and ϕ →ł ψ takes the
value T. One would then have solid grounds for claiming that →v and →ł dif-
fered in meaning, since they produce different outputs given the same inputs.
In contrast, ϕ →c ψ is undefined when ϕ and ψ both take the value I. Here it
is more difficult to argue that →c and →v differ in meaning because they value
ϕ → ψ differently. Instead of assigning ϕ → ψ a value different from the one
assigned by →v , as →ł does, →c does not assign any value to ϕ→ ψ. Using the
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same kind of reasoning Tye employs when claiming that we ought to be satis-
fied with the status of classical tautologies as quasi-tautologies because they are
never false—even if they are not always true—I think Tye would claim that there
is no change in meaning between →c and →v because their (defined) outputs
never differ for the same inputs.10
As with the other examples of rivalry, Tye’s diagnosis will center on his paradig-
matic realm. Tye’s motivating principle is normative, so even the classical logi-
cian must accept that vague sets can be extensions of vague predicates. In order
for the classical logician to make the claim that classical logic holds in the gen-
eral case, it must be the result of an extension from the paradigmatic realm.
The mistake the classical logician makes, Tye would say, lies in being ensnared
by the fact that T and F are the only legitimate truth values in the paradigmatic
realm, and concluding that T and F are the only legitimate truth values for the
whole of our language. This is likely the result of the fact that ordinary language
can be precisified to some extent, even if we make a simple, arbitrary precisifi-
cation by considering the definite members of a vague predicate’s extension to
be its “approximate extension” and all other objects its “approximate antiexten-
sion.”
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The examples of rivalry due to Dummett, Putnam, and Tye show that the most
important part of a challenge to classical logic is the account of meaning for
10I use →ł in the above example as a contrast to the classical conditional. Tye is likely to reject
it because it is not conservative with respect to truth values, unlike his connectives. Specifically,
if ϕ and ψ were to be valued I and then gain definite truth values T and F, respectively, then
ϕ→ł ψ will go from T to F.
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the logical connectives. By categorizing these as internalist or externalist, we
were able to see how the impact of such an account is felt in other areas of
the challenge. This result could be surprising; ordinarily, we might think of the
philosophical requirement as something to which a rival logician must react
after making his challenge proper. However, the above discussion shows that
advancing an account of meaning for the logical constants can be a challenge
to classical logic itself, if that account of meaning has implications that restrict
classical logic to a subset of our inferences.
It is also striking to see how all the examples involve the same characteri-
zation of classical logic as an unwarranted generalization from a subset of our
inferences. Indeed, the philosophical requirement imposes a structure on cases
of rivalry according to which all rival logics will characterize classical logic in
this way. In a sense, this characterization of classical logic is merely an artifact
of the structure of a challenge of rivalry. Nevertheless, having this characteri-
zation spelled out seems to present a vulnerability for the very concept of ri-
valry that the classical logician may be able to exploit in a defense of classical
logic. The three examples of rivalry considered here differ in their motivation,
the form of the accompanying rival logic, and their response to the philosoph-
ical requirement. Despite this, they each attempted to mount a challenge of
rivalry—the strongest type of challenge to classical logic, I claimed—which ne-
cessitated a framework according to which classical logic is characterized in a
specific way. This result suggests that classical logic can be challenged on a fun-
damental level only if the challenge is made against a backdrop of that specific
characterization. If the advocate of classical logic can show that this character-
ization is essentially flawed, despite the apparent normativity of the rival logi-
141
cians’ motivating principles, he will have shown that classical logic cannot be
challenged on this fundamental level.
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